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Treface
The subject cf this thesis was chosen
because it is a field in which I am very much interested,
and have been for several years. ?rcm the time when I
first began to read, I was encouraged to read newspapers*
Later in school history and geography were ray favorite
studies.
When the disturbances broke cut in the
Balkan States about 1912, I remember that I could net see
why neighboring states should go to war, why they could
not find more happiness and greater prosperity in peace
and cooperation rather than in spending hard earned
money and causing suffering in warfare ever questions
that might have been settled by arbitration. Then came
the Great War and it all seemed so unnecessary. V/hy need
so many millions cf people suffer because of the selfish-
ness cf a comparative few who had power, but were net far-
sighted enough to see how much better off nations wculd be
if the money put into the business of killing and de-
struction were used for education, commerce, or in any
way that wculd tend to m ke all the people happiert
For this reason I chose the ten text-
bocks named in the next paragraph, to study for this
1

2thesis. I wished to see what was being taught to the youth
of our colleges, for it is in these colleges that ideas
are put into the mind which cling throughout life and our
ideals are the result of our training. The schools of Ger-
many, prior to 1914, instilled German "Kultur" into their
students and the world was racked by the results. It is
the school which spreads the propaganda which has the most
lasting effect. The old proverb, "train up a child the way
he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it"
is only too true; it is the only impression which tends
to last.
These texts were chosen because of pop-
ular use in a large number of colleges throughout the
country; because of the diverse nationalities, schools
of thought, and principles represented; and because of
the range of dates from 1892 to 1924 inclusive. They
are: Princ iple s of Ethi cs by Borden Parker Bowne, pub-
lished in 1392. Professor Bowne ' s book builds up rational,
fair, ethical principles of what each man's duty ou^ht to
be in ralation to every other man. A System of Ethics
by Friederich Paulsen, published in 1899. Paulsen is a
German. His book came out fifteen years before Kaiser
Wilhelm II plunged his country in the World War, but there
seems to be a note of warning running throughout the book.
Germany is upheld in her ambitions for education, and for

3a place of importance among the great world powers; but
she is continually warned against an over-aggressiveness
which takes no cognizance of other states, and is even
cautiously upbraided in her campaign for a high place
without due consideration to a friendly and just means
of attaining her goal. Although more inclined to go
into sometimes netty details than the other writers,
with the possible exceptions of Dewey and Tufts, and
Drake, Paulsen's work is very valuable, and as a text-
book may be highly recommended for either undergraduate
or graduate work. Ethics by John Dewey and James H.
Tufts, published in 1908. . This book teaches the value
of the politically organized state. The authors hold
practically the same view of the state as do Bowne and
Paulsen, except as they stress the social relations of
individuals, far more than the first two authors named.
Each book is characterized by some one plan or principle
or idea. That of this book is the social morality of the
individual in all of life. Problems of Conduct by Durant
Drake, published in 1914. His aim throughout this book
is personal morality which necessarily presupposes co-
operation and generous relations with all others with
whom one comes in contact. His book is valuable as a
textbook particularly for undergraduate work. It is
simply and clearly expressed, interesting, and. at the

4same time side-steps no important issues. I have always
felt as I have read Problems of Conduct that somehow Drake
was anxious for young people to think through the major
problems and so had written this book, easily read, and
full of good advice, to help the young student. Social
and International Ideals by Bernard Bosanquet, published
in 1917. It is to be prized as a modern book with a
far-seeing outlook on life as a whole. It goes to the
very bottom of every matter with which it deals and ably
brings out new ideas which at times are almost revolutionary
in character. Moral Values by Walter Goodnow Everett, pub-
lished in 1913. There is no section in this book which
is devoted to any definite consideration of international
problems, as such. On the contrary, the whole book is
devoted to values applicable to all mankind - a standard
of ideals which are good and which hold true for all of
life. The general statements which he makes concerning
the main questions of this thesis may be taken as what he
would state if discussing the question specifically although
he would undoubtedly add much more information. On the whole
I eonsider Everett's views to be, with Bowne's, the sanest,
clearest, and deepest of any of our authors. An Introduction
to Social Ethics by John H. Mecklin, published in 1921.
The book is centered in a delineation of what he calls the
"Great Society", which is a true democracy - Utopian today

5to be sure but neither impossible nor improbable. In this
"Great Society", the individualism of the "average man"
(but perfectly harmonious to the larger group) will reign
supreme, for in a true democracy the average man is the
ruler. Ethics by Prince Alekseyevitch Kropotkin, published
in 1924. The basic idea of this book is very like that of
another of his books: Hut ual Aid as a Factor of Evolut ion
,
namely, the origin and progress of human relations in
society. He is not interested in speculation and theory,
but in the everyday ethical practices of human conduct
from earliest times until today. Kropotkin, the Russian
writer, unlike our other nine authors, was a humanitarian
scientist, revolutionist, anarchist, philosooher, and
sociologist. The Ethic s is an unfinished volume since
death came before he could complete his work. Ethics and
Some Modern World Problems by William McDougall, published
in 1924. With this author it is not a question of whether
there shall be a "Great Society," but rather his whole book
is a practical exoosition of two systems of ethics, namely:
The universal system, and the national system. He is con-
cerned with finding a practical synthesis of the two which
shall be a workable program to solve the problems of society.
Ethics , In Theory and Application by Horatio W. Dresser, pub-
lished in 1924. This author is a practical idealist who
plunges into the definite moral problems which confront and
which baffle society in the present day. In addition, I have con-

suited ether texts as reference becks in the writing of
this thesis.
The. wcrk v/ill he t .ken up in five chapters
and a summary: Chapter One, "The Economic Basis of Inter-
national ethics" dealing with governments, their form and
function in relation cne to the cthe>r; Ch .pter Two, "Justice
an Essential Fictcr in the Consideration of International
ethics" a discussion of the twc-fcld implications of justice
as passive, that is right living and dealing cn the part cf
the nation cr st te, nd votive, or the gressive resistance
against wrcng on the part cf ethers; Chapter Three, "The
Meaning cf Patriotism in Internati onal Relations * treating
cf Bian's feelings toward his n..tive ccuntry and the affect
upon .liens; Chapter Pour, "War as a .nemedy for Inter-
national Grievances" takes up the Xiistcrical uses cf was,
its advantages and disadvantages and seeks tc find thettrue
place for war in the present ..nd future needs cf the world;
Chapter Five, mA Program of International Peace as the
Solution cf the Problem" relates the prcgreoas suggested cr
implied by the various authors, compares them, and suggests
a final program compounded from them 11.
Sincere thanks and appreciation fcr help
in the preparation cf this thesis are due tc Dr. lag r
Sheffield Brig htm n cf Boston University.
Llay5, 1930 Edith Nicholson Dclliver.

fSM J2.C0K0MIC B-.SIS OF INTLRNaTICILuL ^THICS

7INTRODUCTION . *n tne dealings of man with man we
consider mainly the personal elements. We know an in-
dividual as a friend, come in contact with him often,
know his interests, sympathize with him as a fellow being
and treat him accordingly. Our dealings with him may be
from a social point of view, and we consider him as an
equal and associate; or from a purely economic considera-
tion, and here we deal with him in business interests
where each man stands alone and each, to be Just, must
consider the rights of the other; or from a combination
of both. But no matter what is the motive for our associa-
tion, our conduct to be good must be based on a sympathetic
understanding of him, and custom backed by law which com-
pels us to accord Justice to another human being as we
wish it accorded to us, for this man is an Individual and
a member of society. Justice through understanding and
justice through law are, then, the bases of our relations.
As individuals make up the group and finally the nation,
then the ethics of nations must be the ethics of the group
and of individuals representing the group.
CONDUCT. The time was when peoples lived to
themselves. Their world was confined to the tribe, nation,
or group and there was no trading with men of other tribes
<<
or nations. Everything they needed for existence was
at hand and dealings with other peoples were not even
thought of. A few such groups still survive, such as
the Esquimaux, and a few tribes living in the heart of
Africa, in Tibet, and the interior of Australia. They
survive so because they are isolated geographically from
civilization and because they appear so far to be back-
ward in attempting to make progress among themselves.
These isolated groups are few in
number. Most of the peoples in this age have dealings
with each other. The inhabitants of some regions today
are practically dependent upon supplies from other
regions for their very existence. England is a striking
example of this. So dense is her population and so small
and comparatively unproductive is her territory that,
were she entirely cut off from the rest of the world in
food supplies alone for less than a week, a vast number
of her people would perish.
DEFINITIONS. Ethics has been variously defined,
Webster describes it as "moral principles of quality of
practice." H. W. Dresser declares that it is the
science of moral values which seeks
to make explicit the distinctive
standards, laws, meanings, and
values implied in the moral ex-
periences of the race,
that it considers conduct with reference to right and

wrong, good and evil, that its basis is moral obliga-
tion, duty, conscience, and freedom, developed in
the light of the highest ideals.
1
Prince Kropotkin thinks that the
end of ethics is the harmony between self-love and
regard for our fellow-men. 2 Paulsen says that its
function is to show how human life must be fashioned
3
to realize its purpose or end. Everett asserts
that the field of ethics is the field of human con-
duct; that it ie the science of values in relation
to conduct and so is concerned with the whole bus-
iness of living. 4 Bowne says that the true ethical
5
aim is to realize the common good. Ethics, then,
is seen to be a matter of one
'
f relation to all
others as concerns value and duty; international
ethics, as a standard of moral behavior which
seeks the attainment of good for all men, sym-
pathy and harmonious development for all races
and people. To secure this development we must attain
to a rational understanding among nation and peoples,
1. Dresser, Ethics , in Theory and Application . P. 1.
2. Kropotkin, Ethics . P. 1.
3. Paulsen, A System of Ethics , P. 1
4. Everett, Moral Values , P. 1
5. Bowne, Principles of Ethic s, P. 97
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fcr until we do there con be no lasting international
peac-. The present state cf aff is and conditions of
world-wide commerce point to this necessity, "but mere
completely to understand economic conditions tcday a
"brief historic.1 sketch is necessary.
HISTORICAL Dewey and Tufts give a most extensive
SKETCH.
historical sketcn. Primitive society Wu.s maii'Iy tribal
in relation and the simplest tribes are these based on
TRIBAL LIFE. kinships or clans. In these we see the
origin cf government, and the ethics of economics for
these groups are at once kindred, industrial, political,
religious, and moral units. Tribal morality long pre-
ceded verb-lly formulated laws. Jrri-.itive man acknow-
ledges the ethics of the tribe blindly, but complete
morality is reached only when the individual recognizes
the right or chooses the good freely and seeks an indiv-
iaual share in the progressive development cf the group.
Kropctkin thinks tribal life is in-
stinctive. He declares that there is a permanent in-
stinct in man for mutual aid and mutual sympathy neces-
sary for the preservation, welfare, and progressive de-
velopment of every species, and this instinct, he says,
is the starting point cf all the higher ethic 1 feelings
as in it is the origin cf feelings cf benevolence and
the partial identification of the individual v/ith the
group, 1 Durant Drake also discusses the tribal begin-
1, Kropctkin, ethics
.
1,14
c\ t )
*
i.
s ( (
c
nings cf our mcdern system of ethics and concludes
that it is tc the primitive group cr tribe that we
ewe recognition of the fact that man cannot live as
he alone pleases, that his actions hear upon ether
members cf his tribe, and that misconduct is tc be
followed by punishment
Sarly civilizations e-ci. contributed
tc our present ethical system. H-mmurabi, King of
SARLY . Assyria, Loses the Leader of the
CIVILIZATIONS:
ASSYRIAN, Hebrews, and Confucius the great
CHUOESS,
HXBRSVj Chinese Philosopher, each taught
a "Golden Rule," the subsUuce of which was "do as ycu
would be dene by. * The Hebrews built their life -round
the fundamental principle cf the wcrs.-ip cf one God,
Jehovah, economically, the e^rly simple agricultural
existence changed tc commercial life under bclcrncn
and later ki-gs whe brought in wealth and centralized
power, government and influence in the cities. As
Professor Tufts points cut, the usual results obtained;
group solidarity was broken up, classes of rich and
peer appeared, oppression, land monopoly, bribery, and
extortion resulted, just as we have it today.
*
The Greeks produced a philosophy cf
acticn, and cf the training of the will to secure order,
proportion, ana harmony with the result that there was
a rapidly growing consciousness cf commercial life, of
1. Trake, Problems cf Conduct
.
P. 16
2. Dewey and Tufts, ethics
.
P. 100
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political interests, power and privilege, and of the
function of the state. Socrates taught knowledge to be
the end of all living as only by knowing can man be
truly virtuous and capable of serving society well.
Plato in his Republic developed the science of a demo-
cratic government headed by a philosopher-king and based
on the principles of Justice and morality. "You and the
State," he says in his dialogue Alclblades t "if you act
wisely and Justly, you will act according to the will of
God." 1
RCkAN. Rome's greatest contribution to
modern civilization was her idea of government and rights
expressed in civil law.
Roman government and law embodied
the Stoic conceptions of a natural
law of reason and of a world state,
a universal, rational society....
it was a constant influence for
guiding and shaping ideas of author-
ity and Justice. 2
During the period of Roman dominance, the Christian re-
ligion appeared with its teachings of equality, the in-
dividual value of a man whether he be slave or master, and
universal brotherhood. The Roman world, with its cen-
tralized government, international dominion, protection
by law of its citizen, universal Latin language and ex-
cellent system of roads which facilitated communication
1. Kropotkin, Ethics , P. 94
2. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics . Pp.l42,l43
r1
13
was ideal fcr the spread cf Christianity. Heme was com-
mercial, industrial, political and these ccncepticns
were passed on along with the Christian ideals cf leve
and "brotherhood to the northern invaders after 476 A. D.
who added to them their own ideals cf chivalry, charity,
and the mere democratic conceptions cf domestic and
social justice. From 476 A. I. until the present time,
man has "been trying tc adjust himself satisfactorily tc
living in a state and "being a citizen of that state, in
economic cc-cperaticn with ctner similar states. The
result has been a democracy cf states as well as of in-
dividuals within a state, ken first found that the
principles of liberty, equalityj and fraternity, applied
tc them as individuals .-..a revolutions followed until
there are new left nc absolute despotisms among civilized
nations, —very citizen claimed fcr himself recognition
of his rights in his st<ate, now states are claiming like
recognition of opportunity and right to existence in a
society cf states. lien have laid down laws and rules
fo^ government within the state and are new beginning
tc do the some fcr the state in relation to other states,
CONCLUSION: This trend cf affairs is seen everywhere.
DEMOCRACY,
THB i^LiULT. Modern literature reflects it, daily pap ers,
magazines, and digests are full cf discussion cf inter-
national problems, and many such periodic .Is regularly
have whole sections devoted tc comment cn in ternaticnal
questions. Now as never before in history,
1. Cf. Lewey and Tufts, P27 ; Bcs^nuuet, 1.3; Lral:e, P. 305
Bcwne, pp. 29 6 -29 7.
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crises are considered matters of importance affecting
many nations, to be closely observed by all governments.
Facilitated means for communication and transportation
have given greater Impetus to international commerce so
that nation trades with nation now, as community once
traded with community. This has brought up new econom-
ic ^problems of international competition, and has led to
the drawing up of certain principles universally admitted
among states and called international law.
BOolTL
.
The first question which arises is that
of the state. Eorden Parker Bowne in Principles of Ethics
begins his final chapter, "The Ethics of Society," with
this statement:
Human beings exist not merely as an
aggregate of individuals, or as members
of families, but also as members of a
social organization which assumes to
control and, if need be, to restrain
the Individual This organism is
variously called society, the state,
the nation.
This is the view held by myself and, I believe, by a ma-
jority of people. Prince Peter Alekseyevltoh Kropotkin
in Ethics gives the minority view: that the state exists
for the individual, but that the state as such is not a
satisfactory institution since it does not make possible
"the greatest happiness of society." "Mutual aid," he
believes, will bring about this long cherished desire.
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics . P. 247.
(\
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I agree with hrcpcthin, bui, with an "if," Mutual aid
would "bring abcut such a condition _if all wen had perfect
insight and jlf their actions were prompted by good will.
There would then "be nc need of society as restraining
cr coercing power, because there would be vision and
wisdom tc understand the conditions of life and the c oni-
ric i. geed, and there would be the will tc ,co-operate in
securing it. Such society would be true anaichy, the ideal
state of social existence. But human beings are net a11 cf
cne sort, and seme me .sure cf government is a necessity
today.
e.
Bcwne b_ses .iis teaching en Lichliormaeher ' s
three leading mcral ideas, the geed, duty, and virtue. Each
cf these is essential in a system which is to express, the
complete moral consciousness cf the race, .nd all three
are alike necessary, for without them, ill conduct becomes
a matter cf selfish shrewdness, ungevemed by altruistic ideals.
He believes that the mcral life begins with
ccnciete duties, net with abstract principles, nd that it
is the duty of eve^y man tc make constant search tc find
out what duties are his. Dcme search for systems of pnudence
only, .nd, he declares, "their typical saint is the long-
headed and shrewd."^" ^en the.e are Ui.exS who think that
life can only be lived in picus abstraction. Bcwne has nc
mere p .tience with the worldly egctist than he has with the
unworldly, falsely idealistic moralist.
1. Bcwne, Principles of ^thic s
.
P. 13.

GOYERMfi^NT. W© are not yet ready for such a
state. Men lack insight, are selfish, and egotistical,
and governments are as are the individuals forming them.
Like men, governments lack good will. They are only
too willing to mistrust each other, to plunder one an-
other. Each is too engrossed in its own importance to
give an impartial estimate of any other and so endless
misunderstandings over sometimes petty facts, unkind or
merely thoughtless; or shortsighted policies result in
wars and destruction. Again like individuals, the
prosperity of each state is bound up in the well-being
of the other.
To adjust the claims of each so that
the best result shall be attained for
all is the problem of problems
,
says Professor Bowne, and he is right. The second main
question, that of trade and class distinctions, he treats
in the same rational, sensible manner. 2
The social order does not exist for
any one state or people; nor for any one class of per-
sons. If each would have sufficient moral foundation
for social authority, each must maintain utter impar-
tiality. On this foundation only can any lasting inter-
national equilibrium be assured.
All action, then, public as well as
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics t P. 253
2. Ibid. Chapter I, first of Part II.
( ft
i
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private, must be conditioned by a moral reference, and
the question becomes a practical one. Not material
wealth but humanity must be the supreme aim, says Bowne, 1
otherwise we are defeated in the end, and we are gradu-
ally coming to realize it. We are learning that we
must defend ourselves against the ignorance and rapacity
of other nations, and we are gradually learning how to
do it. But this control must be such as to satisfy all
and it must be more than theoretical. Idealism can be
a menace unless guided by practical common sense.
EQUALITY VARS I He next takes up the question of
equality versus inequality. "Equality," he says, "is
an idle dream, "2 but we are too prone to allow evils
to remain and place the blame on what we like to term
"biological" or even "geographical" inequality. The re-
sult is often fatal. Nations are crushed out or else
down- trodden, or they rise in righteous indignation
against such large scale snobbery. Bowne advocates fur-
ther legislation for the impartial protecting of the
rights of all nations; national distinction must be avoided,
but behind this there must be the will of the individuals
making up the legislation, and behind these, the nations
and citizens of the countries. As J. Ramsay MacDonald
said in a recent address (title, place, and exact date
1. Bowne, Princi ples of Ethics, P. 259
2. Ibid. P. 261 .
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unknown) nations can attain to no lasting understanding
until individuals forget their "biased views and talk
together openly; not with one hand straying near a
concealed weapon while they verbally assure one another
of friendship and undying loyalty. The ideal, declares
Bowne, is political rights and it is no simple problem.
He says, "the fundamental right of all is to be well
governed; and the fundamental duty of government is to
secure the common good." This applies to states as well
as to individuals; legislation should be such as to
apply to all peoples. If they cannot agree, the first
thing to do is to discuss in the hope of finding some
common ground.
The theory is far easier than the
application. When we are dealing with the abstract no-
tion of nationality and of the relations of states, it
all seems very simple but to try to get along in actual
affairs is a different matter. All states are not on
be.
the same plane of development. Some can scarcely /called
states. It is impossible to trade with all states alike.
It is impossible to accord all states equal rights. They
would not all benefit by such legislation. Indian tribes
and a multitude of petty Asiatic and African states are
not yet ready for advanced complicated economic relations.
But the theory holds true, and they should be accorded
their just due. Yftien they advance it must be recognized
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and dealt with accordingly.
5£?J5P£™™ Professor Bowne considers that a
nation's first obligation is to itself and its own sub-
jects. This is as true in industrial relations as in
the matter of defense anc^protection. We must be care-
ful not to interpret this selfishly. He would not ad-
mit indifferent or hostile aliens into a country. He
would allow only a limited number to become Inhabitants
of other countries although he admits, and I heartily
agree with him, that
the mere fact of living together
in peace will commonly serve to
generate enough of national spirit.
^
His principle is that "the rights of humanity are above
the rights of nationality," that the latter are "sub-
ordinate to the former, and on occasion may be decisively
set aside any nationality or national principle that
stands in the way of human progress has become an obstacle
to be modified or removed." 2
^£U^LIT2?»0:i Bowne declares that the Intercourse of
the higher nations with the lower should be regulated by
regard for the rights of humanity rather than for the
rights of nationality. Selfish exploitation for the in-
terests of any one nation he denounces as infamy. Furnish-
ing them with the means of vice he rightly calls diabolism.
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, P. 298
2. Ibid. P. 299
cc
20
Any interference of one nation with another except in
self defense is unwarrantable.
He finally concludes that internation-
al perfection is yet a long way off. "Life as a whole is
not largely controlled by moral ideas," 1 he laments.
It is Utopian to look for any large international develop-
ment of humanity, unselfishness, and good will in the
near future.
uu, In summarizing his treatment of the
economic problem, we find that he goes straight to the
very heart of it by giving the first consideration to the
part which government must play. Peoples cannot deal
with alien peoples individually or promiscuously, but
rather, being organized, governments can treat and trade
with other governments. The first principle, then, is that
of firm government, of the people, by the people, and for
the people. Such a government will be based upon good
will, not only for its own citizens, but with the greater
and all inclusive ideal of good will extended to all
humanity in order that men of all nations may be benefited.
Nationalism will not be destroyed but perfected; and
nations can, if they will, be as friendly as neighboring
families of a city are friendly. Glass distinctions in
such a world will be outworn, competition will be just
and friendly. Such is the good sound workable teaching
l.Bowne, Principles of Ethics , P. 299.

of Bcrden P. Bcwne,
PAULS-JT , Friedrich Paulsen devotes an entire chapter
of his Bygte] of ^thic s to a consideration of the economic
life. He stresses but little international questions in
themselves, "but the whole trend of his beck is such thut
rules for international behavior may be deduced from those
principles governing the best individual and national behav-
ior.
Paulsen believes in any system of govern-
ment which is best adapted tc the needs cf the people
which it is to serve. It must be, however, an crg-nized
GGV-JtrL^NT. government which can take its rightful
place among the nations, for like Bcwne he recognizes the
need cf seme form of government tc do the business cl the
people and tc assure their international rights and defense.
•In the principle cf relationships among nations, as tc racial,
national, or c1j.ss privileges, he concurs with Bcwne*
UTILITAHIAI; VALlic. He undertakes his discussion cf the
"j^ccncmic Life" as he ne-ds chanter fcur cf his bock,"*" by
giving the natur.listic view that; first, the economic life
had its origin in natural heeds; and that second, Vihen sys-
tematized, the two institutions ^rise which fcrm the basis
cf the economic - namely, labor and property.
He begins by stating his principle that
wcrk is the greatest blessing. he denounces both the idle-
rich and the complacent poor alike and comes forward strongly
fcr economic living. Frugality is even tc be ^referred to
1.Paulsen, A System cf _L.ti.ics , Bk III, Chap. IV, P. 529 ff.

prcd.iga.lity. Greed and avarice, he says, characterize a
PHEVAIENCIS OF GHKKD base nature, They can also charac-
AND SELFISHNESS
AMONG NATIONS' terize a base nation and such nations,
like such people, in which avarice has taken rcct, will
wither and die, fcr they can never see beyond themselves.
The world, they think, was especially ordered for them and
ethers exist icr their benefit, laulsen would advise a
condition of mcderacy in wealth, A nation needs money as
dees an individual, but like an individual it cannot reach
the peak of fullest competence if impoverished* On the
ether hand, if it is very rich and very powerful, material
value will make it arrogant among nations. Necessity for
honest striving is good fci nations for like people, it
keeps them tec busy tc get into miscnief,
i ARE TUg-TS . ethics , by Lewey and Tufts, begins with
a detailed historical view of the growth cf group morality,
a brief synopsis ci whicL ii itroduces this cx.apter. In the
main, it is sua historical discussion of government from
earliest known ages until the present* In primitive unity
HISTORICAL SKETCH and solidarity, in the kinship or
household groups, we fi^d the family as an economic and in-
dustrial unit, with the control centered in tile head or
patriarch. These same clans are political bodies, exercis-
ing control ever the individual, and they are also religious
groups, satisfying the every-day life cf the tribes or clans.
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In the groups there are three levels of conduct: that
which is instinctive and governed by primal needs, that
which is regulated by a social standard, and that regulated
by personal standards or ideals. Education, law, justice
(generally a matter of retribution), and war are controlled
by the group and the center within it.
CONSCIOUS
MOEAUTY From group morality, man passes to the
stage of development where morality becomes conscious.
Economic forces, military, and religious forces enter into
the ken of the individual, he owns and defends property,
he struggles for honor among his fellows, he recognizes the
existence of other nations with whom he must deal, and he
wages war that his nation may vanquish all other nations
and so become rich and powerful. It is doubtful if con-
sideration for the rights of any nation other than his
own has occurred to him.
The authors then go into detail con-
Kerning Hebrew, Greek, and mediaeval ideals. Always the
central theme is government - what form is best - and
international relationships. Too often it is a story of
"tlie the victor belong the spoils," with no consideration
for individuals of another race, color, or state. There
was but one real state, in the eyes of ancient man, and
that was his own. All other states were on earth for his
torture ii he were one of a weaker state, and for his
(
greater deTelopment if he tttrc cf a mere powerful state.
uqimckm \7ith the modern period have come the ideals
PERIOD*
cf individualism in the progress cf liberty
and democracy, as evidenced by the development cf indus-
try, art, and commerce. L\ew worlds, new trade routes,
have been opened up, and nationalism has "become a prob -
lem as never "before. It is a "breaking down cf the eld
order cf t -i-gs and will "be followed, I believe, by a
world cf mere amicable international relationships.
In the first place, stress is laid on
individual intelligence, the transformation of customary
into reflective moral habits, from "Do these things
which cur kin, city, cr class, do" tc Be a person with
certain habits of desire and dcliberati en. " The history
L-IG1~JIN ^.CCIIOI.JC cf setting free individual power in
URALS! ZHB
GROWTH CI1 desire, thought, and initiative is the
MAToRIALICU,
history cf the formation cf a mere
complex and extensive social organization* Instead cf
the disintegration cf the whole social rder, there is
a settiiig up of a new soeial order, a steady enlarge-
ment of tile size and scope of the social group, (as
from clan tc modern national state).
The st&te snculd bring freedom to its
people, Within it, each individual should be regarded
as morally responsible, under the same obligations, en-
titled tc e^ual rights, civil and political.
1. Lewey and Tufts, ^t^ics .Pl. 427 ff
.

Uc suggestion of any form cf social life
is found here, Dewey and Tufts, like Paulsen, take up
concrete problems new facing men. Their attitdue seems to
"be th-t if a Utopian existence free from national ties
is to ccme it is yet tec far away fcr any definite consid-
eration
.
WEALTH. Lastly, Dewey and Tufts discuss wealth,
trade, and class distinctions. They agree with Paulsen that
Wealth is geed for a state if democratically distributed,
and "bad if gained "by conquest -nd exploitation rather than
by industry. If controlled by a minority, wealth is a
detriment tc any nation as i t will almost surely be put
to selfish uses. If unwisely used, wealth can make bitter
enemies, but if wisely managed, it can do much good to
help weaker states, tc put trade on a firmer basis, and
tc bring about more amicable relations among states. The
bock is almost radical in ist denouncement of petty class,
racial, or national distinctions and snobbery.
DRAKg . Tc attain a stable peace is the*first
public duty, he states: the second is the achievement cf
an efficienygevernment. Corruption and inefficiency cb-
ACiil—V—LLuuT 01? struct all social progress, ^ach nation
KFPICEKNT GOY-
EKNMEtfT IS needs an intelligent and patriotic admin-
UAJPB DUTY;
MODZKn INTi^R- istraticn; it needs true public spirit
:t-,tio;:al -iRhors.
and public interest; it needs unselfish
citizenship. Tc sake this world "safe fcr democracy,"
1. Drake, Problems cf Ccncuc t
, P. 305

26
each individual state must strive first for its own
improvement. Rulers and office-holders too frequently
misuse their official powers to replenish their own
ourses, "big business" often feeds unscrupulous polit-
icians and backs by money and votes the political "machine"
that will let them alone, and the average man is indif-
ferent to it all. The result is a low standard of honor and if
men cannot be honest within the state how can there be
any hie-h standards for relations among nations?
Drake outlines the remedy. In the first
olace, the individual must use his intelligence. He must
THE REMEDY; study the situation, keep himself informed
EDUCATION.
as to candidates, and vote at elections.
Public opinion must be kept arouBed, and political mat-
ters keot before the public ey3. When an efficient gov-
ernment is attained, then the way is clear for the amelioration
of social evils - sickness, poverty, vice, crime, and. indus-
trial wrongs. Finally, states having higher standards can
more easily and widely trade among themselves with less fear
of ruin or even of sudden annihilation by more powerful states.
States can share in profit and lose as well as individuals or
companies, and co-operation will increasingly produce more
friendly and more stable relationships.
TRUTHFULNESS. Truthfulness is all too rare anywhere,
and especially is this true in international diplomacy;
(
TRUTHFULNESS. Truthfulness is all toe rare anywhere
and especi-lly is this true in international dip lorn .cy.
Equality is another ideal w..ich is mere verbal than
actual. While it is a recent cnej men are willing to
acknowledge it as an ideal although they ..re net willing
to cc-cperate to make it a reality.
BOSANQ.ULT
.
Bosan^uet regards the state as the ex-
pression of the general will - in ether words, a true
democracy. The primary question in eensidering any
problem affecting the state is: hew is self-government
possible? Anything he says which interferes with the
possibility of self-government destroys the conditions
of true government. The answer is drawn from the con-
ception cf the general will, which
involves the existence cf an actual
community, of such a nature as to
share an identical mind and feeling.
There is no ether w^y cf explaining
hew a free man can pat up with com-
pulsion and like it. 1
GOYEENHEHT TIL. Bcsanquet is the first one to set
xOCPRLSSIOH OF TEE
GjJuiiRivL WILL. forth tnis principle upon which
government must be founded, fcr organized force cf some
kind is necessary and permissible in every grcup, and,
as he points out, in inverse ratio tc political maturity.
There will always be force in a state to insure regular-
ity, but behind the force t.uere {just be firm government,
representing the cciaunal mind, "All other contriv-
ances for government," he says, "are external and
1, Bcsanquet, Social and International Ideals. P. 271
2. Ibid. P. 267
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tyrannical. "1
Although Bosanquet favors government
through an organized state, he does not consider the
state the ultimate end of life. There may be a far
"better plan for human happiness but, in accordance with
the modern view, he conceives of the state as that power
which, as the organ of a community, has the function of
maintaining the external conditions necessary to the
best life. These conditions are the rights or claims
recognized by the will of the community as the sine qua
non of the "highest attainable fulfillment of the capacl-
ties for the best life possessed by its members."
Bosanquet sees below the surface. He sees each member
of the group as an individual, not one like another, but
with like ideals, hopes, ideas, and standards. It is a
modern thought. It will allow for no more tyrannies, no
more rule of absolutism; but it sees in increasing numbers
men striving toward the ideal of self-government which will
endure because it is founded in the best that is in the
group, that is rational.
He continues his discussion. The re-
lations between the state and the individual is the ex-
ternal equivalent of that between the community and the
individual. There is no other body which he believes
can compare to the state in intensity of unity as he says,
1. Bosanquet, Soc ial and International Ideals, P. 272
2. Ibid. P. 271
(
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A national purpose is the most un-
conquerable and victorious of all
things on earth.
1
Bosanquet is thoroughly committed to the state as the
most powerful agent man has for his social development.
This is interesting in the light of his more or less
radical ideas, but there is communism within the state
and no hint of withdrawal from the state in his teachings.
I
j
"
^g^y; ^ We have seen decidedly he approves
of the state as the basis upon which further relationships
may be established. Through the state the will of the
people is expressed. It is an organ of action in the ex-
ternal world and so has the distinctive function of dic-
tating final adjustment of matters in external action. It
is the medium through which all humanity unites. The
normal relation of states is cooperative. "Their influ-
ence on each other's structure and culture," he says, "is
mainly a cuestlon of wants and materials." 2 The main-
tenance of a normal relation of cooperation or its attain-
ment where unattained depends upon the right discharge by
states of their rights and duties, and this in turn de-
pends upon the national mind. Each state must organize
before reenforcing the organization of rights by other
states. States, like the individuals of whom they are
composed, are entirely too anxious to make sure that their
1. Bosanquet, Social and In terna 1 1onal Ideals, P. 271
2. Ibid. P. 277.
(
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rights are enforced, and are careless in their consider-
ation of the rights of ether states. Wax resulted easily,
^V.uRI,TT . In discussing the "Nature ci the Humanis-
tic Sciences, n ^ he takes up the relations between ethics
and the allied sciences, and among these is political
economy. He begins by stating that the older classical
9SCS8SITY OF economists have tec narrowly interpreted
VALUATION OF
HUMAN BFJOBT the task of political economy and that
AS. A VftiOLi..
this has t^ided to prevent them from
dealing adequately with the human valuation of economic
effort, and from making studies in the field of applied
economic c.
He recognizes the importance of the
economic basis of all life when ht says:
-.very interest and ideal that men
cherish exercises direct influence
upon the economic situation.^"
Moral ideas affect the industrial and economic life; so
slavery is condemned, ~nd so conditions of labor are
changed. The key-note is the s; iritual impetus behind
every forward movement as ^verett so adequately puts it:
Give a man a new idea, awaken in
him a larger sympathy, or kindle
in his soul an ..rdor for the
higner tilings of life, and you
have changed in some measure the
existiiig economic system. 3
SSI INT^iRNATIONAL This has been many times illustrated
IDEAS N^LDxJD.
in national groups but has net extended
1. Everett, Moral Values
.
Chapter I, Sec. V, P.20ff
.
2. Ibid, P£2
3. Ibid.
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sufficiently tc international relations. The "new idea"
cf international justice in economic dealings is admitted,
"but the "larger sympathy" is net yet awakened in the major-
ity and until it is the resulting ardor cannot be kindled
in men's souls, sufficient tc change any order. Nations
are afraid tc trace with one another, tc exchange courtesies,
or tc make friendly advances unless they held in readiness,
somewhere in the immediate background, armed protection
in case "something might happen." lien -re afraid tc share
their advantages with otner men lest they be taken advan-
tage of, whereas if they would only try it and exhibit a
friendly spirit they might receive friendliness in return.
This is net alwaye true cf course. Economic v_l ues alcne
do not yield satisfaction tc nations mere than tc indivi-
duals. It is tlie uses tc which men put possessions that
yield the greater value.
"ethics," says Srerett, "is vitally con-
cerned that economic activities shall be ordered in the
ECONOMIC I^T^ILiS^S true interests cf humanity." Indiv-
MUST BE IHTKRHAT?
TO^at.t.Y BENEFICIAL, iduals need to possess certain things
in crder tc exist, and no individual can produce mere than
a very small part cf the numerous things necessary for his
well-being. Sc rapid has been the change from primitive
conditions of society to the highly specialized methods
cf production, that the readjustments' cf the ideau
has not kept pace with economic development.
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HtADITIOH. Traditions concerning the conflict
between possessions and poverty have long obtained. Early
Christianity embraced poverty and denounced possessions.
In the Orient we find the very ideal of poverty deeply
rooted in moral and religious beliefs. In Europe, many
sects are commltteed to the same view. The modern spirit,
on the other hand, teaches that wealth is allowable and is
good, if used as a means to some higher end and not as an
end in itself. A nation can do far more good backed by
sufficient resources than if struggling for existence; but
a nation which is rich is subject to the temptation to gain
more money and more power. It is extremely difficult for a
wealthy nation to maintain an humble, friendly position
among nations. Nations, like individuals, easily become
arrogant through wealth.
EC0NC11IC VALOB£
ARE IlTSTRULu, TAL. Economic values are the only human values
which are purely instrumental. Alone, they do not yield com-
plete satisfaction except as they give a sense of security,
and even this is derivative. Economic value expresses a
relation between other values in the processes of exchange.
Its objects are sought primarily for the satisfaction of
other desires than the possession of wealth. I do not fully
agree here. I believe, that all too often states, as well
as individuals, seek wealth mainly for the sake of possession.
((
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A klaD FOR Economic wealth cannot always secure
SPIRITUAL VALUES.
the end desired. Nations cannot purchase noble leaders,
or great literature, or remarkable history, but it can
afford opportunities for greater friendship and coopera-
tion with other nations. All other values are indirectly
dependent upon wealth - it is the great problem of the
moral. Education costs money. Improvements, health re-
quirements, art, sanitation, food, necessitate wealth to
back them. Even the spiritual life of a nation benefits
by wealth, since religion requires vast economic outlay.
Poverty does not make us more deeply spiritual. Instead
it drags to the depths of degradation and its spiritual
value is only in the comfort it brings of a friend or of
friends who have money which they are glad to give to
help. It takes a firm economic basis to warrant great
outlays beneficial to the citizens of a state and to neigh-
boring states. It takes work to earn this wealth - hard
work, by the people cooperating for the good of the state
and in the last analysis for international benefits.
Economic values, then, provide the
means necessary for the realization of higher values. It
is not a glorification of riches. Since we admit that
they are purely instrumental, they can never be a part
of the true end of human existence; and yet as they are a
necessity tc life, they ought tc be possessed in due
measure by erery human being.
((
1
MaCKLIN Kecklin*s opening sentence expresses the
thought of this matter:
[DAMENTAI
IRCBL^L OF
LIVING TO-
GSTHBR.
Tlie fundamental problem of human life is t
life is the social problem or the
problem of living together in a
social order with the least fric-
tion and the richest possible
conservation and development of
human power.
It is net a question of equality but of fraternity which
will always remain mere or less of a fiction which nature
and heredity will prevent. At best it is a social pro-
gram for the control and utilization of the inevitable
inequalities necessary to a progressive society,, E t is
the idea of fraternity, of spiritual and moral like-mind-
^USSTIQH IS OH edness among all peoples and nations,
OF IHATEBNITY,
:;0T OS EQUALITY. That is a difficult goal to reach and
can be dene, Mecklin believes, only when the ideal of
the social ccxiscience is attained and that will be
far in the future. Vecklin is an c^tii-iist however.
He outlines the history of moral growth and draws
his conclusions from his observations, he does not
lay down any definite plan of action as do Kropotkin
and McLougall, as we shall se later, except to discuss
his "Gre-t Society," that utopi-n wcrld-v/ide insti-
tution which sahll be ideally governed by "average men."
l.Koc'rhin, Introduc ticn to Social i/thics, P.
3
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TRAITS OF THE _ , , . _ . _ „n
"GREAT SOCIETY" In 1 13 ting the traits of the G-reat
Society,"1 he finds it both materialistic and idealistic.
Prosperity and social welfare go hand in hand. This is
an Idealism of action: he realizes that men have two
natures, the one selfish, Interested in profits, material;
the other, seeking to help other men and nations less
fortunate, the aspect of man's nature which rebels against
slavery, against oppression of the weak by the strong, for
education and opportunity for better living, and better
trading conditions for all peoples - in other words, the
ideal. Mecklln realizes that it is as impossible to smother
out the one as it is the other, and so he advocates the
uniting of both forces into the incorporating of a
Society of give-and-take, whose ideals are not merely
theoretical and which would crush out weaker peoples but
one which will benefit all and make this world a better one
in which to live. It is an idea somewhat similar to
Kropotkin' s "mutual Aid" but rests its authority in some
form of government and not in communism or anarchism.
ITS PRIIICIPL^S. He outlines in some detail the princi-
ples upon which the "G-reat Society" shall be based. Fore-
most among these is the economic principle of friendly
mutual co'o'peration among states. He would abolish all
racial distinctions, and make all men truly as brothers.
(
In the end, the states themselves wculd amalgamate into
one great world nation. It may come true. Mecklin doe s
seme very good teacniri£ of sound economic principles to
be followed in international, a,s well as in national re-
lations, "but acids little new to the discussion.
BOPOTKIS. Kropctkin exhorts us to active particle
RUSSIA1T SOCIALISTIC nation in life. He calls upon '
VHf: C0SHDHI8TIC
FOBX OF GOV-uRELLJJT man to remember that his power
Bv.ST.
is not in isolation but, in alli-
ance with his fellcwmen- with the people. Krcpctkin means
with all the people, the "toiling masses" as well as the
"privileged" classes."*" He attempts to create a social
morality. Progress is found in social life, since life
in societies engenders in men the necessity for mutual
aid, which in turn becomes transformed into feelings of
benevolence and sympathy.
Individual initiative must not be fettered
in the modem ethical system. He is net in accord with
POSSIBILITY OF most of the advanced ref ormers of the
A STATLi OF
AIJfcRCHY. present day who favor still greater ab-
sorption of the individual by society. He has little or
nc use for what he terms the "war machinery of the state,"
and existing institutions. Vfliat he envisions is a vast
society of ethical, moral beings living together in a
condition of "mutual aid" - cc-cperation being the ideal.
1. Cf. Krcpctkin, gtkicg t p. 26.
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Such a time will come, he believes. In the meantime,
men are to bend every energy to the moralizing of the
individual to make him more fit to live in society.
Effort should be put forth, not in perfecting the routine
of the state nor in teaching children their relation to
their respective states and to every other state, but in
teaching them love and sympathy for all mankind.
He deals at length with the historical
development of morality as do Dewey and Tufts but in a
different way. They discuss movements and changes in
general terms. He treats of them, in the main, by dwelling
on the teachers and effect of teachings of the great ethical
writers of each period. It is a wonderfully interesting
treatment as it shows the causes of the resulting movements.
ACTIV^ PARTICIPATION
SOCIETY. Kropotkin believes in one ethics for
all men. All men were human beings, and class distinc-
tions did not matter; as human beings all were bound under
the same laws. He showed his meaning by using the word
"solidarity" instead of "brotherhood
;
" brothers frequently
quarrel among themselves, but the conception of solidarity
is expressed in sympathy, cooperation, and mutual aid.
He saw the present need of determining the bases of
morality. Scientific knowledge has made such progress that
men can no longer can live by and to themselves as in times
(I
past. It has achieved a double aim. On the one side it
has given man a very valuable lessen in humility, as it
has taught him that he is but an infini tesimally small
particle of the universe. At the same time it has taught
man how powerful mankind is in its progress if he but
utilizes what energies he has. It has torn down class
and racial barriers to a considerable extent, nor is
its task finished. He is a teacher of the social gospel
in the extreme. Like Spencer he took a negative atti-
tude toward the State which, he held, destroyed the
rights ex t e individual. Also like Spencer, he held
th -t man is capable of change~by adaptation to conditions,
and in time, will be a perfectly moral social being,
tiClQUBALL LicDougall gives a practical exposition
of two systems of ethics or forms of government. The
first system is the universal. To this t>« long the ethics
DISCUSfilOB OJ TtfO of Christianity and Buddhism and
ETHICAL LYSUdL :
UNIVERSAL. mere or less strictly of Mohammed-
anism. Saeh cf these codes is bound up with a religion
that aspires to universal dominion; therefore each claims
that its rules of conduct shall be binding upon all men,
and each seeks tc bring all mankind under the sway cf its
rule.
The second is the national system under
which Judaism, Brahmanism, and the ethical systems of
1TATIONAL, Japan and China are included, Saeh claims hi
ethical principles to be Valid fcr all men, A criticism

of the national system, however, is that the only men
generally recognized as men in the full sense are free
fellow citizens. All others, even their slaves of
similar race, remain for the most part despised. The
national system draws a rigid class line and such dis-
tinctions arbitrarily drawn result in two things: a
drawing-away from the world at large into a seclusion
which fully benefits neither the "jew" nor the "Gentile"
and makes common intercourse impossible; or it creates
constant irritation among all concerned and a feeling of
distrust where no open dealings can be carried on.
On the other hand, a national or
political ethical system makes for national stability and
endurance. It tends to preserve the national type, not
only by inculcating respect and reverance for national
ideals and institutions, but by preserving the racial
purity of the people. These are values, but is such
extreme nationalism the only way by means of which these
ends may be attained? Is not the national system that
of China, Japan, and Judaism? And was it not for just
such teaching that Socrates was compelled to drink the
hemlock? Systems of national ethics are, by their inQ
trinsic nature incapable of extension to alien peoples;
otherwise they become ineffective and are no longer
strictly nationalistic.
(I
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Universal systems have a very dif-
ferent history. They are by nature intrinsic and mis-
sionary, seeking to extend themselves over all the world.
In the main they have spread by destroying or supplanting
the lesser national codes and they have been the cause,
says McDougall, of the great world struggles between
"universal" and "national" groups. Intermarriage is
endorsed under such a system, and races are so amalgama-
ted that old racial pride is entirely lost. Such a uni-
versal code breaks down the traditional groupings of
mankind. It frees man from any feeling of group spirit
and it tends to foster disregard for national laws and
customs.
CRITICISM 03? Professor McDougall devotes considera-
CHRISTIAN ETHICS
.
ble space to what he deems the three great universal sys-
tems: Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. 1 He
severely criticizes each, Christianity in particular, his
strongest point being that there has grown up the strange
anomaly of a
society of nations all of which have
accepted the religion of peace and
brotherhood with its universal ef-
forts, yet which are constantly at
war with one another.
2
Universal ethics makes nations come into constant contact
with one another and the result has been rivalry and hos-
tility among them. On the other hand, universal ethics
1. McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, Pp. 16-39
2. Ibid. P. 25
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lias its advantages. Among these is the stimulus to
thought and discussion that comes from the conflict of
mixed peoples. It has its disadvantages, "the penalty
of progress is unrest and discontent," but these, if
properly controlled, need not be all together of ill
effect for where there is dissatisfaction, change fol-
lows and often for the better.
COSMOPOLITANISM. Detailed demonstration of the in-
adequacy of universal ethics to the need of the present
age follows. 1 McDougall has no use for the anarchistic
or the cosmopolitan ideals. They are, he says, incom-
patible with the universal code and more especially with
the Christian code. They demand for their realization
the complete repudiation of national ethics and they
make the serious error of assuming that all men and all
races are, for all practical purposes, essentially alike.
They accept literally the old dogma that "all men are
created equal" and they Interpret it not only in thes
sense that all existing men have equal claims upon their
fellows for Justice and consideration, but in the much
more questionable sense that all men have by nature the
same potentialities. They assume that the observed dif-
ferences in men are due only to the degree in which these
potentialities are realized; realization, in turn, being
l.McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems , P. 73-14-8
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due to differences of circumstance and opportunity.
Here McDougall repudiates Kropotkin 1 s view, and I am not
inclined fully to agree with either. It would be inter-
esting to see what would happen if all men were in like
circumstances and were given equal opportunities. I be-
lieve that there would be found men of equal capabilities
in every class.
SVILS OF UIJIV^R- One of the evils, he believes, which
would result from the universal system of abolishing all
nationalities would be the tremendous multiplication of
peoples of lower cultures. He draws a vivid and horrible
picture of such a condition. 1 People of the most di-
verse origins would mingle on terms of perfect social
equality and intermarriages would result. This dreary
forecast he bases upon four assumptions: 1. ) under
conditions of universal freedom and of political and
social equality population would rapidly distribute itself
over the face of the earth; 2.) peoples of lower cultures
would multiply rapidly; 3.) peoples of higher culture
would in all probability dwindle in numbers; 4.) miscege-
nation would result. His proof, although plausible, is
not sufficient. I agree with the earlier authors that
man would, on the whole, be better off if perfect anarchy
did obtain; but I admit that there are moments when I
have my doubts and prefer nationalities as we now have
1.McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, P. 82 f.

them. McDougall offers much further argument against
the universal system based primarily upon class dis-
tinctions some of which he tends to favor. In conclusion
he makes the statement that the gloomy picture he has
drawn expresses a tendency which will more and more
realize itself if a synthesis of national and universal
ethics is not achieved.
A HtiiW IivTcJlN^- This synthesis he outlines as fol-
TIGNALISM HJfiBDSD,
lows. He begins by insisting that it is the
function of mind to exert a pro-
gressively Intelligent, farsighted,
purposeful guidance upon the seem-
ingly blind mechanical processes of
the material world If mind has
this power of guidance, it may hope
to guide, though it may not effective-
ly combat, the cosmic process.
^
Man's very nature, then, will approve such precepts as
universal systems set forth. Again, ethics cannot be
divorced from politics. This is the fundamental error
of universal ethics and of the extreme forms of national
ethics. As universal ethics represent ultra-democracy
and national ethics the aristocratic view, their synthesis
will demand a synthesis of the aristocratic and democratic
principles. This is McDougall' s stand. Such a synthesis
is not impossible.
He offers suggestions tov/ard its
realization. First, there is the need of well established
l.MeDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems , P. 157

states having representative forms of government. This
is the ethical basis necessary to our civilization.
Second, is the need of a selective birth rate, an
indispensable condition of national welfare enabling
nations to "secure the benefits of natural selection
without inflicting its cruelties." So, he claims, the
various peoples of the world will produce only the
highest type of men and women capable of fully assimila-
ting and refining the culture transmitted by our fore-
fathers. Third, every man is to be regarded not only as
an end in himself but also as an element in the life of
a nation. His welfare must be in some degree subordinated
to that of the nation. But the national organization,
then, must be such as to favor the highest development of
personality. Fourth, internationalism rather than cos-
mopolitanism is the true and desirable world-order.
Nations are to be recognized as the products and instru-
ments of the process of evolution. Each nation should be
capable of taking its own place in a society of nations
and of undergoing a process of further evolution.
JUNCTIONS OF The two great functions of each
A NATIQH.
nation must be kept in view: 1. ) the internal function
of efficient legislation and administration, and 2.) the
external function of effective cooperation with other
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nations. This is the most difficult point, but it is
a condition to be hoped for and striven after. Other-
wise
there is no other conceivable
world-order under which we may
rationally expect or hope for
continued progress, or indeed for
anything but general relapse into
barbarism and world-chaos,
1
He then discusses what kind of citizenship is to be al-
lowed. A very interesting, though to my mind unpractical
discussion of literacy tests follows by which to deter-
mine who shall be fit to hold office in the state,
CRITIC IS] , McDougall's book has been severely
criticized and in my estimation rightly so. Frank Thllly,
writing in the Philos ophical Review for September 1925,
commends McDougall for his stand and adds that he goes
to the heart of the matter revealing the little thought-
of rift between universal and national ethics. E. L.
Schaub, in an article published in the Philosophical Re-
v iew a year earlier scores the work as "dogmatic , ""cursory ,
"
"popular." The Transcript of April 5, 1924, commends him
on his "array of illustrative material," while the Nation,
May 14, 1924, scores it roundly as a book "hardly deserving
serious review. " For all that, it is thought-provoking.
He goes to the extreme many times. I often have the
feeling that he has become so worked up over his subject
l.HcDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems^ P. 190

that he lets his imagination carry him toe fai "but his
teachings are well worth considering. As a professor,
I should never advise the book for use as a test. It
is toe dognatic and at ti es seems shallow. These are
my own two criticisms of it; it leaves an unpleasant
feeling. I feel as though he, like Nietzsche, were
forcing upon me his conelusicns as to what is wrong
with the world at l^rge and the only remedy for all
evils, while he really has not taken the trouble tc
study the natural tendencies of the ^jurnan race,
DH&SSER. Iresser points cut that the ideal is
difficult of attainment. Conditions are such that
we almost despair and new difficulties will appear as
eld ones are cleared away, "but the struggle is well
worth the effort. The demands of life compel men to
devote most of their time tc the adjustau it of conditions,
"but "because of ideals we make every effort tc overcome
past disappointments and so wt anticipate "better forms
of government, an improved system of education, some-
A PRACTICAL tuing like e^ue-lity of opportunity and
idealism;
the supremacy cf peace and reason where
war and passion new prevail. Hew optimistic ..nd inspir-
ing is such ^ note at the very i..trcduc ticn cf his work,
and hew great is the contrast with Mclcugall whose book,
although it may exoress more reality and call men tc see
things as they really are, yet expressed bjit one ray of

hope for the future unless present tendencies are checked,
and th~t is for mankind tc follow his suggestions!
Such an emphasis on values as expressed
by Dresser dees net necessarily imply alienation from the
EMPHASIS PLACED world of affairs. There is the most
OU VALUES.
intimate relation "between events and
the ideals for wxjich man continually contends. Moral re-
form begins with the individual and in the inner life..
With the individual as in the nation
it proceeds in so far as the ideal
becomes grounded in the things of
daily life precisely where the indiv-
idual stupids,
GOVKRHH ,NT. As to government, Lresser closely follows
the conception of a perfect state to be locked for in the
future, but the present governments are best suited to the
..^eds of the separate states in sc far as they are net in-
harmonious tc all. As did the others', he bases his ideas
upon the historical evolution of society. He advises the
use of cc.j.^ -sj-.se and prudence in all dealings. He
EEUOGRACY. maintains that laws expressed by the majority
should be enforced and recognized by all nations, first,
for the welfare of the nation and second, for universal
interest and benefit. But governments, ruling by lav/
alone, are net enough. Tnere is mere than force.
Le.-i iuac Co:. -tribute to society's gece". through
the inner fcrces of duty and responsibility.
1, Dresser, ethics in Theory a. >d Application
.
P. 94
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Nor are these three all. Man must be in sympathy
with the ideals of the state before he can give to it
his best cooperation, and he must have in his heart
love and the will to understand and to cooperate with
his fellow-men both of his own nation and of other
nations. The bulk of Dresser's arguments upon this
point so closely follow Bowne's, Paulsen's, Bosanquet's,
and Everett's that further explanation is unnecessary.
Likewise, does he hold practically their views of
class, racial, and national distinctions viewing them
as outworn prejudices of the old order of things.
KDUCATION, He strongly emphasizes the need of
education to prepare youth to live amicably among all
classes, of different origins, historical backgrounds,
and ideals of right and wrong. Youth must be definitely
trained to the moral life, his sympathies must be
aroused, and his conscious cooperation secured. Super-
stitions, class hatreds, and extreme nationalism are
but precepts which are drilled into young people from
babyhood. The schools of today play a larger part than
ever before in history in shaping the ideals of youth,
and it is what is taught to youth in the school that
will be the policy of the nations of the next generation.
Therefore as man is a being whose relationships in the
world center about economic conditions, it is natural
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to urge that further moral and ethical education
should prepare youth to cope wisely with the great
world problems which he will meet all too soon.
SUMMARY. To sum up Dresser's arguments: ideal-
ism is the impetus of change; altruism must he the
fundamental ethical standard upon which true friendship
and lasting cooperation shall rest. Democracy is the
best form of government and international progress can
only come as strong nations feel their obligations to
the weak. Lastly, through education there must grow
up a distinct body of sentiment or social conscience
which shall be fundamental and authoritative in all
our relations, and which shall be the larger, inter-
national conscience which will recognize the necessity
of organic cooperation among all nations for their
mutual benefit. The "ethical horizon" must carry over
into the field of the largest body politic or social
organization, on a world scale, the idea of the moral
order of all things.
Meanwhile, the larger social conscience
called for by the international situa-
tion is steadily being acquired in
these days of widespread interchange,
rapidly increasing information con-
cerning the nations, and growing knowl-
edge of the difficulties which beset
moral idealism.!
1. Dresser, Ethics in Theory and Application, P. 441

CHAPTER TV/0
JUSTICE AS ESSEITTLvL FACTOR IE THE COJSJBI33BBATIOU
OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS
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IUTRODUC T 1 1,
.
In the Handbook cf E thical Theory
.
George
Stewart Fuller ten quotes Joseph Butler as saying:
However we m y dispute abcut par-
ticularg, there is m universally
acknowledged stand rd cf virtue,
professed in public in all a
JUSTICE A UNIVERSALLY ages and in all countries,
ACKBQWLSDGS) STAND US) inaae a shew cf by all men,
CI V..-LUE. enforced by the primary and fu
fundamental laws cf all civil
c ens ti tutiens : n me-ly, justice, veracity
and regard tc cemmen geed,
Hew truly he expresses it, "professed in public by all men";
histcry, past aid present, would be very different if all
men practiced what they professed. The appeal for justice
is the great cry cf mankind, for rights, fair treatment,
respect, and equality in opportunity tec seldom obtained,
but histcry shews us that mere and mere the ideal is ccming
to be re. lized. It is far from being realized, but advances
made show that man's progress, though slew, has been steadily
upward. Although justice is held practically universally as
a moral ideal, in practice, men are net yet sufficiently
controlled by moral iceals and fair treatment is tec often
disregarded in practical dealings, bcth by the individual
^nd by the group.
Webster offers a variety cf constructions
l.Fullt j-tcn, G.S., Handbook of Ethical Theory
,
P, 3.

tc be placed on the word "justice" - the quality cf "being
just, integrity, imp .rtiality, retribution, vindication,
DEFINITION CE the right, rights. Meanings and interpee-
oUSTIC^.
taticns given by the authors studied will
be fcunfl in their discussions cf justice within the
chapter, Th<_re will fellow a biief discussion cf the
practical pplication cf justice in the H gue Tribun 1.
Historically, the 1 w was justice tc the
members cf the group. All liens did net count s fellow
human beings arid therefor- h d no rights and deserved no
consider ticn. We find such conceptions .-aid limitations en -
graved among the Laws cf Hammurabi, aid the Old Testament
KISTOEIOaL SKETCH, teachings were all cf this nation .1
type, H n must accord justice tc his neighbors and in turn
receive just trei tm< i t at tl ei nda , but that was all that
was necessary, Jesus went further when He taught the brother
hood cf all men, Man, no matter cf what race, color j or
nation, is an end in himself and as such deserves just treat
meat, T.H. Green says:
Since these times.
...
.primitive
duty tc a n ircw circle h s
widened into a duty to man as
man, this duty is felt tc be
morally as binding as any legal
obligation, and c nnct be ex-
plained as a mcdificaticn cf
self-interest. It is no unreal
extension cf the social obliga-
tions cf man, but mmst, as it
becomes part of the recognized
morality, greatly further the
development cf human capabilities;
it is the natural ouxecme cf the
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
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Briginal idea cf a ccmmcn good, new fixed
tc a certain degree in 1 v; and in social
requirement*
Kant expresses the same idea in his famous "categorical
imper ative" when he s.ys, "So act as tc treat humanity,
whether in thine own person or in that cf any ctner, in
every case as .n end withal, never as i means only. " Tc
accord justice !«-•• here the explications cf Kant's theory of
"good will" as the only good.
Justice is felt tc "be a duty
.
and it re-
fers tc acts directed .gainst all men. Justice, then, must
he enforced for all men dc not willingly do their duty. This
"duty" idea is the common one held regarding justice, but,
with Krcpotkin, I "believe that we have missed the mark.
Justice cf cticn and word c in enly "be honest when impelled
"by just thoughts. Just treatment is only good when respect
for the persenility of others is the motive "behind the act.
Until respect fcr ethers is the "basis cf cur tre .tment we
are only partially just. Je may h .ve little cr no respect
for seme men's actions, but all men are human beings and as
such are tc be respected as we respect ourselves. Justice
must ccme from the heart first.
Professor Bourne makes this statement:
BOTOL Back of both the individual and the
collective will is the fixed nature
1. Green, T.H., j-re lexeme n. cf ethics . P. 237
2. Kant, Imrnanuel, Cri tic.ue of Practical i Leasen and Other
V/cxks cn the Theory cf E Lhics
.
Tr, By" Abbott, P.

of things, the moral lav/, the natural
rights of the person, and the consti-
tution of the objective world; and
all that men or nations do must finally
be referred tc as their warrant and
foundation. These constitute the law
of nature, that higher law, antecedent
and fundamental tc all statute law,
which has always haunted human thinking
in this field, and so far as society-
departs from this law it lcses all
j us tif icati on.
Justice, then, is the application of this fixed moral law,
making certain that each individual has his natural rights.
JUSTICE --.S THE This makes justice something net determined
^PLIC-.TIOU OF
FIXBD MOR.^1 by man but by a lav/ of mature. I agree
IAW.
heartily. Hew can man perfectly determine
at all times and in .11 instances just what is right, true,
good, and fair? There will always be difference of opinion
as tc what justice is, because cf c.ifferences cf viewpoint,
but Bcwne's statement wculd make it possible for only one
side cf a problem tc be just and tuere wculo be no further
question. Cn the ether hand, it must be kept in mind that it
is man whe makes the final decision as tc wh it is just or
unjust, and here tv/c considerations present themselves: first,
all men will net agree; .nd second, hew c in any man really
knew what is the racrul law, what is jaat? <Tcr can he always
knew what is the moral law, he cannct see far enough ahead tc
knew what the end cf his decision will be. Scciety(that is,
1. Bcv/ne, Princ inles cf ethic s , P. 251.

all mankind) Is tc be subordinated tc the highest ocmmcn gccd.
But let us hope that men will grew in wisdom as time gees
en, tc knew what is this gccd and hew all men may attain it.
It can be seen sc clearly in thecry and can be described,
cne can become enthusiastic about it, but in real life con-
ditions are sc un-ideal that it is easy tc become discouraged.
the benefit of persons, it does net exist for any one class,
nation, race or people. In crder tc maintain social equilib-
rium, utter impartiality cf social action must be maintained
and crder and equal justice fcr and among all peoples. Im-
partiality and impersonal international justice appeal to
us all, .nd we claim that we desire justice first of all.
But when it comes tc acting, we try first tc have cur own
way, and tnen, if that is impossible, we prefer justice to
letting ethers h ve their way. A conflict cf selfish interests
individual, n .ticnal cr racial, can never be sclvea en the
plane cf selfishness , but only en that cf equal justice,
Histcriccilly, justice has been put too far into the back-
ground, while privileged classes and class legislation have
ruled, and/only came together as pecple banded tcgetner tc
win justice, obtain their rights, cr die. And many died.
encugh; punishment is net mecuit icr improvement , and is not
always just
Althcugh the social order exists only fcr
JUSTICE AS
,-cyr^IBUTIOin
PU^.'ISHIMT.
A ccmrncn view cf justice is the primitive
one cf retribution. But punishment is not

always just. No, justice must "be positive and must build
up ideals. Again, it is often identified with the legal,
and sometimes it means fair, sometimes impartial, some-
times it is a synonym fcr all the virtues. Justice is
RIGHTS, connected with the idea of rights; each indiv-
idual (and broadly speaking) each state has a field of
action whose limits are to be resjjected by all. Inter-
ference is resented as net merely a wrong, but as an af-
front. Justice has the task of protecting rights, and as
such is largely negative. Here Bcwne and Puuisen disagree
Paulsen claims justice to be positive as overcoming wrong
as well as negative, protecting rights. As seme sense of
rights is absolutely necessary to the existence of any
mcral group, justice is made to appear as a mere funda-
mental ideal than even good will. There is nothing much
mere bitterly resented than injustice. Nations can get
along together reasonably well, with any amount of indif-
ference or dislike, if rignts are left intact. This is
Bcwne 1 s stand when he says:
Justice is only the negative side of
gcog will, -is such it represents merely
the demands of good will wi th reference
to rights. The positive fcrm of good
will is of very slew growth in social
relations, while as the negative fcrm
is necessary to the existence of soc-
iety, the latter seems at once tc be a
special idea by itself and to precede
good will as something primal and
fundamental in the mcral nature,
1. Bcwne, Principles cf g thics
. P. 109,

Personally, I dc net fully agree here witii Bcwne. I believe
that a state where justice reigns will condition a feeling
of good will one is necessary tc the ether. Can a grudg-
ing, ill-willed justice "be sincere? 1 "chink net.
Be tli the individual and society have a
right tc self-defense. There can be no moral life without
DiiFiiNSE . the security cf the individual, and, in turn, of
the state. This is restr ant. Guarding the individual and
the state against criminal intent is reasonable and jast in
all eyes, if net carried cut tc unnecessary extremes.
E1ED FOR JUST as tc the relations cf the states, he has
UT^xiiUTIOi^AL
r^L^TIOaJS. a final word. Seme states have extensive ter-
ritories, are complex ana powerful. Others may be well org-
anized governments but sm~ll in domain amd population, as,
for example, Switzerland. Tnere are also social organizations
ranging all the way from the tribe tc the better organized
kingdom. Bcwne dec^res that it would be absurd tc accord
the same rights tc tne tribe ~s tc great empire cr rep-
ublic. That by no means indicates that the less powerful
tribe is to be freely exploited, cr that it deserves no
rights among nations. It does deserve fair treatment, and
opportunity for improvement. It should never be allowed to
a"dumping ground" for "civilized" evils. Our civilised
nations have much yet tc learn about just international
relations.

.
Paulsen devotes a chapter tc the ccnsid-
eraticn cf justice, ^e di stinguisaes "between the two phases
cf justice when he says that justice, as a racral h .bit,
is that tendency cf the will and mode cf conduct which re-d
frains from disturbing the lives and interests cf o there
j
and, as far ts possible, hinders such interference on the
part cf ethers. Tc violate the rights | tc interfere with
the interests cf others, is injustice. All injustice is
directed against a neighbor and is the open avowal that
the otner is net an end in himself, haying the same value
as the first party. Be expresses a general formula cf the
duty cf justice thus: "Dc no wrong, and permit no wrong to
be dune, as far s it is at rill possible." Or, positively,
Mespect and protect the right."
JUSTICE A^u^G- It is net easy foi individuals or for na-
AT1VS: PASS IVs.
tiens tc "dc nc wrong". It is the spirit
cf humility. It dees net flatter the vanity, as dc ccurage,
magnanimity, liberality, I means submission tc a general
rule. It is an individual matter, and individuals hate to
stand cut in ^ny group fcr in unpopular principle. It is
the old Quaker view, the pacifist program. It is no small
task fcr the individual alone tc live up completely tc
the principle cf just living, and it is almcst impossible
fcr a 1 -rge group tc hold the same ideals and tc carry them
through. I believe that it can be dene. When governments
stubbornly refuse to be drawn into selfish schemes fcr the
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benefit cf an alliance against seme weaker government, and
when a government will net t..ke advantage unfairly, cf one
less powerful in order to make or to get money net its due,
cr to annex territory by might r .ther than because cf nat-
ural ownership, then shall we see this principle practically
.plied. It is so difficult to dc right, but do easyfto/crit-
ize ether nations. This is perfectly natural. Man is by
nature intent upon self-preservation and self-advancement.
Lvery creature naturally acts as though he were the center
cf the universe, and that all things are means to be used
by him for whatever end he cheeses.
JUSTICL AS POS- The positive side cf justice is that cf
ether, and that dene to ourselves. This is speken cf as
the "sense cf justice"'*" an(*it is the easier justice. Such
is the instinct cf retaliation which is the b .sis cf pub-
lic punishment. Outstanding examples are: America's res-
ponse to the sinking cf the Lusitania and her response to
the call for help in the fiTear East. The symp -thy cf the
disinterested party is always for the victim against the
offender. A st te,like a community, ...Iways reacts against
its members, cr upen innocent, defenseless victims, whether
these be individuals cr less powerful peoples.
ITIVE: ACTIVE
warding eff injustice that dene to the
P .ulsen considers that the real test cf
Hauls en, A System of laiics
,

justice is the ttitude toward enemies cr opponents. It has
been thought to be perfectly right to consider all enemies
ATTITUDE or opponents in a cIlss alcne, net tc be
OPP012ENTB Cfi
BHEBfY H^TIOllB; regarded as human beings cr ends in them-
selves, but tc be automatically relegated tc contempt be-
cause they are net on cur side. This is net right; hven
though enemies, they dc net deserve tc be despised, dis-
graced, hated and abused. It is even mere difficult tc be
just tc collective enemies - such as enemy nations, than to
person 1 enemies. Ve cannot knew them personally , and sc we
feel little cr no pity fcr them. All tec often nations
think cf opposing nations as fit only tc be eliminated from
the f ~ce of the. earth; Injustice hers assumes the form cf
fidelity to principle, loyalty tc , cause, a cause to which
we have subscribed unconditionally. We may be perfectly sin-
cere when we inflict all possible injury upon cur opponents.
It is very difficult tc judge without prejudice, ana tc rec-
the gcod on "the other" side, Paulsen says : *P artisanship
is the deadly fee cf justice" and we find this truth cor-
roborated in every field, political, ecclesiastical, sccial.
The significance of justice fcr human con-
duct is shewn by the effects cf injustice. The imrnedi .tee
effect is th t it disturbs or destroys the welfare cf these
against whom it is c emmi tted. Injustice creates strife and
sc a state cf war arises, which may spread tc otherwise
1, Paulsen | A System of ethics, P. 60c
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EFFECTS OF peoples. Another effect which injustice prc-
IITJD3TICS.
duces is a feeling of insecurity, net only in
these who suffer, "but in -11 v/hc are witnesses, What has
happened once, may happen again* This is the inference
forced "by all injustice .:.d violence.
Injustice, then, tends to destroy the
state of peace and security, and to substitute
for it the st-.te of war and insecurity.
Such a condition papalyzes life and icticn. It makes
planning for the future difficult. ./ .r has the same effect.
On the ether hand, justice tends to es-
tablish and maintain a st te cf securi ty , which is the pre-
condition of human activity, and peace , the precondition
of social life. Injustice tends to destroy these forms cf
human welfare,
SUMLLvKY. Positive right, under the protection cf
might, becomes t power in the world. Laws formulate the
right as tne expression cf the will cf the state, and so
it is invested with power to overcome the resistance cf
individuals cr the states. This positive right, or system
cf limiting rules, defines the spheres within which indiv-
idu Is may move and still enjoy the protection cf the state.
Beyond the st.<.te, ti.-ere are these prescribed by inter-
national requirements and agree;:ie..t among states fcr tne
protection of a itions. This will be further discussed in
the last chapter cf this tnesis.
I. Paulsen, . System cf ethics, p. 603,
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: ,
. EEY . hD TU?TS . Dewey ana Tufts ix.tr educe a splendid def-
i
initio:: cf justice:
In its widest sense, it means righteousness,
uprightness, rectitude. It sums up morality.
It is not a vittue, but it is virtue. The
just act is the due act; justice is fulfill-
ment cf cblig ticn. This passes ever into
fairness, equity, impartiality, honesty in
all dealings. The narrowest meaning is that
cf vindication of right through the admin*
istration cf law*
They tre it at length cf the history cf
justice. In primitive society it is membership in the group
which gives the individual whaterer rights he has. This is
HISTORICAL still largely true cf legal rights. A st.te
SKETCH;
may allow a citizen cf another country to own
land, to sue in its courts, ad will usually give him a cer-
tain amount cf protection. But the first named rights ate
apt tc be limited, luvex; ..hen leg -1 theory dees net recognize
race or ctner distinctions, it is often difficult in practice
fcr an alien tc get justice. Justice was, and still is tcja
large extent, a privilege which falls te . man belonging tc
a family group, and not otherwise.
In this conception cf rights we have the
prototype cf modern lav/. Dealings cf state with state are
matters cf negotiation, net cf law. States tre.t each ether
LlODiiiJtf LAV/, as wholes in certain respects; if a citizen
cf one state is attacked by citizens cf .nether, the injured
part invokes the aid cf his government, A demandjis likely
1. Dewey nd Tufts, ethics
.
P, 27ff.
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tc be made fcr punishment. This may take the fcrra of a de-
mand fcr apology if between civilized nations; if between
primitive tribes cr statesi expeditions may be organized
ag .int the entire offending tribe, and innocent ana guilty
suffer like. States, then, protect their own members
gainst ctner states and .venge them upon ether states,
each opposing - united body tc the other.
GRATITUDE, An early conception of justice, evidences
cf which are still seen, is tiie justice cf gratitude. Funda-
mentally, it is . geed thing,, but within tne group, this
policy h-.s caused much corruption; among states, the results
have been equally evil. The most signific .it thing about
LOVii &JSD SYl/iP.iTHY; justice is its connection with love,
RETEIBUTIOJJ.
and with condemnation and punishment.
Justice is thcug.it tc be harsh cr hard in its dealings, but
truth is, that much whicn passes fcr justice is net justice,
but law, which has tc be vindicated, ihem such conditions,
there ^rises a demandlfor tempering the stemess cf justice
with mercy, and fcr restoring neglected human values into
ihe ide . cf what is just.
The greatest prizes, not only in materi 1
goods but ii: line of reputation, seem ^c
fall tc the individualist if he can enly
act on a sufficiently large scale, fcr then
he can be both prosperous and respectable.
...Even tncugii he may. steal a government,
he net only esc -pes punishment, but he
may be honored by his fellows,
T -- -
1. Dewey and Tufts, 1. 153.

This is true cf nations as well as cf individuals* In in-
justice on large sc .le, the perpetr tor is often the
h .ppiest cf winners, md the sufferers are those who may
refuse to do injustice. They may be the greatest losers.
A n .ticn may "by fraud or force take away the property cf
another nation and he praised for the act, whereas an indiv-
idual committing - similar crime would be punished and held
in dishonor. Dewey and Tufts -discuss the justice cf indiv-
idualism and claim it to be good in that it seeks justice
for ..11 mankind by giving fair pi y to indivicu .1 action,
and sc by bringing that for which we re all seeking: "The
git. test geed for the greatest number," - for there can be
uc real justice, they aver, unless every intelligent person
counts as one. Individuali sm Tiv ±ies for reflective mcr .lity,
and is therefore a mark cf a progressive society; individ-
ualism is concerned with the question; "Am I my brother's
keeper?" Its answer is "Yes", since individualism seeks tc
develop legislation, tc embody sentiments cf justice, and
tc guarantee its execution.
In general, this beck de Ls with problems
affecting the individual; I feel as though no new idea of
justice h id really been contributed. Justice was discussed
SUHLt-F.Y. mainly from the standpoint cf industryj tc these
authors justice would be th t which would put all men on
Qqual terms, sc th . t they would have e^ual rights and eppcr-
1. An example: partitioning cf Pol nd tc Prussia, Russia,
and Austria, 1772, 1793, 1795.
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tunities tc work and tc find justice through the living
together in society in such a way as tc bring about
greater peace and prosperity,
PEAKS
.
Throughout his beck, Drake is interested
in conduct. He comes to the conclusion"*" that conduct is
geed which shall consider all the consequences, near and re-
iacte, md produce the most good in tne end. This dees net
me n th .t ny conduct is b ccd. if tae end is good. The end
must net be att ined t any cost. Rations are tec prone to
reason like individuals: if a backward country is net making
use cf its natural resources, it is considered perfectly
right for t mere progressive nation tc step in and use these
resources. On first observation, ^his seems right, but in
practice i t is net often dene with . view tc utilizing the
resources for t.ie benefit cf the natural owners; but rather
tec often resources and sometimes even countries are taken
frcm the original owners. Injustice? Yes. Hew else can it
be dene? Friendliness, if genuine, is generally repaid in
kind. After making friends and winning the confidence cf
the backward nation, then help that people tc see the po-
tential value cf their own country, the prespects cf trade
and advancement tc a position cf importance among nations,
that they get g^cd f r themselves, tc use in trade with ethers,
Tc ride rough-shed ever ether's feelings, tc inflict injury
in the geed cf a cause, may bring g'ced iti the end, but it
l.Dr-vke, Prcbxems j££ I . .-. ..rl.
,
p. 79.
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"but it can never repair the damage dene.
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, Drake pleads for industrial justice,
POLITICAL LIBLKTY,
£ iUALITY. equity fcr employer and employee,
honesty in .11 commercial dealings, and fcr political lib-
erty. This dees net mean a freedom from legislation, "but
mere and wiser government which will "bring happiness tc
these at heme, and . mere aarmcnious internaticn .1 relation-
ship
.
Equality, he says, is . modern ideal, and, although
all men are net equal in natural gifts, yet all ought tc be
made equ .1 in opportunity, and tc have ... right tc freedom
.nd equality. This plea must net result in attainment cf a
dead level cf e^u lity at the sacrificecf the pctenti .lities
fcr the common good which lie in the free pi ty cf individuality,
but, rather, the various projects fcr securing a greater
equality among men must be scrutinized with an eye tc their
total effects upon human happiness, Rebert Burns expressed
the sentient aptly, when he said, "A man's a man fcr a 1 that".
"Justice is prior tc all expediency,
*
Drakewrites, and uhe only reason that weever hesitate tc
acknowledge it i:. any concrete case is that we overlook
the indirect and remote results, and see only the immediate
effect cf action. We let selfishness blind us tc greater
good. That is one cf the greatest human faulys: all cf us
. re tec prcne tc live only ijjt the present and net make any
1. Drake, Problems cf oendue
t
, p. 414
£. Ibid, P. 91

attempt tc try tc see ahead. We sc govern ourselves that
cur present needs are t-.e only ones which interest us.
Injustice is harm dene net only tc cue man,
one group, cr one people. There is t..e sympathetic suffering
EPFECTS OF INJUSTICE ; caused tc ethers, and that feeling
S'JULAhY.
of insecurity ( cf which Paulsen .
speurzs
, ) caused in each "by the realization that he, tec,
m ty be the next victim. There is the d ng< r th t if geed
seems to derive from injustice in one case th .t it will so
derive in till cses, which is tec seldom true. Men cr states
are net tc be trusted tc judge cle ,rly cf results; they
must bintf themselves tc an inflexible cede cf justice, with
tiiis motto: "This one thing I do; in all things, and at all
times te be wholly just, sc far s in me lies." . t all ccsts
this dede must be maintained if right is tc rule,
BOSANlUET .
BeBanquet says:
JUSTIOi. AS Justice has tc dc with rights, and seems
BIGHTS, tc be based on the fact that human n iture
lives in a multitude cf individuals, whe
have a common quality which demands that
that they be tre .ted by a common rule.
But s there ire v st differences cf opinion as tc what is
this *'ccmmcn rule", we need a clearer interpretation ,nd
understanding of rights —id. justice.
He first describes justice as we tec cften
l.Bcs '.nouet, ccial ,.rid Internaticn .1 Ethics. P, 19 5.

POETIC JUSTICE. think cf it - "poetic Justice", he calls
it, a mere artificial "but gratifying scheme cf retribution
but he has little use for this si.alio 1., arc. often unjust
interpretation. l£en as well ^s nations are .itcgether too
much engrossed in seeing that just retribution is made
for grievances committed. Bosanquet thinks this is sel-
fishness, a near-sighted view cf the whole matter, .nd
one that should net be dwelt upon toe much, Grievances
which are jwpt in mind, c^use greater rancor t^^inst the
offender, who may net deserve sucn hatred, and tnere will
be less tendency to see the right and to act wi th justice.
"Justice has to do with rignts"
,
says
Bcs-mquet, who gi.es cn to .dd, "tc recognize a right or
rule is what mukes tne doing cf it just, while injustice
is tc recognize a rule, but tc fcllcw it in some Cclscs,
and net in ethers."^ Justice depends upen two factors:
1. ) keeping the rule one professes tc keep, and allowing
nothing tc interfere with its application; and 2.) de-
pending upon what rule cue recognizes. In ether words,
one must c refully choose a rule or a g-cd, consider it
thoughtfully, before committing oneself tc it. This is
seen tc be l composite cf Paulsen's twe c.usew and so
needs hc further comment.
1. Bosanquet, Scci ~1 -rid Intern^ ticnal Ethics . P. 48f
.
2. Ibid, P. 196.

HOMESTY. nations derive their ideas cf justice from trad-
ition and form incomplete pictures cf facts, nd so are
net impartial in their dealings with other nations. They
dc net cbseive carefully enough ,all the possible f .cts
before making laws wnich might he outrageous fcr neigh-
boring peoples;
JUSTICE TKi B.1.SIS Justice, he declares, is the basis
FOB ^LL SGCIAL -, T
HBALIBG, fcr -11 social dealing.' lx lles in
the impartial distribution cf advantages -ad disadvantages
tc .11 men.
Individual huna.n beings iiave tc be ta^en
account cf; each is cne ..mcng ethers,
having ^. bodily and spiritual life cf his
own, which cannct even be genercusly sac-
rificed or surrendered unless it is first
his cwn tc sacrifice cr surrender.
Ecscnquet hej.e, I think, gets at the bottom cf the m tter
cf justice; first individuals must be free, then they
must have rignts and advantages, .na last, ti.ey must be
free moral agents in .11 tneir dealings, serving m.nkind
justly. Only as are the individuals wnc are its citizens,
is the naticn.
nECLSSITY PGR He strongly emphasizes that justice is
fi-u^DOM.
equality: all rational beings are equal
in having within them the right to freedom; th .t equality
is the principle of self-government; ana finally, equality
1. Bcsanuuet, Social ..nd International ethics, P. 198.
k.. Ibid.

of mankind makes him violently resist and resent f < rce
and mnnecessary and foreign controls. This aces not mean
th .t to be perfect, men should, ill be .^like, for s Aris-
totle rem .rked: "He community can be constituted of sim-
ilars, but it should be made up of equals and similars if
possible .
"
There is so much talk -bout and dem~nd
for justice, that Bosanquet has listed men's desires for
justice in two divisions:. 1.) to s. tisfy the dem .rids by
making possible .n inpartial development of human capacity,
which would be a long process of evolution, but a condition
which we would at seme time attain; and 2.)to guarantee
the public welfare by in efficient managment, securing
from individuals the necessary scci -1 performances. It is
this second that we are trying so hard to ccomplish today,
Bosanquet is extremely idealistic. He sees
the vast possibilities held in check by human nature t and
he is an optimist in that he believes in the inherent gecd-
SUMLL-vRY. ness of man and the steady upward climb of the
human race. At the close of his remarks he adds:
Ideal justice is the end toward which we -re working, that
ccmpararive weighing of the difficulties
of every case, and - nice adjustment of
the obligation to serve eveiy inequality
of situation,'-
and insofar as nations consciously seek to adjust their
laws and social customs to this obligation, so far will
international harmony result.
1. Bosanquet, Scci .1 . aid Pitematicu .1 g th i c
s
,
P. 267f
.
2. Ibid, P. k.06.

EVERETT.
JUSTICE IS OF
MORAL VALUE.
Lverett devotes no chapter cr" paragraph
tc tiny discussion cf (justice, per se, butt
his stand en the matter m ,y "be seen in the entire "beck
Justice is cf moral v~lue, it is a. mcr .1 v.lue, cue tc be
ccntinu .lly sought after.
He classifies a!11 moral values into eight
groups, and under each grcup there are the more clcsely
related v .lues. Justice is „nt cf the recognized character
values, along with truthfulness, "benevolence, temperance, etc.
The moral man is he who observes all the wider interests
cf life as taese are fcuua tc furtner cr to hinder the ful-
fillment cf its purposes.
BXTEBSIOJS CF Justice, <.s he brifly discusses it, dees
JUSTICE TO -vLL
KAKlilNu, net extend merely tc the rights cf one 1 s
family and friends, cr tc the formal requirements cf lav/
and convention. It also means by cemmen consent the effort
tc make ^jggtice prev.il in eccncmic life, in political
institutions, in intern .ticnal relations. "Justice," he
SUiuLLAiiY. says, "if interpreted in its full significance
commits ore tc . struggle against all the forces that
eppese its realization* * This is the some opinion s
that held by Paulsen, a double program, that cf individual
righteucsness ~nd cf organized effort tc oppose injustice.
l.Eierett, Moral Values
.
P. 165.
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LLJIXI.N , To Moeklin, interested in the organization
cf a "Great Society", democracy is the only solution for
every nation, as its task is the organization, enlightenment,
JUSTICE iiSSiLiTTLi-L and efficient application cf the senti-
IU A EEMOCBACY,
ment cf the group to the problem of
living together in society. But there is something mere
fundamental than popular sovereignty, as Plato pointed out
in his iie -public . Justice is the supreme test which must be
applied tc the sccial problem. Equity is mere fundamental
EQUITY to democracy than tc popular sovereignty.
JUHDAlffiUTAL
Americans are said tc exalt it even .<.bcve
freedom as ultimate and final; but v/e are tec often blind
to the f ct that cut equality .nd justice .re rather arti-
ficial, net on end, but a means tc the attainment cf some-
thing else. Justice and equality will always be mere or
KQUALITY BIOLOG- less cf a fiction, Mecklin thinks,
ICALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
even in a democracy, because nature
,nd heredity do net permit it. Progress demands inequality
JUSTICE MUST and injustice as well as justice and
BE PRACTICAL.
equality, fcr -t best, equality is a
scci .1 program fcr the control and utilization cf trie
inequalities that are inevitable and even necessary tc a
progressive society.
By insisting upon eg u.,li ty cf opportunity
we make it possible tc select fcr positions
of power ^nd leadership those who are
possessed cf real ability. This ability

72
is the:, utilized "by society in the elevation
of human life to a higher level where the
principle of equality may again he applied
in the interest of further advancement.
I think th .t Mecklin strikes at the heart cf the matter,
theoretical .:s is the -hove statement. Men talk glibly cf
justice and equality and yet when -hey ccme to act, too
often cne would think that the ide.- cf justice was entirely
foreign tc them,
Mecklin quotes at leng&li from seme cf the
cider ethical writers, shewing their ri.rrcwness cf vision,
their commendation cf slavery, their notions cf the right-
wucsness cf the exploitation of mere unfcrtun .te peoples,
and their religious bigc try. This last he condemns as the
underlying c ...use cf the preceding, and maintains that the
increased secularization cf the scci .1 conscience is the
greatest cf mcdern liberation advances. Men lu.ve "been re-
leased from dogmas .aid .re seeking the ultimate sanctions
through which to justify tneir efforts after social justice.
KLiOPOTXIa
. Kropctkin c|ces net cenceive cf rights as
a condition cf citizenship in a state; Tc hiin, each man
because he is a man ha.s right tc justice, jii return, tc
merit justice, he has certain chlig tiens tc his country-
men. Like Prcudhcn, Ccmte, and ethers, he teaches the
equity cf men and tae equality cf economic fights as the
"basis cf ethics. No ether has made sc held a statement.
1. Lecklin, Introduction tc Sec ial hthics
.
P. 4,

JUSTICE THE Nii.T- All have declared that inequalities
URAL RIGHT OF MIT.
existed ana that tney must be taken
into consideration, even in a democracy. Mecklin was one
of the strongest of t:.ese, McDcugall is ... close second.
Bcwne, Paulsen, irverett and Dresser conceive of a future
when .11 men will be equ .1, txria so entitled to absolutely
equal rights in -11 things.
Krcpctkin outlines his plan, recalling
Prcudhcn's On Justice in the revolution .nd in the Church
.
^~
Prcudhcn v/ished to ere :te a "philosophy of the people",
based on knowledge; the object of this philosophy, as of
all knowledge, being foresight, so that the "path of
scci 1 life may be indicated before it is actually 1 .id cut"
Such ... scheme would bring justice to all
men, he thinks. Krcpctkin has tremendous faith in m .nkind.
I shculc liks to see his iae.-.s carried cut. I favor his
te .chings .beve all ethers, unrest; exceptions be made of
Bcwne and Kverett. I .-dmire his kindliness, generosity,
vision, ind -rdcr for what ne believes to be the happiness
of -11 men, A Prince himself, ne pra< ticed what he preached.
I despise c-ste, class, station; I detest "bourgecsie
"
pugnacity in trying tc climb the social ladder: is the cry
of Krcpctkin.
1. Krcpctkin, Kthics
. P. 27 Of.

He ccasiders the sense of person -1 dignity
is the true essence of justice and the fundamental prin-
ciple of all morality. He says:
PiLiiSOHxiL DIGITITY If this sense of personal dignity
FUj^G)«i£^I«.L. is uevelcped in .n individual, it
becomes with reference to all men-
regurdiess cf whether t^ey ..re friends or
enemies- a sense cf human dignity. The
right is .,n -Ability inherent in ..11, to
derndiid from -11 others that they respect
human dignity in their own ^ersens; and
duty is the demand th t everyone should
re cognize this dignity in ethers.
Although it is impossible to icve everyone, we can and must
respect e<.~ch one's personal dignity; we c-nnct demand the
love cf ethers, but we have a right to dem .nd a respect for
cur personality. Society, says . repctkin, cannot be built
on mutu .1 love, but it can be built on mutual respect, --.fter
respect, just treatment comes naturally, .nd friendliness
is likely to fellow.
To feel and tc ^ssert human aignity first
in all that pertains tc us, and then in
i-he person. tlity cf cur fellcwQmen, with-
out failing into egoism - as well as net
paying attention either tc duty cr tc
society - this is right. Tc be ready
unuer all circumstances tc iise energet-
ically in defense cf this dignity - this
is justice.
Here he differentiates the just into
i
"right", which is Paulsen's conception* If men fully
c .rried cut these principles j there wculd be nc rccm
for slavery, no selfish dictatorship cf a nation by any
1. Krcpctkin, Ethics, P. 270.
2. Ibid,
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ether nation, no striving for egotistic. .1 m.stery among
nations, no cemmerei .1 injustices. If men were guided by a
JUSTICE AS "sense of righteousness", (which Jcdl calle
RIGHT.
by the plain, cld-f .shicned name of conscience),
that is, the consciousness cf the e4 u..i right of ..11 men
to i mutual regard for personality; and felt for fellowmen
a natural kindliness and the feeling cfl syrnp .thy, something
far higher than the mere feeling cf scci .lity; tnere v/culd
be m equal opportunity for .11 men and for .11 n._,ticns.
This feeling is net inborn, it must be developed and this
is no easy matter ;icthing worthwhile is easy.
SUl/Q&vriY. Krcpctkiii believes that justice begins
witn the individual, and wnen the individual is right, all
will be well. His ethical formula m .y be summed up in the
following: Without equity, tnere is nc justice, and without
justice, there is no morality.
MCSOUGALL . McDcugall brings the individual into his
discussions but rarely. Let the few make the st-te right
and the problem is solved. The individual will follow his
^IMS AT JUSTICE IN leaders as the sheep will fellow the
GC^h.^lCTG.
bell-wether . His theories on democracy
ci.sh with all the others, (except Iircpctkin, ./he dees not
go into any lengthy exaltation or condemn- .ti en cf this
mode cf government, ) when he writes that the principles cf
ultra-democracy, aii-ncugh its ...dvcc.tes cl .im highly developed

mcr-1 c .p ..cities for all men, are yet founded upon a deep-
lying distrust cf human nature.
It cl-iras that every men should h ve an
e^u.-l voice in the central of aff .irs,
on the ground that no man c in be trusted
to ict f-irly towards his fellcwQiaen,
that every m..n who may held power in his
hands will use it unjustly, that he will
net act et..ic .lly, striving only to real-
ize the e t^ico-pcli tic-1 ide hut will
r-:.tner act unjustly for his own advantages.
McDcugall, the most aristocratic in principle cf any of our
group, here entirely repudiates t.e teachings cf Lecklin,
who f..vcrs democracy us the cne and only solution cf the
E^UiiLITY BI0LOG- problem cf government, and yet is him-
I J..LLY IMPOSSIBLE.
self willing to .dmit th t the ^reat
principle upon which democracy is founded - "all men are
created equal" - is net wholly true, nor can it ever be.
Therefore .-11 men cannot be tre .tea with equity, McDcugall
disagrees with all the ethers. The whole tone of his book
is pessimistic, .t times almost sour. He has but little
faith in mankind in general, ana is therefore afr -id to
"give the incft 1* fcr fe;.r that men will take the 'mile".
In all cf this he m .y be perfectly true. On the ether
BXnflfAfiT: HIS h .nd, is it net far better to vision the
PESSIMISM.
ideal through reality, even though it be
sordid? How at variance .re his teachings with those cf
E. Stanley Jones, .vac sees men striving fcr the attain-
ment cf t.ieir ideals, potentially geed, with vast pos-
1. McDcugall, thics -nd Seme Modern World Problems
,
P. 17 5.
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sibilities, c ^abilities and en thus i una fcr moral progress.
It seems tc me that LlcDcugall has an unfortunate tendency
to see al men through the principle th t they re at the
threats of t..eir fellows, deliberately enccsing the un-
just in conscious preference to the just.
I BgSL^R . "The essence cf justice has sometimes been
regarded -s reciprocity,"^ writes Bresser. Confucius centered
his formulation cf the Golden *iUie around t..is idea; What
JUSTICE HOT TO BLa. ycu do not want dene tc others, do net
CCOTUSED WI'iH
x_i JlPrtOCITY. do tc others* 11 Here again we have P .ul-
sen's firs$ consideration cf justice: namely, e ch individual
must do his proper part in the rel tionships cf daily life.
Confucius went no further than this; if his people tended
to live ti.eir own lives ..isely, t..ere wcurd be no injustice,
he thought. But all men do net, no. so we have Paulsen *e
necess .vy rules.
Again, we see t.. t reciprocity is said to
imply a law cf compensation, in human relationships in
their entirety, a "law cf .cticn and reactxen such that
deeds done signify t,.e rebound cf experience fcr experience".
JUSTIJli AS In ciher words, "what you sow, ye sh .11 -iso
..DJUSTML1TT.
reap*, if one s-ws injustice, he sh 11 reap
injustice. Such a conception makes cf injustice a kind of
mecxicniical adjustment in precise c errespenaence tc deeds
1. Dresser, ethics in The cry . ua plicati cn t P. 360.
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dene and makes nan ,.ct justly for fe r ill will return to
him. Thus Smersozi refers tc justice which "executes itself"
where each receives wh -t he merits."*- T:iere are twe ebjectiens
tc this view: one given by Dresser when he declares th t
it "substitutes an e .sily ssumed cptism fcr needed inves-
tigation of sccinl conditions," and the second my own , name ly
,
that men will .ct tec quickly ana unjustly, talcing chances
that the compensation meted cut tc tliem m..y be overlooked
this time, or be comparatively slight. "Life invests itself
with inevitable conditions which the unwise seek tc dedge".
Dresser believes th it tiie highest moral
duty fellows from -.eve rather than from a sense of duty.
This is practically i.x agreement with Kropotkin's, (and
Proudhon's) teaching, Man h .s an .version to duty. Love,
JUSTICii COMHiiLLLD BY also, has the same aversion, but
iX)V^ B&THBB THAN DUTY;
SUMMARY, whom man loves he aces all possible
tc im.ke happy; ana justice then becomes - pleasure r t.ier
th a grudgungly performed duty.
Ethically speaking, justice is the highest
principle tc be considered, th t is, justice
is -icble public lcve.^
Such leve is made" universal, not selective, and free from
the intellectual restrictions of knowledge, circumstance
nd temperament upon which choice is bused. Justice seeks
tc benefit all aisinterestedly. This is i very ide .lis tic view.
1. Emerson, Lss^ys . First Series.
2« Dresser, Ethics in The cry .nd . yplicaticn
,
P. 360.
J
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CE&PTBB THREE
PATRIOTISM
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INTRODUCTION.
Fnen Sir Walter Scctt wrote the "Lay cf
the Last Minstrel", he touched a very tender spot in the
hearts cf mcst men;
HATUxiAL LGV^ OF H0M8 "Breathes there a man with scul so dead
AHD COU3TZRY LAUDABLE: Vba never to himself hath said:
•This is my own, my native land? 1
Y.hcse heart hath ne'er within him "burned
As heme his fectsteps he hath turned,
From wandering cn a foreign strand?
If such there "breathe, go, mark him well,
For him no minstrel raptures swell: "
We have no use for a shew of indifference
cr ingratitude toward cne's heme, town, city, state, co-
nation. A m^n w.xC has never thrilled to see his flag aloft;
who has never felt - tinge cf pride in reading cf his country's
heroes and their exploits, is fortunately trie exception and
net the rule, Such a one h..s no right tc demand cr even ex-
pect protection from his government, icr he gives i t nc al-
legi nee.
In centuries p .st there was nc such tning
as patriotism, unless we except China, where the people were
closely knit together, and the Jews, who have survived as a
people; if net as a nation; simply because cf their pride
in their Judaism, ncme ' s emperors fought for self-glory,
net fcr t..e s dee of one Roman people. England hu,u tc employ
hired soldiers to fight her wars
;
Germany ana It..ly have
only recently been united; patriotism, per se, in Prance, is
an outgrowth of the French Revolution, Even in Lhe United
States ; which was forced tc present a united fremt against
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Gre t Britain in order tc win and then tc maintain indepen-
dence, there wae a split into two warring factions which
fought a civil war 4 only tc "be re-united in spirit as well
as in name, when sens of the "blue" as well as tnese of the
"gray" fought for a common cause in 1918.
Lcd-y we hear much ..bout p.-trictism. In
me -ling, it is generally understood tc be lcy.lty tc one's
"patria" or country, tc fight and tc die for ner. Unfort-
unately we seldom hear of living for one's country. "<7e
are taught that true patriotism is unquestioned loyalty tc
the fatherland, or tc the land of idepticn. This is harmful
teaching. A nation, as well as an individual, may be wrong.
If tnis wrong c ainct be ligntea, then it is better tc fellow
the teaching of Bxyce ad be "loyal tc lcyalty", which means
Icy lty tc oneself. In such . c .se cne will net aid and abet
a country in evil practices. This is the stand of the Quakers.
They believe war tc be n unmitigated evil, 'nd they gladly
endure disgrace, inconvenience, eteen tci'ture, rather th^n
fight. Tney are net "slackers". They are real nerces in that
Lhey are really lcyul tc what tc t^em seems right;
BCWi\A . Bowne rates patriotism very lew in the scale
cf values. His discussion, though brief, is extremely inter-
esting-. Lian, he s :ys, is still in the embryenie st-te cf
MA.il IL> L.TILL Il\ life i;i many w ys, and reason ai.d conscience
BMBfiYOlfIC ST^TL.
play bu t i ve.y Bmall part in aault life.
As illustrations, he cites "personal^ tribal and national
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antipathies and prejudices, cticns of hcncr and patriotism"
moot of ift ich, he declares, nave neither moral ncr rational
standing. Society is net held together "by reasoned loyalty
to humanity and moral devotion, but "by something analogous
to the herding instinct of cattle. This instinct hinds men
tcge tiier and subjects them to the law of the herd; so much
so th^t in the lower ranges of society the individual has
no rights against the tribe. Bcwne, then, would make pat-
riotism something irrational, unthinking. Tec cften it is,
but, as we shall discover as we proceed, this is but a narf
row, pessimistic view of patriotism, although undoubtedly
the most common. But Bcwne does net go beyend. He dees not
admit the ties which bind the individual tc the herd, and
which form the basis of patriotism. These- -re good. It is
only, I believe, when men are blind tc the real meaning of
patriotism and become unthinking, thu.t patriotism becomes a
vice, rather than a virtue.
On the other hand he states, later in the
beck, that
we cannot well have toe much of patriotism
which seeks by all honorable methods tc lift
one's cwii country tc the highest development
and power.
*
This patriotism tx-kes the form of friendly rivalry, and it
is only by this tru.t human progress is secured, he says.
1. Bowne, Principles of ^thids , P. 296,
CI
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Afl a nation's first obligation is tc itself and its subjects,
sc a subject's first obligation is tc himself and his nation.
This holds true net only in the,, matter of defense and protec-
tion, but also in industrial and otner international relations.
It dees net mean petty, national selfishness, but working for
and loyalty to the best that is upheld in national hener,
IlTTliRNATIOKAL Nations have great tasks which they can per-
FBISHDSHIP8.
fcrm for the sake of humanity, but it is easy
tc become self -blinded, and net tc wcrk for ether nations
than car own. Again, if a nation has such a task, t~ey must
not allow hindrance. Here Bowne takes up the question of
admission of aliens, and writes tnat a state. may net admit
aliens and other elements which are indifferent or hostile
to the national aims and spirit tc a sh^re in power, and
only tc a limited extent tc a habitation. All individuals
must be loyal and homogeneous in spirit, must be patriotic
in feeling tc the country in which they live, and whose
protection they accept.
Historically, patriotism was the great
virtue. Today patriotism is a subordinate virtue and the
st-te is only instrumental tc the good of the individual.
It is net the state, but the individuals and the ideals of
the state which count, and above these is the great ideal
of humanity which has become mere than racial grcup.

SU12MAKY. Bcwne devotes nc mere space tc any de-
tailed discussion of the subject, but as we read through
his "beck, we knew that nis ccncepticn is net a narrow,
exclusive, "better- than- thou" national one, but an all-
inclusive ideal, which so loves one's country that he
will do all within his power to make that nation worthy
of his allegiance, and worthy of being set up as an ex-
ample among nations.
I .i'u1jL>xJT Paulsen writes:
Feelings of good will for collective bodies
are manifested in three fuiidamentaQjf crrns :
as love cf heme, love of country,
and love cf humanity*
GGOL BKRIYKD Feelings of patriotism axe rooted in
FROM PATRIOTISM.
the love cf heme. Through the heme
we are united with the people and tne fatherland; a com-
munity closely knit together through a common language,
with common reverence •£ -.nd appreciation for the heroes
and leaders of the people in war and victory and in works
cf peace. We are bound together nationally in common
feelings, thoughts and belief, from which few ever get
entirely away, no matter hew long they may be separated
from the land cf ti-eir birth. The individual is bound
to his etuntry by ties cf gratitu.de, reverence, love,
and affection, and by pride, common honor tc his home
and tc his people of wnich he is a part. Tnis continues
1. Paulsen, A System cf ethics
.
P. 656.

even after all ether "bends have "been severed. Many find
greater appre ciaticn for hone and country after travel
cr residence in foreign lands. The heme and the people
unite the individual to humanity.
The nation with its historical life
appropriates the great spiritual goods
of humanity, assimilating them in its
own peculiar way, and each member of
ti.e people participates in the life
of humanity, and thankfully acknow-
ledges his membership in the great
kingdom of spirits and of Geo. upon
ear$h
,
1
Mere pride in and love for one's
native land is not all that is included in the word
"patriotism". Paulsen gives an interesting account of
the origin cf the use of the word. It is of foreign ex-
IFKBCTS OF MISCONCKPTIOU traction and comparatively
OF ITS NATUKE.
new, having been used first
by t]::e Jacobins in distinction to the Royalists during
tiie French revolution, A true patriot is net one who
merely appreciates his native land from afar, but cne
who gives his whole-hearted support tc his state, and
who considers its affairs tc be the affairs cf the people.
A patriot is loyal to his state and wills that all its
citizens be likewise* A man may love his people and not
be in sympathy with the policies of his state. He may
even be estranged from the state as such in his devotion
1. Paulsen, A System cf ethics
, 1.657
r
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tc the c^use of the people. But that is a matter con-
cerning 'individuals in relation tc their respective states
and net tu be discussed here. The writer of this thesis
regards states as aggregates cf individuals, regardless of
policies. And true patrictism is loyalty to the geed of
TBtK PATRIOTISM, all the pceple, and net necessarily tc
na tic rial policies, »
Paulsen implies that the uccentuaticn
cf patriotism
,
taking the fcrm cf rabic nationalism
is much stronger particularly in Surepe fcr the last
three generations than before. I ^uestic.i the truth cf
that statement. Throughout history, most n tiens h .ve
fcught tc retain their national integrity and power.
PATRIOTISM AS TOEBBANCH Nations have always been
B4SKD OK MUTUAL,
NATIOHAL, BBSPECT, mere cr less blind tc the
wcrth cf the rest af the family cf states. This holds
true even today, with schemes, treaties, pacts, con-
ferences in nDimber abounding, and these re hopeful
signs cf tolerance # There is still the one-sided con-
ception cf the relation cf t.-e individu 1 tc his pecple
which entails certain .buses. This ie true cf peoples
everywhere; American tourists think that ether countries
_re interesting but are re illy inferior to the States,
. id they shew thin feeling tc the peeples whose land
uhey visit. Patriotism is used fcr advertisement, tc draw
1. Paulsen, , A System of ithics, P, 659
Ibid,
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recruits to party fanaticism, and as a cloak for chauvinism.
National arrogance and abuse of foreigners still hide Behind
its name; patiotism has too often been a narrow-minded, wrongly
employed term, and and if it continues thus it will menace all
national peace and security. This is especially true today,
when nations are more interdependent than they have ever been
before. Nations, like family groups in a community, have to
live together, and they will find greater happiness and pros-
perity in peace than in hatred and destruction. It is not
necessary to be patriotic to the extent of exciting hostility
against all foreigners. National
,
pride , hatred and contempt
for neighboring nations impel men to seek quarrels; pride turns
the heads of nations as it does of Individuals. A nation,
like an individual, must have self-respeot and self-reliance,
and these must not be built up to the detriment of foreigners.
An athlete or a political party does not win sincere respect
when either one tries to extol his own virtues at the expense
of other athletes or parties. No more can a nation win lasting
respect if it uses like underhand methods, injurious to others,
to win its end. Arrogance and hatred, whether in an Individual
a group or a nation, are really always si&ns of an irritable,
diseased self-consciousness; rather, they are the indications
of no self-confidence.
SUkkARY. The function of education in arousing
patriotism is to guard love of country from degenerating into
false patriotism. Love and admiration for the great leaders
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of one's country are natural. But Paulsen thinks that respect
and justice to the foreign nations do not arise of their own
accord. On the contrary, he says;
Contempt and hatred are the natural feel-
ings. To suffer and understand the for-
eign is culture.
1
I certainly do not agree with him here. It is training which
breeds contempt for the alien, not nature. This can he seen
in the actions of little children. Regardless of color or
nationality, they play until seeds of Jealousy, suspicion and
nationality are sown and too often beautiful friendships are
ruined in th's way. I believe that it Is natural and in
stlnctlve to all men alike, nor is it unpatriotic. On the
other hand, I believe it is the evidence of a higher patriotism
to show generosity, kindness, and genuine friendliness to all
peoples, to make them feel happy and at home in the country
of their choice, and to give them equal opportunity to make a
living. It Is also more patriotic to show the best of one's
country while travelling or living abroad, and not to act
snobbishly, but to give and to win sincere friendship. In
this way would love of country and appreciation of humanity
be fused.
ULYLY jjHD TUFTS . To Dewey and Tufts patriotism is a
social question. Not to feel love of country is to be anti-
social, and is almost a crime - an expression of the disposi-
tion which is dangerous to all. As such it is a matter for
1. Paulsen, A Sy stem of Ethics , F.661,
<Q
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PATRIOTISM a SOCIAL ^LbSTICN. direct jurisdiction cf
authorities, as he who bears a grudge against his country,
spreads his poison tc sympathizers and it "bodes ill for
them all. Generally, little or no harm results to the state,
[BIG Ci PATRIOTISM, Patriotism . s being active for
the good cf tl;e st.~-.te. The patriot studies the candidates
ACTIVITY PGR GOOD on the ballet-sheet, - after he has
OP THc ST^Tx..
all the information, he votes as he
thinks wisest, and he always vc tes . The patriot dees net
merely wave flags, -no. sing national anthems. He lends his
interest ana supp ort at elections and he votes for those
whom he believes will best serve the people, regardless of
money, reward, and u political party,
AUOHG bTi.-i.TiiS: A TRULY In international relations, patriotism
IhXLUSIVx, GOOD.
means the working Reward a "truly
inclusive good." That is no true patriotism w^ich arrays
itself c.i the side cf cue's fatherland, ..gainst all or any
ether state.
Llt^L— . Drake describes patriotism as
that erne ticn, .... whose training and re-
direction must underlie the movement
tcvaxc. uhivexsal peace.
Patriotism itself is as much abused as the term, Matthew
---rncld began his ^meric.-n uddress in lumbers by quoting
a saying cf Doctor Johnson* s : "Patriotism is the last refuge
1, Drake, I rcblems cf Conduct . P. 305,
I<
of a sccunarel. " Tec often it is true, Tec many crimes are
covered with the excuse of patriotism* But, when rightly
considered, patriotism is one ci the most useful of emotions
LOYALTY TO it turns duty into a joy, it binds men to their
HOMELaHD .
hemes and country with unbreakable ties, it
tends to make brother of all individuals of cne nation.
It is necessary for men to be loyal to their country, to
PRIDE IN take pride in building it up, in making it
HOMELAND.
safe and happy for its citizens, to live so
that no disgrace will come through their names; and the
real patriot recognizes his resp cnsibili ty and lives ac-
cordingly.
Unfortunately, all men do net recognize
this responsibility, and they become emb-rassing subjects
tc any naticn, but these ^re in the minority. Patriotism
RESPONSIBILITY is of value to the state, in that it welds
TO HOMELAND.
men together, softens civil strife, and
reuses men tc maintain national honor and good against
internal and external dangers. Today, in countries where
so great a percentage of the populations are of mixed nation
ality, it is even mere necessary tc instil into children the
responsibility they owe the country under whese protection
they live.
Drake points cut the dangers of patriotism
oilier than those discussed by Paulsen. First, patriotism
DANGjjRS OF must be rationalised, so as tc be an enthusiasm
PATRIOTISM
for the really great and admirable phases of
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the national life. Instead cf national pride in armies and
navies j it should become pride in national efficiency, health,
art, literture, statemanship , an educational system, publio
"buildings, .nd tocve 11, public morals. National honor is
never decided by me^ns cf force, but by defense cf moral
st nd ids. "Dulce eib decorum est pre p .tria mcri," was all
right for heme ..nd her gladiators, but there is l newer
ideal today - the joy cf living for cue's cenntry. To make
friends, net war against neighbors, is the ideal.
Patriotism must net merge into conceit
.nd blind self-satisfaction. As Lr~.ke frankly states, it
is the superior, patronizing air cf many travellers that
C0NCi.IT. dees mere to prejudice foreigners than any ether
cne thing. Modesty, international geed manners, generosity
and . reccgni ticnACwe
1 s own shcrtccmings are much needed
virtues. Lvery government .nd eveiy people h .s failings as
well as geed points. Men need to criticize their cwn gov-
ernments.
The last point that Drake brings cut is
much simil r tc Paulsen's view: that true patriotism must
not imply a hatred cf , or a desire tc, hurt ether countries.
xJJMITY TO/W&fiD ALLc-iS. Tc speak selfishly, in the end the
interests are the same, no nation profits enough by another's
less tc warrant that less; the g -in might have come peace-
fully, -.nd hcjve been gain tc both. It is far better tc help
I (
\
(
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in the "building up cf trade among nations than tc destroy
life ,prcpe_ ty , ndj in seme cases, national resources.
Human "beings are much the same the wcrld ever, regardless
cf ecler, race, nationality, and i 11 men and all nations
shculd "be governed by tne Golden i-iule cf humanity.
ECSAN-, QBT, BoBanquet gives the most detailed, inter-
esting nd instructive teaching cn the subject. The first
p,~rt cf his book is taken up with ide s on patriotism. Ke
begins with the assertion that patriotism should be taugnt
in the schools* He proceeds tc qualify his statement.
POPULAR CC_ 3SPTIOBB Patriotism is an everyday ffair,
or patlicti&h.
net a sentiment to be dr gged cut
nd indulged in time of war or similar crises. The only
patriots are net, s many seem tc think, military man,who
may, and shculd be, patriots. Patriotism does net consist
in violently waving flags, in beating cf drums or in much
hoarse yelling about the superior glories cf ore's native
land and the inferiorities cf all other lands* True pat-
riotism is act found in the ssertica "My country, right or
wrong, but my country." It is net sentimental devotion tc
one's country, saluting the flag, singing national anthems,
and, in time cf war, willingness tc die fcr one's country.
Patriotism is asscci -.ted in the minds cf mcst people with
war, monuments tc sclc.iers, histories, triumph .1 arches,
hatred fcr other nations. This is the patriotism taught in
the schools, and nations seem tc approve cf this teaching
c
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and tc further it by recommending the observance cf patriotic
holidays. BeBanquet "hits the nail on the head" when he says
:
in patriotism we have n immense national
force -nd magic txaditicnal watchword which
may be .ppe-led tc with less or mere jus-
tice and common sense ana which is easily
made capital cf by foolish no unscrupu-
lous pclitici .ns.
The question is hew tc de.l with this gre -t force so as tc
keep it .live against ccianess and pessimism while making
it . spring of good life instead cf a source of brainless
clamcr or dangerous f -naticism.
When he discusses patriotism historically,
ne s .ys : patriotism, as a national force, rests upon:
1. ) family nd kindred bleed ties which extend tc the natio
is one great frjnl ly; k.,) heme, the actual pl .ee cf father-
HISTOKIC^L land with which cue h .s ties cf custom nd
SKETCH,
affection; and 3.) one's whole power and
me ma cf action, 1-nguage, modes cf life, social habits.
The limit of any country or nation is the limit cf common
experience; the people share the same mind and sentiments,
c.^n understand each ethers 1 ways cf living and so make
allowan es for each ether sc that the Seme 1 ws and insti-
tutions -re acceptable for all,
Since men h ve been able tc travej. so
easily and at sc little expense, the tendency has been to
m.ke cemmen cause independent cf nationality. It is a step
forward, .ve want ..11 men to ccme together en the basis cf sym-
l.Bcs^nque t , Sec i-1 .~nu Intern -ticnal .L,x,hics , P.S,
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pa thy, and not through force or fear. We want people who
belong together to live together in an organized state un-
less they willingly choose to make their residence and
business in another country. New states were created after
the World War on the basis of nationality. Alsace and
Lorraine being heavily French returned to France. Patriot-
ism, based on "patria", fatherland, is a question of nation-
ality but true patriotism must be intelligent and include
recognition and aprreciatlon of the rights of other national-
ities, if it is to be useful and not a source of conflict.
PATRIOTIC TEACHING. It is all important how one cares for
his country. He may either be united with mankind or he
may cut himself off from it. "it all deoends on whether one's
love 3f country is penetrated with a Just sense of what
makes life worth living. Patriotism must be sober, daily
loyalty; the recognition that the working center and purpose
of life lies in our duty to our f ellow-citizens and in the
law-abiding citizen spirit."^ True patriotism is this law-
abiding spirit; the recognition that to fail in normal citizen
duty is
so far as in you lies to make war
uoon and undo the society and the
state to which you belong. 2
Again he says:
true patriotism first recognizes
the root of our moral being in
the citizen-spirit and citizen-
duty and second, it is a love for
our country as an instrument and
l.Bosaniuet, Social and I nternati onal Ethics , P. 5
2. Ibid. P. 8
(LI
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and embodiment of truth, "beauty,
and kindness, or of religion. This
is the most practical of Ideals.
1
Bosanquet thinks our patriotism is in
need of a thorough cleansing. No patriotism and no poli-
tics, he believes, are trustworthy unless they are kept
sweet and clean by a real and fundamental love for those
things that are not diminished by being shared - such as:
kindness, beauty, and truth. He says:
Nothing else will lead a nation
straight and liberate it from
class interests at home and
national interests abroad.
2
He sees the whole mind, the individual's and the nation's
as a system of ideas and purposes in which, if the leading
ideas are false, narrow, and bitter, the rest of the system
is necessarily poisoned and distorted. It is, therefore , the
duty of every nation, as well as of every individual to be
strong. "it is more than a precaution or insurance; it is
oart of a nation's dignity." Civilized nations are contri-
butors to a common good, and their success is the success of
each.
PBESiUfT TRjsNDS. Patriotism and humanitarianism are
thought to be antagonistic. Humanity (the existence of
mankind) is a fact. Bosanquet says:
humanity as a quality is first,
culture, and second, sensitive-
ness .3
Honesty, kindness, and justice, he sees as the b ^unden duty
l.Eosanquet, Social and International Ethics, P.16
2. Ibid. P. 12
3. Ibid. P. 14
(I
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to mankind of each nation. We cannot live for ourselves
alone any more than we can live by ourselves and each hap
a great duty and privilege to perform to each other. He
continues:
Practically, if we belong to one
of the great civilized nations,
our highest sense of humanity is
drawn from our own national cul-
ture and kindness, only tempered
by a respect and sense of Justice
for the masses of mankind.
Thus we discover a duty to mankind that is beyond our
national patriotism, and our nation remains our Instrument
for doing service to all peoples, and our main source of
the ideal of humanity Itself. Then our duty to mankind will
be dictated by that sort of patriotism which values above
everything else; kindness, truth, and Justice. This ideal
of patriotism is of the purest kind, the only kind of service
to all men.
SUMMARY. Patriotism,, then, to Bosanquet, is not
merely a shallow, national sentiment. The highest patriot-
ism is that which makes one proud to be of the world, proud
to be one of all mankind, one which seeks to give of friend-
ship and cooperation to all peoples, at the same time being
proud to be of a nation which will be one to seek the good
if others. It is a splendid expression of international
good-will which he outlines, and it is based on good,
common sense. I believe that the sort of patriotism he
teaches will some day obtain, but it is to be worked and
l.Bosan;uet, Social and International Ethic_s, P. 15
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prayed for by all who sc see it,
BVgggTT . Nowhere dees Lverett devote space to any
detailed discussion of Patriotism, as such, but his great
message is thut of the individual, and the individual isju.
PATRIOTISM AH social being, co-operating with his
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM.
fellows. To ^verett, that individual
is ~ true patriot who best serves his country and likewise
-11 humanity by first living a life which embodies ^11 the
values possible, sc far as he knows, and second, by co-
operating with ethers, making no distinctions as to color,
race or creed. The humanitarian ideal is higher than the
HUMANITARIAN IDj&AL national, .nd is one which in-
HIGHLR EL'IT NATIONAL.
elides all men as countrymen, and
is the great Christian ideal of "neither Jew or Gentile,
bend or free," m synthesis of intelligent egoism and sens-
ible altruism,
LL^CxCLIIT , On the whole, Macklin shares the ideals
of Bos^n^uet. He stresses the individuals love of country
mere th.-n dees Bcsanquet which is good in a practical
sense, for the ideal of patriotism as above outlined, pre-
supposes nations which are advanced in civilization, and
probably democr .tic in spirit in spirit, if net in letter.
BMMD OF INCULCATING Like Bcs .n^uet, he begins with the
HUMANITARIAN IEEAI&.
necessity of inculcation cf bread
humanitarian ideals into the individual, then he teaches
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lcve cf country, a program of hard for the "betterment of
the nation. At the same time he warns against overemphasizing
the importance cf the nation, lest its citizens see no ether
peoples in ci favorable light. His idea is that cf instructing
DUAL IDEA OF the individual in "both, that is, he is to
PATRIOTISM.
love his country and to seek her improvement
that she may be able to stand among nations, and may better
help to improve the condition cf backward peoples. However,
^RBITR.RY ^JULTA- that nation must net try to arbitrarily
TION COm^MU.J).
exalt herself to first ^lace amftng
nations, nor be c entemp tuaus cf all aliens, or condescending
toward less advanced peoples, or in any other wise selfish
or egotistical, but friendly. He realizes the necessity cf
making n.tiens take a definite pride in themselves, and be
of true worth, before they are fully ^ble to co-operate
for the good cf all,
KROPOTKIN . Tc Kropotkin, ition -1 patriotism is cf
very miner consideration. In fact, he wculd be better
pleased if there were no nations j but ..11 men were in one
SOCIAL ILtjAL great state cf society, in mutual cc-
OF PATRIOTISM.
operation without governments. But as such,
an ideal cf the "greatest happiness tc the greatest number"
is something yet tc come.
S^LFISHII^bJ CQWBUSSD* Kropotkin has no use for a selfish
patriotism which is loyal to one cenntry t the expense cf
V#
I
others. He ihcncughly agree* with the ideals expressed "by
Bcs Hi quet. True lcyalty tc one's own country should in-
TBH8 LOYALTY elude a desire tc wish every ether tc he
IS ALTRUISTIC.
as "blessed and. to have the s-me eppcrtunitie
and just treatment. This is real patriotism It is - false
notion th^t t^e property aid happiness of ^ny nation can
ever be b .sed upon the degradation of ether classes, races,
or people. Modem society is teaching man better than that,
it is teaching him modesty as well as power.
Uct patriotism, love cf country, but com-
munism, social love, is the ideal. The three elements of
morality, as he sees them, ..re: 1.) mutual aid; k., ) justice;
COMLiUiriSM AS 3. ) self-sacrifice. There is no room for a
THE IBBAI>.
patriotism which aims first at self-improve-
ment, and does net give its .11 tc better world conditions
especially among the less fortunate peoples. As he says:
Mutual aid within the species thus
represents the principle factor,
the principle active agency in
that which we call evolution.
On the other ^and, he recognizes hew closely
the individual is bound up in the tribe or cl-n. Of tais
form cf society he approves, for within the small group,
HBCOG3ITIOH OF HATr mutual aid is the rule, but in the
URAL LCV^ 07 CCC 'h.Y.
Summary. larger, show and ostentation before
ethers is the rule, and international enmity the result.
1. ihopctkin, L th i c
s
.
P. 45.
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In any society, he s .ys, regardless cf the st.ge cf devel-
opment, there will always be individuals trying tc take
advantage cf their strenght rid adroitness in order tc sub-
jugate the will cf ethers tc their cwn will.Tc prevent this
-s fax as possible, he urges that each individual identify
himself with the life of his clan, or state, but never to
the exclusion cf one clan or aiate from all others.
MCLGUGALL . ' Professor LicDcugall sets forth three notions
cf patriotism. The first, found in these countries whose
system cf ethics is t..e national system, is whet the name
implies - purely nationalistic. fine example is found in
IL^TIONALISTIC. tile Jews. T.iey be .st th .t t-.ey are the chosen
people, sens cf Abraham, whose God is the enly true God, -nd
whose God is Gcd cf the Jewe enly. Their teachings .±c
elusive, their Bible is fcr the Jews enly, ...nd they have
little use fcr the rest cf the world. They do net proselyte.
Only these bexn Jews are chosen. Yet their very Judaism has
preserved them through the centuries, from assimilation
and perhaps from obliteration. The same thing is true of
the Buddhists, and with the Mohammedans, tc seme extent, al-
though these last h .ve a definite program cf missionary
work fcr the converting cf ether peoples tc t..eir belief.
The second notion is that cf these people
UiTrVoixtS^L SYSTEM, unuer the universal type cf system, who
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say: "My country, right or wrong, but my country; if you
come to live in my country and enjoy her benefits, you
must become a citizen and swear undying allegiance to
her." McDougall finds two outstanding faults here: first,
each state under the universal system has a hostile attitude
toward every other state, and each fights and strives for
its rights, and to have a higher, more powerful place a-
mong the nations and a name more to be feared; second, each
state tries to "run down" every other state, making itself
the one important country with no other in any way approach-
ing it. It looks on the citizens of every alien state as far
infeior to its own and yet tries to attract all aliens
possible into its bounds, and then attempts to convert
them almost overnight into citizens who will love and honor
their adopted state, entirely forgetting any previous sen-
they
timents that may have had for the "Fatherland." Theoret-
ically, however, the ideals of these states call for a com-
plete sweeping-away of all racial and national prejudices,
but it is fortunate, claims McDougall, that they are un-
successful, for if
such preferences, rooted as they are in the
traditional sentiments, were entirely swept
away from a people, its component individuals
would become cosmopolitans.
1
and nothing cound be worse in his eyes. If there were no
national prides, no patriotism, such preferences would be-
1. McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, P. 31
4
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come mere prejudices, the traditional sentiments of our
forefathers would no 1 nger flourish, and men would merely
"float upon the currents of life," thinking to be guided
by reason alone. A breakdown of the traditional grouping
of mankind would result, men would be freed from the con-
trol of the group spirit, whichk he thinks, renders them
loyal to society , ready to spend and sacrifice themselves
for the good of the group, obedient to its laws and re-
gardful of its future welfare. 1
Hegel taught the same view: man exists
for the state, he is first a citizen and all his ethical
obligations derive from his status as a citizen; his con-
duct is right and moral insofar as he obeys the state,
serves it, obeys It, and promotes its welfare. Such teach-
ing is the reverse of Kant's. Here man is no longer an end
in himself. This view was taken up by Prussia and we know
the result.
We can no longer tolerate any such extreme
patriotism. Our western civilizations have been theoret-
ically advertising their allegiance to an ethical con-
ception which says: MAll men are equal, and we love all men."
But in practice, when the conflict comes, man follows,
in the main, the national system. Thus he finds his prac-
tice inconsistent with his profession, and he is at a loss
to know how to make them agree.
1. McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, P. 22.
«4
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A SYjNTK^LIl*
. Hov; then, can we unite the two systems?
McDougall suggests a synthesis. First man, being a social
being, should belong to an organized group. He should be
proud of its history and hopeful for its future. Men owe
allegiance to the group to which they belong and from which
they receive the most benefits. No cosmopolitan scheme
can perform the functions of a nation. It is too vast for
men to conceive and toe heterogeneous to call into play
the social potentialities of men in general. It suffers
weakness from its vast size. Nationalism, and the sentiments
of patriotism and national loyalty are essential conditions
for the good life for the masses ofmankind.
It is fashionable among those intellectuals
who claim for themselves a monopoly of en-
lightened liberalism and human sentiment,
to decry patriotism as a barbarous survival
which, however excuse or justification it
may have had in the past, can now and in
the future work only harm to mankind.
1
This belittling of patriotism is one of the stock features
of cosmopolitanism.
CRITICISM; McDougall is so enamoured with patriotism
SUMMARY,
that he gives it a high place, higher than religion. He says;
Fortunately, throughout the development of
European civilization with its dual system
of ethics, the dominance of sentiment over
logic, so natural to the mass of mankind,
has permitted these two great sources of moral
effort, religion and patriotism, to cooperate
in a large measure, in spite of the logical
incompatibility of patriotism with the univer-
sal ethics.
1. McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, P. 64
2. ibid, P. 65.
(1
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I think that here ag tin he shews lack of
deep thought. Religion stands for these values which true
and net narrow patriotism expresses. McDcugall, however,
dees net go "beyond the hounds of the n .ticri in his conception
of patriotism. For -n illustration of what "religion" has
done for a country which he considers devoid of patriotism,
he points to India and cites as his authority a hook, "un -
surpassed" in value, .s he thinks, by Mr. William Archer j
India -nd the Future . In it Mr, Archer states th.~t religion
is doing India no good; th~t what she needs is "patriotism
as an inspiring principle." But he gives no reference to the
kind of religion under which Indi.- struggles, nor dees he
seem to know anything about her struggle for freedom from
Eritish domination. Mr, McDcugall is interesting. He says
much of value, but he is disappointing. He dees net seem
absolutely sure of his own stand and ~s a result he begins
what premises tc be ft valuable, enlightening study in real
patriotism, ..nd ends up lamely in a nationalism which he
himself confesses is net sufficient for today's needs.
gjUSSSgjB . Dresser, opposite in view tc McDcugall,
OPPOSITION gives very little space tc a study of pat-
TO MCDCUGALL.
rictism as such, and what he dees s.«y very
closely resembles Bcs-nque
t
1 s teachings. He has no sym-
C0I©^M1^i;..T.x:l.L p.. thy with a blunt, national form
FORM OF PATRIOTISM.
of patriotism and promptly dismisses
it as "cut of date."

I am glad tc see him take this attitude.
I believe that t.ere was a time when patriotism, the nat-
ion .1 expression cf loyalty that so "believed in one's
SinffiLJ-iY. country that it could see no others, was good.
But today we ..eed the patriotism that is Icy .1 tc .11 hu-
manity, th t is proud cf the f .the rland *hen th .t father-
land is deserving, but which Bays: "My country, may she
ever be righti! Beyond this, Dresser has nothing tc -dd.

WAR AS A REMEDY
FOR
INTERNATIONAL GRIEVANCES
*
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INTRODUCTIOH. Wai has always been one of the favorite
methods of solving problems and settling disputes. It is
a "hang-over" from the animal kingdom. I cannot see the
necessity of it for human beings. It settles disputes,
but it leaves with the unfortunate defeated party the de-
sire for revenge as soon as he has gained strength enough
to inflict it. So the feud goes onf, whether it is be-
tween individuals, grouDs
,
states, or nations.
HISTORICAL SKETCH. Tn earlier centuries, man knew no re-
course for wrongs but to fight. He had no thoughts for the
rights of other people. It was a question of having what he
wanted. The earliest books of the Old Testament teach
this. The Israelites destroyed the Canaanites and took
Canaanitish land. G-od had ordered their deed, and it was
right in His sight. But it was not right for invading
hordes to lay waste Judaea. That was another story.
Justice in war depended upon one's viewpoint.
L^TEJl DLV.J.L0PILOTS. Even some later wars are not all to be
condemned. Rome opened up Europe in her invasions. Com-
merce has resulted from war. When the route to the East
was closed by the capture of Constantinople, trade routes
had to be changed and water routes were sought, with the
result that Columbus found a new country between him and
Cathay. Again, revolutionary wars have been necessary
and have brought progress. The American and Frehch, and
now the Russian and Chinese revolutions are examples. Most
c*
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Most men dc net believe that the Civil <"ar cculd hav e
been averted, except "by allowing the Southern States quiet-
ly tc withdraw from the Union. When an immovable body meets
an irrestible fcrsre, a clash results, and when progress
has anywhere met the old regime
,
blccdsned has nearly
always resulted.
CL^SoIx'IC-^TION . As far as possible the latest conceptions of
war will be discussed in this chapter: v/ar which is good in
that it incites progress; war for rignts against grievances;
and war which "lets off steam." Against these we find reasons
for the abolition of war in: man's control cl emotions; in
nations and races seeking mere rightly tc interpret ether's
motives; ana in arbitration,
BG'tfAe. . Bcwne emphasizes the importance of nation-
ality, but sees no necessity for t-^e ncstiliLy which has
generally existed jrncng nations. He admits, ^owever , that
EmPHASlS OH friendship and uuderti tanding are easier
:"-^TI0;;aLISM. in theory than in application. He says:
When we ..re celling with the abstract
notion of nationality and the relations
of st tes the mutttr is fairly simple,
but ..hen v/e pass tc the relations of
actual states the questions are far more
complex, x.gain, if all states were on
the s;ime plane of development and civili-
zation it would be relatively e<~sy tc de-
termine their mutual duties, but in fact
we nave social crgani^&ti ens varying from
the patriarchal and tribal condition up
tc t..e modern civilization,
1 . Bcwne , Prii.ci pJLeg of .ui.ncs . P . 29 7 ,

10?
How are all men, from such widely differentiated stages of
society, to get along together without bloodshed? Individuals
on the same plane in our most civilized nations cannot do it.
Is it then useless to conceive of a warless world?
HISTORICAL SKETCH. Historically, wars have often been necess-
ary. Wars of self-defense have been waged by the civilized
nations against the barbarous hordes, and it is only a short
time since the barbarous and uncivilized races were so defin-
itely put under foot as to be no longer a source of danger.
Modem science, by its military inventions, has rescued civ-
ilization from the danger of barbarians. Again wars have
arisen in order to secure rights of humanity and industrial
development. Both of these types have been necessary, bene-
ficial in their results, and morally justifiable. Bowne has no
use for the "professional philanthropist," who, he claims,
overlooks these facts and denounces all wars as in one class
of butchery and murder.
War for passion's sake is only animal
ferocity; war for ambition's sake is the
sum of all crimes.
,^3ITRATI0M. With the progress of humanity, it is
hoped that the latter type will not be necessary, and that
the former type will be impossible. Bowne expresses the
hope that national differences will yet be settled by rea-
son and "righteous arbitration." He hopes that the spread
of education will make men more reasonable, less blinded by
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, P. 301.
(«
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the glories of war, and that it may show them the unspeak-
able folly of the customary rant about national honor. He
concludes
:
In particular the spread of the industrial
type of society and of the Christian idea
of man must tend more and more to make war
in its traditional forms something which the
conservative and humane elements of society
will not tolerate.
1
War, then, for protection he considers
excusable and it is the duty of the nation, but he condemns
aggressive warfare. Y<ara is one of the results of our pres-
ent system of nationalities, but as no better system is so
far known to suit the present needs, he warns men to use
caution and consideration in their international dealings
and to busy themselves with better things than war.
SUMi^RY. Bowne's treatment is very brief and
abstract. He wrote during a reconstruction period in Amer-
ica and one of comparative, although smoldering, quiet in
Europe. The World War with its horrors had not yet happen-
ed, war was still a simple proposition. He would have had
much more to say had he written thirty years later, for he
never hesitated to face any issue and treat it fully and
frankly.
P .UL&l.- , . Paulsen first takes up the question
in his discussion concerning the theory of evolution to
pthe antithesis of egoism and altruism. It is claimed, he
states, that a system of moral philosophy which is based upon
1. Bowne, Princi ples of Ethic s , P. 301
2. Paulsen, A System of Ethics, P.394-f. From Huxley , Evolution
and Ethics, and Kidd, Social Evoluti on.
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the theory of evolution cannot explain the social virtues.
Natural selection may produce selfishness, strength, and
shrewdness, and energy in the pursuit of selfish interests,
but never self-denial and self-sacrifice. He answers to
the contrary. There are a few isolated cases, but on
the whole, men live as human beings, in tribes, societies, com-
munities, nations. Beasts of prey live in isolation, the
only examples claimed above.
Man unites with other men in concentrated
efforts to produce lasting good. Sociableness preserves
life, like the qualities of loyalty, fidelity, devotion, and obed-
ience, upon which it depends.All these qualities, he says,
tend to preserve the life of man and can, therefore, be
developed by natural selection. They will be developed
especially in the struggle for existence which tribes and
nations are constantly waging against each other. "Man is man's
most dangerous foe." Paulsen sees good in this struggle, as
the more fiercely the tribes struggle for
their interests, power, and existence, the
stronger the pressure is from without, the
more essential and the firmer becomes the
internal union. Disobedience, selfishness,
disloyalty, and cowardice are condemned most
severely and eliminated most thoroughly when
the tribe is threatened by an enemy; whereas
external peace tends somewhat to loosen the
internal union.
1
Daulsen here considers Herbert Spencer's
view that the altruistic or social impulses are constantly
1. Paulsen, A System of Ethics . P. 395.
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growing at the expense of the egoistic. Human nature
adjusts itself to the conditions of social life. Wars
become less frequent and therefore the military instincts
gradually disappear and industrial life of peaceful cooper-
ation replaces the military.
TUM.-j.?
T
ts OF Y/AR. In contrast to Spencer, Paulsen favors
war when necessary. He declares,
It is a strongly socializing force. Simul-
taneously with the hostile instincts it produces
social instincts. 1
Civilization, which makes wars less frea.uent, weakens the
militsrv instincts on the one hand, and looses the internal
unity on the other. Spencer describes historical develop-
ment as a progressive socialization, in which there is a
gradual abatement of war. Paulsen agrees with him insofar
as he has to admit that men no longer live like savages, but
he sees mankind as essentially egotistical, and declares
that feelings of hatred, suspicion and envy are more com-
mon today than ever before in society.
"The more complicated the cooperation,
p
the greater the opportunity for friction," he teaches. For
proof he would have us compare the number of colisions
found among a group of officials, teachers, or preachers,
to those among a group of peasants or soldiers. But he does
not take into consideration the fact that those among the
former, though bitter, are generally verbal and an agree-
ment is nearly always reached peacefully, while those which
1. Paulsen, A Sys_tem of Ethics , P. 396.
2. ibid. P. 397.

1do occur among the latter are often caused by trifles,
and too frequently blood is shed. Which, I ask, is pre-
ferable?
Paulsen does not believe that wars will
disappear. Nations are too desirous of power, honor, ad-
vantage and fame at each other's expense, for peace to have
WAR MAY BE any chance as a oermanent condition among
OUTGROWN.
nations. On the other hand, he expresses him-
Belf as half wishing that he could share what he terms
Spencer's error (that is, a dream of eternal peace) and
he hopes others may share it with Spencer - so many others
that sometime it will become reality. But for Paulsen,
he is satisfied that the "industrial life" and the "militant
life" may flourish.
Paulsen was a German writer, a professor
of philosophy in the University of Berlin in 1899, un-
doubtedly saturated with the Bismarck ian philosophy and per-
CONCLUSION AND haps afraid to teach peace, fearing
SUMMARY; HIS
GERMAN VIEWPOINT. Prussian displeasure. The Prussian war-
machine was in full force at that time. *t was the greatest
German interest; it was in process of perfection. Paulsen
could not teach otherwise, in all probability, but it is
interesting to note the suspicion of uncertainty which he
allows to enter his discussion. This is most noticeable In
his evaluation of the Spencer ian views on war. He realizes
that to espouse war directly opposes his philosoohy of a
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life of peace and equality. There is a faint note of un-
certainty, a wistful hope that war may be able to disappear
from the earth with no detrimental results to the closely-
knit states whose cause he champions. Later on in is book,
whilt discussing "veracity,"
1
he again sounds this faint,
uncertain note, when he cannot make the strategy and deceit,
(so necessary in times of war) quite fit into a scheme of
universal honesty to be employed by all people at all times.
He excuses such deception by claiming that it is right,
since both sides use it - a theory of "all is fair in war"-
but that whenever in war a person meets another person who
is not a foe, utmost honesty must again prevail. The same
is true whenever there is a temporary suspension of hos-
tilities such as an armistice. He makes no effort to re-
concile the 'two, nor could he. Paulsen's treatment of
war is his weakest point.
MBBff AMD TUl'To. Dewey and Tufts take up the earliest
historical consideration af war and agree with Bowne and
Paulsen that historically wars were often both necessary
and beneficial.
Wars and contests in games served to work
out characteristics which received also a
definite social reinforcement, namely,
courage and efficiency, a consciousness of
power, a sense of achievement.
2
Again we find t-at "cooperation in war and the blood feud
were patent as uniting factors within the several groups as
1. Patlsen, A System of Ethics, P. 675.
2. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, P. 42.
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members must unite or be wiped out." Then mutual help and
defense made fellow feeling, but times have changed. The
earliest causes for war were moral and not bad in the eyes
of the group. Important among them were: 1.) to gain more
land for the group; 2.) to acquire booty for the group;
3.) to avenge wrong done to the group or some members of
it. War as an occasion involving some special danger or
crisis, called forth the spirit of unity within the group.
As a playchological agency it tended toward individualism.
The struggle for existence bred into men the habit of
united self-defense; with this came the emotion of anger,
and the instincts to rivalry and mastery and the corres-
ponding aversion to being ruled. Dewey and Tufts hold that
the contests between groups tended to bring forward leaders,
with the result of one code for the rich and the leaders,
and another.for the poor who had no choice but to {light at
the eommand of the leaders. Such a state of affairsis all
wrong, they write, for a
social organization is clearly defective
when its constituent portions a.^e so set
at odds with one another as to demand from
individuals their death as their best ser-
vice to the community.
1
TiuIDLNCIiS TODAY. In wars today tnese writers see only
self isliness , ambition which sweeps aside all consideration
of others, ill-conceived revenge for wrongs which could be
settled quietly without incurring the needless pain and
suffering of war, and torture which is unnecessary in our
1. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, P. 442.
((
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civilizations today. The development of national st .tes
marks a tremendous step forward in the realization of the
principle of truly inclusive common ^ccd, but it is net
NO ItiCLSSITY the final step.
FOB JAR.
States are still arrayed against states
with patriotism, loyalty, as an internal
virtue, and the distrust and hatred of -
divisive hostility as the counterpart vice.
The ide,. c£ humanity has been obtained in the abstract as
a moral ideal, but the political organization of this con-
ception, embodied in law and administrative agencies, is
still far. from being achieved. In conclusion it is refreshing
to nctw this frank statement
1
The argument that war is necess-ry to prevent
moral degeneration of individu Is m.y, under
present conditions, where every day brings its
fresh ch llenge to civic initiative courage,
and vigor, be dismissed as unmitigated nonsense.
V/cuj.d that more autners, politicians, teachers and preachers
would take this stand. There wc uld be less money spent on
cruisers, bombs, large standing armies, gcla lace and Sam
LXPiiNDITUiiEi SHOULD B* Browne belts for generals, md
ON NATIONAL IHPHOVSMENTS.
mere money put into flcdd control,
farm relief, or Near Bast Relief; But politicians, (and also
seme teachers and preachers,) love to arouse the excitable
emotions of "patriotism" in people, and so win favor, votes,
or increased salaries, c± increased s ilaries. If movie directors
SUMLUnY; CONX8SU- would believe it and dare act upon its
[&TION OF WAB,
principles, there would be fewer pictures of
1, Dewey and Tufts, Ethics ; 1. 442.
2« xbid, P. 482.
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the glories of battle-field heroism. I think it would
"be a g ^od thing for Americans and for all the world. Why
constantly remind men of hatred and strife? We are too
much at the mercy of suggestion; and there is enough hatred
and strife prevalent as it is. Would it not be tetter if
out) aim were friendship, cooperation, understanding; to sow
seeds that will yield these fruit and abolish all other?
EDWARD KELi^IEuiL. 1 should like to insert here a brief
sketch of war and imperialism, given by Edward Kreibel. 1
He is avOTrealy a nationalist of the strongest stampi. He
flefiner nationalism as "the power to make war and peace;
the supreme and effective jurisdiction over a given area
and its inhabitants." To him, the state is absolutely
supreme «iu the fed era*,ion of ^tate** is impossible.
The current philosophy of the state,
he says, accepts the nation as the best and highest possible
development, as such. Each nation believes it has the pe-
culiarly important m'ssion to perform; each nation claims
superior bravery and fighting audacity; and each nation believes
its highest duty is to survive. To him, nations mean
nothing in cooperation. He sees each at the throat of
t ie other.
Such an attitude leads to Imperialism,
he says, because a vigorous nation must expand. It can
never stand still. Its superior ideals demand expansion
1. Kreibel, Edward, Nationalism, War, ajad Society , N.Y. :
1916. A book found 'on college shelves for reference
wort.
»I
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to smaller, weaker, less civilized nations. In this way,
each state becomes the rival of every other state. As
rivals, each state recognizes national necessity to be
above law, and to hold first place over promises, treaties,
and humane considerations. In the state each citizen is ex-
pected to accede in everything that the state does. Force,
he declares, is the ultimate solvent of differences between
nations, and so preparedness, to him, becomes comparable to
insurance. Again, force is necessary to maintain a balance
of power, absolutely necessary anion? states.
His frank treatment of war follows the
same lines: war, he says, and the need for it, is inevitable
because 1.) it is a divine Institution; 2.) it is confirmed
by history; 3.) human nature is so constituted that wars can
not be helped; 4.) commercial rivalry leads to strife; 5.)
war Is a wholesome moral influence (he is not explicit as
to how it is such a wholesome or such a moral influence);
6.) rivalry makes for alertness (is rivalry the only thing
that keeps us alert?); 7.) war helps progress by deciding
differences: 8.) war maintains the level of population (but
are the enormous war debts contracted by belligerent nations
economically advantageous?); 10.) armaments secure peace (he
wrote thirteen years before our present Anglo-American
cruisers difficulties) and lastly, war is good because it
necessitates the centralization of power and the reduction
(
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of personal liberty*- Could anything be more Prussian in
tone? The tone of the book is militaristic, man is con-
ceived of as a mechanistic puppet, obedient to the mili-
taristic whims of an imperialistic state. Could anything
be worse for the peace of humanity? We know all too well
the results of such a philosophy from the tragedy of the
World War of 1914-1918. Dewey's and Tuft's stand, dia-
metrically opposing this, is far more humane and righteous.
DKAK^
.
Durant Drake offers his discussion of
war by listing first the benefits of war, then its evils,
comparing the two, and drawing his conclusions. It is in-
teresting to note how different are the benefits he lists
from those of Kriebel: 1.) war brings joy and excitement
to men, a sense of power, daring, achievement, patriotic
feelings. Men love to read tales of heroes, they enjoy im-
agining themselves as such. They enjoy martial musice,
wearing military uniforms, drill and routine of war. They
feel a sense of effort and accomplishment, of worth in life,
a thrill of pleasure at the thought of sacrificing them-
selves for a cherished cause. But in our present methods of
warfare, much of the glamor is eon©. When millions fight,
the individual is minimized; there is less daring in hushed
trench warfare than in infantry advances to the roll of
drums; achievement is not thought of in terms of cathedrals
ruined, and children maimed and orphaned. At the front,
martial music must be taboo, military uniforms are no longer
(r >
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of brilliant colors, frilled and gold-laced, but full of
vermin and drab in color. Instead of war, satisfaction is
now being found in friendly rivalries, games, and useful
endeavors. 2.) War necessitates discipline and organization,
courage, self-sacrifice, and stimulus to virtues carried over
into other fields. It kept men from inertia, from idle
pleasure-seeking; it fostered energy and hardihood. It quiet
ed civil stri_e. It taught the necessity of union and Jus-
tice at home. But national solidarity is now our stable
possession. We need no longer strive for it. Hardy virtues
can now be awakened in less disastrous ways. War is no
longer a spur to personal or social morality. 3.) Wars of
self-defenoe were once necessary. Wars of offence were also
necessary to wipe out existing evils. Our Civil War was one
of these. The French Revolution was another. But - modern
justification along these lines is a flimsy pretext and
truly legitimate occasions for war are now rare. Nations
now use courts of arbitration. Again, nations are showing
more patience with one another. 4.) War has been a means,
directly or indirectly, of spreading civilization. But to-
day all lands are open to peace penetration; missionaries
and traders do more to colonize than do armies.
XVILB OF WAB, He then lists the evils of war: 1.)
Sherman v/as right in his famous description of war as Hell,
agrees Drake. War spreads disease and causes suffering,
crippling strong men and innocent child i en, death in the
»
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prime of life, bereavement to sweethearts, widows, and
orphans. 2.) War is morally harmful; it is cruel, callous,
contemptuous of life, it makes for sensuality, it kills
sympathy. National hatreds instead of national apprecia-
tions result. It takes away effort that could and should
be used for remedying social and moral evils. 3.) War
costs the loss of the best blood of nations. It was this,
says Professor Drake, that brought about the downfall of
the G-reek and Roman civilizations. A. nation needs its
manhood to live, not to die for it. The inevitable result
is racial defeneration. "War is r.he greatest of dysgenic
forces, it undoes the effect of a hundred euganic laws."^
4.) War is a tremendous drain on a nation's resources, re-
sources that might otherwise be utilized for the advance of
civilization. The Y.'orld War left a debt of nearly Three
hundred billion dollars - enough money to have built ex-
cellent roads, comfortable homes, and given education and
pleasant conditions to every one. Every shot from a modern
sixteen inch gun costs a-poroximately a thousand dollars. Add to this
the indirect costs of war: loss of time and work of millions
of able-bodied men, economic loss of their illness and death,
destruction of property, obstruction of commerce, paralysis
of industry and agriculture, ravages and looting of armies,
maintenance of hospitals and finally, pension and insurance
money. Beyond this add the cost of an army maintained during
1. Drake, Problems of Conduct , P.316.
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times cf peace: the feeding, clothing, ihd housing of men,
"building and maintaining barracks, forts j battleships, guns,
amuniticn, and arecplanes, Nations waste themselves in war
efforts, and the results are net worth it.
EOSAH^UgT, Bcsanquet agrees that war should be
KIS NEUTRAL ST^InID:
WaR SHOULD ELd abolished, but he qualifies his state-
ABOLISPhJ).
ment when he s.rys th .t in this very
imperfect and uncertain world, it is necessary to be pre-
pared to repel force by force. He cites Plato and Pichte,
"two of the greatest idealist cf the world," as these whe,
like himself have sternly insisted on the duty cf a state
to be strong. As to disarmaments, in connection with this
SOlik. AELu*liLl\TT necessary preparedness , he continues to say:
Ycu have to distinguish between the
demands cf maiihcod with national dignity
and security, and the lu:jt for military
predominance and interference. The only
way to be sure cf keeping straight, is
to cherish a patriotism which really
and sincerely desires for one's country
the best things cf life, ^nd ethers
only as a means fci them.
Ve should continually ask ourselves: Is this that is .pro-
posed really necessary for the picrncticn cf the best life
fcr my country and her dependencies? Or is it just an cut-
come cf jealousy and selfishness and the desire tc play a
selfish nd conspicuous part?
A healthy state is net militant. The nor-
mal relation among st .tes is cc-cperative , and its main-
1, Bcsanquet, bcci -.1 ud Intern ^ticnal ^ th i c
s
i
.
P. Ik.,
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tenance depends not upon armed force, but rather upon their
right discharge of their duties to their mutual benefit. In
order to reinforce the organization and observance of rights
by other states, the main thing is for each state to complete its
own and enforce its own laws to advantage. In this way
each state maintains its own peculiar contribution to the
whole of human life and the human mind.
War is not of the essence of states, he
declares. Rather it has its causes in their "internal disease
and destruction," and its policies of expansion. Man too
easily values power, territory, and fame above conscience
and brotherhood, and while this obtains, the root of wat
exists. Bosanquet is optimistic enough to hope for a day
when men will put altruism above egoism and when wars will
no longer"*benecessary , but that day is still far in the future.
He expresses his opinion when he says:
The hope that the danger of war would be
diminished as the grosser personal inter-
ests of monarchs and statesmen ceased to
be among its causes, has no more been ful-
filled than the kindred hope that represen-
tative self-governemnt woujd ipso facto ;
bring haupiness to people. 1
Although people (and nations) are still in great part deluded
into war by their rulers, yet at times a certain principle
of their own consciousness acts in that direction. Here
Bosanquet blames both the "average man" (see Liecklin) and
the ruler. He further reproves:
1. bosanquet, Social and International Ethics, P. 303.
((
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The spirit of a state, that is, the
executive unity of a people, is a force
of human nature which is found on occas-
ion to make powerfully for war.l
We argue that not only is human nature prone to err, liable
to go to war, but we go further and say that war is just
what human nature means and demands. Making war thus right
raises it from a fact to a principle and the state becomes
the state militant. The spirit of the state, in turn, be-
comes a war spirit*
Although this is only too true it is
not good. The principle stated above ignores the positive
function of the group-will, and is the rock on which most
peace pacts, leagues, and federations come to grief. As he
sees them, most leagues and similar organizations aim at
restricting and disparaging the group will. The greater
they become, the greater the hazards. The principal condi-
tion of our trouble today, he believes, is that huge federations and
alliances have gone beyond the control of this group-will.
If they encroach upon one another, disaster is inevitable.
He does not credit most of them with "sagacity," "flexibility,"
or "single purpose of a true communal mind and will." Bosan-
quet does not, as is seen, favor the political or internation-
al organization in this respect. To him it gives the com-
munity but an inaccurate expression which is ill in effect.
Bosanquet strongly favors the community. Further dis-
cussion on the community as an agent for peace rather than
1. Bosanquet, Social and International Ethics, P. 303.
(
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the large international organization, will be treated in
the last chapter,
CONCLUSION, In conclusion, he sees a hope for
peace. In armies, the private must now have qualities
as high as those which in previous warfare had been de-
manded of officers. This should have an important influ-
ence on our future attitude toward war. We can make
better use of such men than as food for gun powder. It is
finer to live for a cause than to die for one. Anyone can
die for a cause but it takes eiierp;y to live. War has
brought benefits, but war is outgrown in the world today.
Selfishness and imperialism still exist, but they are econ-
omic in form. Men are coming to see that in the long run
there is more gained by peaceful means than by waste and
destruction.
jJI^R&TT . Everett stresses Individual morality.
Good and evil are to be found in the lives of individuals.
The realization and appreciation of all values is ultimately
always an affair of the individual consciousness. If man
at all times considers his actions in the light of what
is good, he need not worry flor himself. His duty then is
to his fellow-men that their ideals may be raised to the
end that good-will may obtain.
On the other hand, individualism may
become only the "conceit of a visionary and ill-balanced ego-
(
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tism." Individualism has often been misconceived as alien
to the interests of others, and as remaining permanently
apart from society. He says:
It is true that new values come largely
by a revolt of individuals against the
traditional order, but whether the unique-
ness which inspires revolt is subjective
caprice and lawlessness or a fresh addition
to existing values, has to be determined
in the end by its own individual worth,
1
(The term "ov or-individual" he uses for certain universal
values. ) The need today is for individuals who will en-
rich civilization, not destroy it.
"in a world of interacting elements,
adjustment is a universal and unceasing process," says
Everett. The adjustment of human Interests is the most
complex task of adjustment. It calls for moral reflection
to comprehend the relations of individuals. Seeking in
n- ture, we find in man an instinctive feeling for his
kind, or sympathy. In the lower stages of human life,
sympathy is limited to the tribe; all outside are enemies
to be attacked and slain. With the inarease of numbers
in the tribe, this feeling becomes more inclusive until
in our modern civilized nations, we see millions of men
living peacefully together. Increasingly, in the course
of civilization, men are devoting themselves to things
of the mind, but even yet we tend to think and act in herds,
we follow our leaders and we act as our neighbors act. We
t. Bosanquet, Social and International Ethics, P. 303.
I
126
need tc turn cur thoughts tc lcve, sympathy, .nd good-will,
tc individuals, with weIk-thought-out ideals of cur own.
If we go deeply enough tc include humanity, tnd -re con-
trolled "by cur ideals, war and hostility can h ve no place
in cur lives, ^verett can find ..c place for hostilities if
gccd-v/ill is tc abound amcng men. I certainly admire his view*
He is deep, kind, a thinker who gees tc the heart cf the
problem and dees ..ct allow himself tc he sidetracked by
petty details.
;-XICLIN . Mecklin dees net think war geed,
] OT A EBSITIVis STAID.
cr beneficial, but he dees net be-
th.it the time will ccme for - long while yet, ..hen there
will be nc mere war. He bases his conclusions first upon
HUMAN I\UTURc. human nature itself
. Hail is at the same time
egotistic and altruistic. He strives for
mastery. He is possessive, vain, nd it irks him tc have
men men cf another race cr nation surpass him, and receive
the benefits denieo him. Sc he gees tc War tc maintain his
self-respect, .nd tc gain wh t he ccve/ts. Again, m.-n is
afraid cf a neighboring nation fcr fear that his cwn safety
is endangered* and h .tred fcr this nation results.
In the second place, history points tc war
as one cf the benefitstcf mankind. By it man has progressed,
HISTORY PCIHTS TO BENEFITS, manj&and the state have gained
fame. W, r must be seen in its present light j tc be rid from
scciety, net in its p st record*

127
Third, there re the present tendencies;
I . .-3_2!T glory, competition, preparedness, safety for
MERCIES,
cur economic interests abroad, < rd tec, the
likelihood of momentary differences with ether nations,
revolts and internal difficulties.
Mecklin does net see war as a panacea
SUMMARY
for all ills. He does net have the attitude
of war fcr revenge or for injury, "but he hesitates tc do
away with armaments at once. The risk is too great. War
is a case of necessity and net evil. His is the stand cf
the Breat American Public today, and "by all indications,
cf the world at large. He is willing and anxious for per-
manent peace, and he approves facts and agreements tc that
effect, but he wants tc have adequate protection ready in
the background in case cf emergencies. Their cost and
their implications he dees net discuss,
Ivrcpctkin, as wculc be expected, dees
EBOPOTKIg
net see th..t war and good-will are at all
compatible. In a world cf mutu .1 friendliness there is
nc room fcr w.rs or rumors cf w.r. Destruction, hatred,
WAH aKD GOOD- arrogance, selfishness .nd petty nation-
NTLL ABE NOT
COMPATIBLE* isms are banned, and .dmirably sc.
In his consideration cf the mcr l teachings
he "begins with Kant# The first formula of conduct, suys Kant,
1, Krcpctkin, gthics
,
P.JclSf, bee also Kant, Cri tique cf
Pure Reason
,
1,94,

So act as to treat humanity, whether
in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal,
never as a means only.
The ideal which morality is striving to approach, is, accord-
ing to Kant, a universe of free and rational persoaali ties
,
in which every personality is the aim of all others. On
this basis he formulated the moral law as:
Act as if the max'm of thy action
were to become by thy will a uni-
versal law of nature.
Every action of every iddividual should, therefore, be
prompted only by good-will. Nothing else can be conceived
of as good without quantification. Kant appealed to the
better instincts of man. He asserted that a}l men should
lead a moral life because such is the demand of our reason.
It is man's duty , it is his absolute obligation, and he is
evil in not doing as reason and duty demand. Kant had
great influence in Germany, but not enough sufficiently to
impress the intrinsic value of man upon the Prussian mind,
for when men conceive of each man as an end in himself,
respect follows; and when men act so that their every action
may be a "model" for every other man to follow, less self
over-riding of the feelings and interests of others will
result. There are grave flaws and human impossibilities
in the Kantian ethics, but it is an ethics of peace.
At the end of the eighteenth century,
and the beginning of the nineteenth, says Kropotkin, men
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began t<h see the basis of human morality in justice. Side
by side with this conception of justice and the striving for
it, there exists in man equally the striving for personal
domination, for power over others. To him, men have not
begun at the starting point, that is, respect for human
dignity and until they do, there can be no lasting peace.
COD.cS OF MOit-.LITY. Spencer wrote of two codes of morality
among men: 1.) the old, to hate and destroy our enemies; and
2.) the new, to love and aid our fellow-men. The first says:
Be obedient to the militant state. The second answers: Be
an independent citizen and strive for the limitation of the
power of the state. ^ "That which constitutes evil in society
includejas all acts of aggression of one member of society
against the other;" if we tolerate such acts, social stab-
ility is weakened. It is obvious, he says, that the main-
tenance of society requires the mutual cooperation of men.
If cooperation is not practiced for the defense of the
group, its usefulness is lost. The original seoclal organ-
ization was military or militant, In which everyone was
subjected to the demands of war and struggle. The system
is one of industrial cooperation.
ABOLITION 01 I7AR* Kropotkin expresses great faith in the
masses, among whom, he writes, mutual benevolence exists.
He has no use for the ruling classes who selfishly make
1. Kropotkin, lithic s t P.JOlf.
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war, commit untold ravages and carry away plunder for their
own use. He believes in a great society of the people, where
the aim would be to enable everyone to
fulfill requirements of his own nature
without interfering with the fulfill-
ment of such requirements of others, 1
and where the function of the state would be limited ex-
clusively to maintaining justice. He agrees with Spencer
that such is not by any means the present condition, and that
while the nations of Kurope are partitioning
among themselves parts of the earth inhabit-
ed by inferior peoples, with cynical indiff-
erence to the claims of these people, it is
foolish to expect that in each of these na-
tions the governemtn can have so tender a
regard for the claims of individuals as to be
deterred by them from this or that political
measure. So long a? the power to make con-
quests abroad is supposed to give rights...to
the land taken, there must of course per-
sist at hd>me the doctrine that an Act of
Parliament can do anything - that the aggre-
gate will may rightly impose itself on
individual wills without any limit. 2
COXCLUSIOB. Kropotkin has no use for wars and strife.
He quotes the Chinese thinker, Lao-Tsze, who taught that
"peace is the highest aim," and the India Mahabharata,
which closely follows Kant and our own Golden Rule:
Treat other as thou wouldst thyself be
treated. Do nothing to thy neighbor, which
hereafter thou wouldst not have thy neigh-
bor do to you. A ::.an abstains a rule of ac-
tion by looking on his neighbor as himself.
As we have found in the previous chapters, McDougall es-
pouses the cause of nationalism, and while there are nations,
1. Kropotkin, ethics , P. 318.
2. Ibid. P. 317,
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he believes that there will aiw -ys be causes fcr and dan-
ger cf war,
FAVGKS KAR« Under the national system cf et: ii c s , nat—
icns kept fairly well tc themselves, were ccntent with trad-
ition, conditions, religions* lars were undertaken only
WAh UBEEH ii>.TIONAL when conditions became tec crowded,
SYSTEM 01 LTHICS.
ci tc keep cut invading heroes.
It is u different stcry with states whose
et.-ics is cf the universal type. These people go cut tc con-
quer in the name cf their great religious leader, nd ter-
rible wars ii -ve resulted, where all mcr 1 laws h.ve been
W^R UUBLli uitfl viixiiiML forgotten and lie thic .1 principles
SYiAl-L ul i-.ThlCS.
bicken. In politics, they mve re-
tained national cedes, in spirit, ohey held tc the universal
system .nd conflicts ensued. In Europe the result h s been
a society cf nations, .11 ci which have accepted the Christ-
ian religion cf peace .nd brc theriiccd;
;
ye t they .re con-
st ntly .t war one with the ether. During the Cius-des,
they attempted tu sink theiz differences in cne gre t cause,
the Cress .^;.inst the Crescent, This is the only time great
Christian)! nations h ve m,-de ny success cf combination,
.nd that w .s both partial and painful. Allegi .nee was never
^ mere th^.n nominal. The Church aid net succeed in effecting the
unification cf Europe by securing the indisputable sway cf
Christian ethics. They h ve alw ys been tern between Christ-
i n duties cf fellowship .nd friendship and cblig tiens tc

city, state, king, country, or nation. The latter has
won out on the whole as is testified by history's long
recital of European wars.
The influence of moral philosophy
has been on the universal side, as we find Kant, Bentham's
Rule: "Act for the greatest good of the greatest number;"
and Schopenhauer's formula which acknowledges acts of
loving kindness as the whole sum of moral action. ^ These
take no account of the fact of nationality; they are, to
McDougall, formulas fitted only for a world that has passed
beyond the need of civil government, for loyalty and for
national defense. Hegel, Machiavelli
,
5odin,and Hobbes
on the other hand, have sought to justify and establish the
principle of nationality. It is only the dreamer and the
unthinking Christian, declares HcDodgall, who denounced
the ethics of nationalism as accursed and demand* that it be
wholly swept away. I can not see McDougall 's argument here.
He himself admits the evils of nationalism anc speaks of
the attempt of the Church through the Crusades to unite
nations, yet he has no good word for any such efforts and
loudly demands more of the nation - make them strongerl
How can this be, but at the expense of the weaker people?
I do not see how he can so consistently demand more nation-
alism in view of its historical record of competition,
strife, irritation, and wars. He does not seem to recognize
the idea of universal athics is good, but that the ideal
1. McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, P. 4-1.

has never been completely attained, that man is in the
process of evolution, that he has necessarily had to strive
at the order of his spr:eriors and to take up arms to pro-
tect himself, hut that the ideal has persisted and that it
has progressed is shown by the fact that there are such courts
as the Hague Tribunal and the Geneva Conference, It is the
selfishness of the leaders, not the idea that should be
cond emned.
SUfflL&Y. McDougall has done some valuable ser-
vice is showing men their shortcomings and the discrep-
ancies between theory and practice. It would be well for
men td> think over these things and to lfove so that their
ideals and actions coincided as closely as possible.
Nationalism, then to McDougall, is
the greatest force in the modern world and is capable of
doing much good or much harm, according as it is directed
wisely or unwisely. Man must remember that love of one's
country does not necessarily involvd hatred of other nations,
and he warns that much current nationalism is rooted in chau-
vinism as well as in patriotism. A timely warning! What
we think is patriotism is far too often chauvinism as well
and disastrous to our relationships with neighboring states.
The hope is that nations may attain a
higher level of international morality in their dealings.
More moral restraint is needed. No nation can live to
itself alone. The welfare of all is increasingly dependent
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upon the welfare and stability and morality ofi each.
Nations need to be cooperative, friendly and considerate
of one another.
IruiSSjcJR # McDougall fearlessly goes to the &eart
of the matter, in revealing the rift existing between
ethics in theory and ethics in practice, but he offers no
hope, no ray of light on the conditions. Men can no longer
endure upon a dual ethical basis, b$it he sticks so to the
present that he lays down no well thought laws for the
future control of moral relations a nong nations. Like
McDougall Dresser offers a discussion of the ideal and
the practical, but the two are diametrically opposed in
his viewpoint, arguments, and conclusions. Where McDougall
can find nothing but discrepancy between events and ideals,
Dresser sees an immediate relationship between the two.
He says:
WAB IS UNH^C^S^RY.
A world crisis is indeed a reminder of the
truth that we are participating in moral
experience even when, to all appearances,
we are in complete subjection to material
conditions.
1
Some idealists had been dwelling so apart from the actual-
ities of the world and had espoused the cause of peace with
such zeal, that a war seemed impossible. The coming of the
World War was a reminder that when a crisis comes it is the
ideals which have been grounded in the actual social sit-
uation that are effective, and we are known by the "lowest
1. Dresser. Ethics in Theory and Application , P. 18.

level of civilization, not by the highest fends to which we
aspire." This last war dispelled the illusions of many who
thought that the idea of peace was enough. Through the
disappointments came the discovery that the war itself, "to
make the world safe for democracy," was accompanied by
a moral impetus which once more proved that dearest to
our hearts are our ideals.
.
WORLD WAE. He discusses the World War at lefcgth.
Apparently no event in all history, he claims, was further
removed from the moral sphere, but when one stops to think,
the call to war was here a call to a moral standard such
as never before. Each nation had to decide between loy-
alties. Individuals had to face the issues og unionism
or patriotism, socialism or nationalism. The struggle
was regarded as a war to end wars, to insure peace and
prosperity. The result was knowledge of the point really
attained by civilization, and such knowledge is moral
power. We learned the real causes of war among nations;
the passions and selfishness of the individual, moral causes
far deeper than the external lust for power, the commercial
imperialisigfbr the economic determinism which appeared to be
the actual causes. In war, international problems show on
a large scale what is true of the individual, and we see
our own lust for power enlarged with the consequences of
our selfishness.
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We realize tc wh t n extent the indiv-
. idual | the small social group is coerced,
by hard necessities imposed by dominant
£ i c up s of c.emag egue s and war - 1 c rd s ,
OOKCLUSIOilS : '.V.JR ,;,.r dees net reform nations, heform
LTOT REFORMATORY,
is ji individual v-rcblem.
./e cannot, he
insists, single cut war and .sk that it .lone he abolished.
It is tied up with problems of justice ana m<..ny ether issues
cf ccvilizati on. It is foolish, he says, tc ask ycurh tc sign
a pledge nevei to participate in war under any circumstances
whatever. In dcing so, we neglect the fact that cur knowledge
dees net permit us tc see f r en.uji head. Life is Bet sc
simple as such .n agreement would imply,
IMLilELIIC^ Ol1
ITS ISSUES. The significant fact is th;.t the great mci\ul
issues h .ve been raised at last, ana we need tc think them
ever long and e.refully. Such a tie trnent ci the subject is
very general ana iae il i<. its outlook. The question is: Will
the people heed?
Sul£L-LY. There has been great contrast among the
views held by these authors. T.ieir conclusions have betn
varied. Only licDcugall, the ^merican prcfeuscr, has nothing
tc say against war. His is the mcst pessimistic view, while
I believ th t Dresser's is the mcst optimistic and idealistic.
On the wncle, however, for cur purpose in everyday life in
this changing world, I consider Bcwne's aid Everett's treat-
ment superior. They are frank, reasonable, sincere, fai -sighted.
1. Dresser, h thics io. Theory .no u.yplic. -tipn
, 1.^0,

A PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AS THE SOLUTION,
OF THE PROBLEM
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INTRODUCTION. In this final chapter we shall try tc fmnd
the suggestions fcr international peace put forward "by each
author, put them in t..eir place as they c .me , and .t the
close of the chapter try to finc/2. firm ground upon which to
"b Be cur structure of future nations,
BOWNL . Bcwne begings feis structure of society with
the state, mude u^ as it is of very imperfect individuals,
hut individuals cap. .hie of improvement 4 who see ahead into
the future of mankind, and who at heart wish Justice tc he
the same fcr all peoples. The gcca st .te will he that which
rests upon the Bhoulders cf all the peoples,, and may he over-
thrown or changed by the people if necessary. Within the
PEiti'LCTION OF THr. state are the gre .t fundamental rights
STL.T^. IBTEitNAL,
ana interests which precede government -
cf prepcxty, the family, contract and security cf the indiv-
ual. If these -re net secure within the state then there is
something wrong with that st-te .na until it is righted, it
is net fit tc take equ .1 place with ether st tes. A state
is no stronger than its internul structure and if the fault
is there, ether nations can never be s.-fe until it is cor-
rected, fcr internal revolution may put it temporarily cut
cf commission with disastrc^s effect on trade, commerce and
manufacturing. Such . stu.te. is u menace tc all ether nations,
fcr if Si^e is strong enough she" m y at any time shatter wcrld
j . .ce, First, then it is the duty cf the st .te tc put herself
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on a fiim b..sis internally,
*wi tliii the e^.te there should be as much
freed cm as possible. Eccncmic, intellectual, nd spiritual
interests generally flourish better when left to individual
.nd voluntary crganiz.. tion th .n when undertaken by the state.
THROUGH EDUCATION Cn the ether handymen are selfish, egc-
OF TKh HtDIVIDUUj,
tistic.l, partial in their estimate of
in
right ..nd wrong, and\many of the most important undertakings
(mainly tAi cse cf an eccncmic nature) an authority above the
individual is often necessary tc mke ihem possible. A state
should m -ke every effort tc acquire -nd maintain this balance,
it is tne best assurance for the maintaining cf satisfaction^
prcsperityj and peace -nd i^uiet within the state. When men
are busy .nd happy, they .re less irritable and a nation in
such a condition, v/hese le iders re wise, is not e sily led
into war.
Internationalism is net tc be conceived cf
as a rule cf the strong ever the weak, -nor as a tyranny cf
the majority ever tne minority, but .s a subordination cf
<*11, from the most powerful tc the weui.es t. The claim t&at
IilTEiuIaTIOL'ALISM it is bused cn simple might h .s been
OT THE RDTS 01
TiLci BTBOHG OKEJj only tco true historically; However, sc
THE IEAK,
great is the ideal as an "incarnation cf
the mcral order cf the world? that many believe it tc be
th e fiist end ef human development. The individual is tc
\ < <
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the state, as the state is to the international order, only
the material for filling out the social form, which in turn
has supreme value in itself.
We have society in all stages of complexity,
from the simple patriarchal and tribal or-
ganization to the highly complex system of
modern civilization. Concerning this order
ethics insists 4>nly that it shall minister
to the common good in the most effective way.l
GOViiiLNMjiNT. Nations, like individuals, have to live
together, and society enforces the conditions of living to-
gether. To this extent natural rights must be limited, and
to this extent any limitation* is, he thinks, Justified, It
would be a much more pleasant world, many think, if each
nation or race had a sphere of its own, but as it is, all
are inter-related, and each is rightly responsible to every
other. But we must determine the rights of each state in
regard to all and we must equally determine the rights of
all with reference to each. The prosperity of Bach is
bound up in the other. Unfortunately, states have too often
failed to see this and wars have been the result. The prob-
lem of problems is how to adjust the claims of each so that
the best result shall be attained for all. The way in which
to get any sufficient moral foundation is to maintain order
and equal Justice among the nations. "Only on this found-
ation can social equilibrium be assured,"
The actual situation is never ideal. The
world is full of want and distress on the one hand, and of
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics , P. 254-.
*c
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needless extravagance on the other. The old methods of
securing social reform by reforming individuals are thought
too slow. Men believe that they need something more direct
and speedy. Society has been thought too individualistic,
and great schemes for rapid reform by law have been drawn
up. But they have never worked out effectively.
LAWS. If laws were always a manifest implication
of moral principles there would be no distinction between
moral and positive law, and there would be no question of duty
in obeying the law. But the mass of legislation Involves no
moral principle, but only a practical judgment of expediency
and is often unwise. Hence, it is not to be expected that all
peoples obey laws formed by a few. Tariff laws do not always
carry enforcement through conscience and judgment. Laws
should be as wise and righteous as possible, only on this
condition can they secure obedience. Beyond the point where
the$ command the judgment and the conscience they can be
enforced only by power.
JUSTICL ^MONG STi*T^.In cases involving neglect of duty, or
others where punishment is deserved for wrong, punishment
should follow, but it should accomplish its end - that of
reforming the culprit state. Punishment for the sake of re-
tribution only, brings hatred and further hostility. Law
and justice, approved by all, must do the punishing, for,
says Bowne, contact with the impersonal operation of a just
law will tend to waken the dulled conscience. For one state
rc
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in a society of states to take matters into its own hands
and inflict due punishment is like subjection to the "brutal
violence and passion of an oversees in its diabolism. This
form of punishment is unjust and leaves its subject worse
than ever.
Bowne does not lay down any fast rules
for the type of organization of the government which shall
form this society of nations. Democracy may be bad if the
people are bad. Election by a people does not always Insure
infallible rulers. Monarchy is, on the whole, open to great-
er objection, based as it is on heredity descent.
For peoples which have reached some
measure of development in civilization
the condition of supreme importance is
that the government shall be sufficiently
flexible to respond readily to changed
conditions of society and to new needs
as they arise.
1
Bowfae expresses no belief that all peoples should be under
like forms of government. The form is not the main consider-
ation, but the spirit.
The questions are: how to escape both
anarchy and despotism; how to combine strong central govern-
ment with social self-government; how to organize the govern-
ment so as to secure the highest efficiency; how to unite
social stability and social progress; how to defend the
people against the governments themselves by fixing limits
which may not be passed.
1. Bowne. Principles of ethics , P. 294.
r
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COSMOPOLITANISM. Bowne has no use for what he terms a
mistaken cosmopolitanism. "The importance of nationality,"
he writes, "needs to be emphasized." In this he agrees with
Bosanquet and McDougall, and the other authors excepting
Kropotkin, who looks on the state as something to he endured
until, in the course of time, men can live in peace together
without these great nationalistic affiliations.
A mistaken cosmopolitanism and phil-
anthropy are sometimes inclined to do
away with the nation in the interest of
a federation of mankind. The only good
in this is the aim to do away with the
hostility which has so generally existed
among nations. For the rest, it does
not tend to profit. 1
It is by friendly rivalry, rather than by any universal phil-
anthropy, that human progress is to be secured. Within the
nation, he recommends that, so far as possible, people of
one race and blood live. "No body of porsons not homogeneous
in spirit and loyalty can long be tolerated in the midst of
a nation." He favors banishment for aliens, where possible,
although he admits the rights of nationality are subordinated
to the rights of humanity.
In intercourse, highe relations should be
regulated by regard for the rights of humanity rather than
for those of nationality. Exploitation is infamy. Nations
forcing vice upon weaker nations he brands as diabolic. He
does not advise any Interference among nations, unless in
self-defense, unless we are sure of bettering their condition.
1. Bowhe, Principles of Ethics . P. 296.
re
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He dees net think that all nations can be accorded anticn-
al rights.
SUMMARY. If ^ife were only cci.trc.iled "by gccd-wiil,
unselfishness and leve cf humanity, national questions
would he peacefully solved, but they are net so controlled.
ill be
Selfishness, passion and ..rath let loose, ana .11 we sran
hope is that a higher' power will restrain or use them for
the_r mutu.l aestructicn. The greatest aeed is the impartial
and unselfish will to dc right. Bightwcusness cannot be
achieved ence ind for .11. It must be a ste *dy growth and
striving toward tlie rigj.t,
PAULSiA' . I .ulsen's view is vu±y different from
that cf Bowne, resembling that cf McDougttll, mere than cf
any cth^r. harmony, there must be, but similarity is not
geed; ii/t'act, it is impossible. Man is to seek jy„rfecticn
IKDIVIDuaX Plii-iEECTIOl] in his cwn life thrcugn such modes
IBS FlhST x^^elxii^^.T.
cf conduct as tend to realize the
highest geca cf the will which m^y be c -I-ed ..elfare. A
people or race consisting cf tot illy similar copies af a
peifect original pattern wcuia be infinitely empty."'* Society
must ..ct expect similarity in -11 men. But, we ask, hew are
men to get ..long tcgetner whe are so unlike? Will net their
differences iiritate until a breaking pci;it is reached Jid
pe .ceful rea tiens ..re shattered? No
,
s^ys Paulsen, the
very thca^ht of similarity is horrible, it v.culd bring i
^. xaulsen, A System cf Lt-J.cs, I
.
IS.
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about unpleasantness. Perfection consists, not in the sim-
ilarity but in the variety of forms. In humanity, many
different forms are necessary to realize the idea; we should have
a multitude of nations, tribes, families, individuals, and
modes of life. He goes on to say that there can be no uni-
versal morality in the concrete. The different expressions
of the universal type of man demand each its own particular
morality. The Englishman, the Chinese, and the negro are
each different and ought to be so. Consequently each one
has a different morality. It is an undoubted fact that every
nation has its own particular ideal of life and its own moral-
ity. The question is whether "what is" "ought to be." If
we justify the different forms of human life, we shall also
have to justify the different rules of conduct. So far,
I believe that Paulsen is right. He is simply setting
forth what exists and it cannot be denied that it is im-
possible to change conditions except through the gradual pro-
cess of evolution, Bowne admitted the same thing to be
true: as there are nations, so there are and will be diff-
erences, but Bowne' s was that all men should, as far as
possible, be treated alike - as Kropotkin puts it,
treated with respect to personality. Here Paulsen goes a bit
further and draws what I believe to be an erroneous con-
cluslonras long as cconduct and ideals of morality differ
among various peoples, so should the treatment of, say,
(I
an Englishman to an Englishman differ from the treatment
of an Englishman to a negro. As he says:
A mode of conduct which is suitable
and essential to the former, need
not be so to the latter.
1
However, atrocities committed under such a code are wrong.
I cannot agree with him. Paulsen, with IJcDougall, believes
that there is no such thing as universal morality. I be-
lieve that there is, but that we are not far enough along
in civilization to have sufficiently tried to understand
all peoples, and to have given them all a fair chance. You
say that they should make their own chances. All people
are not so constituted, but when they are once started the
results are surprising. For example, see what the negro
has accomplished since 1865. Rapid changes and reforms are
in progress today in such states as Mexico, Turkey, China,
and Afghanistan, under strong and able leaders who are able
to see beyond the present. Should not they be given the
respect due them? With the vast opportunities which Eu-
rope and America have I think that they have cause to be
ashamed of themselves in many ways, and I believe that there
is much more that they could learn from these brave attempts
at improvement on the part of countries that "western civili-
zation" scarcely considers in its too self-centered loftiness
DIFl'a^kli^G C01i»S. Paulsen believes that particular natures
differing conditions and differing times imply different
moral codes. McDougall would second such a motion. I
1. Paulsen, A Sy stem of Ethics t P. 20.
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believe that they have missed the mark; that Bowne and
Everett came much closer to finding the better way/of life
in our international relations. Differences there are and
must be. All peoples need$ not live in democratic states
patterned after the ideal of American democracy, as Ivlecklin
would have them to live, but when all men treat each other
with respect as human beings, there is greater chance
for "peace on earth, good-will among men," and greater
happiness and prosperity, I believe, will result. Simply
because a man is of a different shade does not mean that
hft is of lower mentality or capability, and because a custom
is not like those we are used to, does not neam that it
should be abolished and ours put in its place. There has
been too much of this in history, and if we study closely
we can see the fatal results. I do not believe Paulsen
when he says:
Different nations, even different groups
of the same nation, and, finally, diff-
erent individuals, are subject to special
moral codes.
or when he says that
Kant's rigorism is entirely in place
against the inclinations of the natural
man. ^
CHRISTIANITY. Paulsen harshly criticizes Christianity.
5
1. Paulsen, A Sys tem of Ethics , P. 22.
2. Ibid, P.23.
3. Ibid, Chapter II, "The Christian Conception," Pp. 65-97.
and Chapter III* "Chris tianization of the Old World , Pp. 98-115,
Note: The four great truth^s which Christianity has engraven on
the hearts of men are, as he sees them:
1. Suffering is an essential phase of human life.
2. Sin and Guilt are essential phases of human life.
3. The world lives by the vicarious death of the just and
innocent.
4. The longing for the transcendent.
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I believe that here again he made mistakes, What he crit-
icized was the so-called Christianity as exemplified by the
so-called Christian nations. He calls it harsh, a religion
of denial only, suppression of the natural instincts, ascet-
icism, negation of the world. On the other hand, the "Christ-
ian" nations have shown themselves to be unjust, dishonest,
unscrupulous, grasping, hostile among themselves, unutter-
ably selfish. The pictures that he draws are to be com-
pared with IficDougall's gloomy view. Eoth draw, I believe,
but one side of the truth. Again they have missed the mark.
Everett and Bowne give the other view - of a Christianity
which had its mistakes because it had sought to do right,
but has erred because men had not enough light. The basic
ideals of Christianity are those, and only those, I believe,
upon which any society of nations can hope to endure in
peace: brotherhood, mutual respect, justice, veracity, sym-
pathy, love. As for tryin^but these ideals, a society of
nations is yet in embryonic stage, but, as Dresser s§tys, the
ideal is there and through error and disappointments it re-
mains and is the only hope for all peoples.
HIS P-cSSIMISM. Paulsen's whole outlook is inclined toward
pessimism, although he himself declares to the contrary. He
say s
:
Nations are still more in the dark con-
cerning the future of their course, than
individuals,!
1. Paulsen, A Sy stem of ethics , P. 280.
1*
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Summary and Nations, like individuals*! anculd share in
Conclusion.
the c .re of each other, I doing so, they
must be careful not to aestrcy the- independence of the state.
Nations hate "been accused of willingness tc protect and
eagerness tc annex "|>rotected'' nations. Ealfcherj they should
fester a feeling of self-reliance within the nation. This
is fai toe seldom the case at present,
S^OBEu^vY. Again, it is nesessary for states tc have
special duties toward each other cr toward s^eci^l states.
Care should should b^ taken that secret alliances and "inter-
national snobbery" do net result,
CHARITY* States must be c .reful in Uie giving of
aid and charity tc ether st .tes net to make the recipient
economically dependent, fcr there can be pa±asite states
as well as individuals.
HOEESTY* , Lastly, states, like inuividu..ls, should
m.-ke absolute honesty the rule. Counterfeiting, secret
treaties, political lies, prcpanganda, are evil nd stir up
stiife where sincere, frank, friendly treatment would bring
about security, pie sunt relationships, and peace, which
l^st is Lhe "precondition of social life."
L^WhY Tuj'TS
.
Dewey and Tufts m .ke peace .n individual
problem. If man reflects, he ought tc be tc act mere in-
telligently .no freely to achieve the satisfaction that
always attends en scientific ls compared with uncritical
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practice. Justice, kindness, the conduct of the Golden
Rule are right and good. Injustice, cruelty, selfishness are
wrong and had. TThat he must do to live the moral life has
two aspects: 1.) higher, ideal interests of art, knowledge,
freedom, rights must dominate; 2.) he must exercise regard
for others, in justice, sympathy, benevolence. On the side
of "how" he must live, we find: 1.) there must be recognition
of some standard which may arise wither as a control, such as
"right" and "law", or as measure of value in the form of
an ideal to be followed or good to be approved; 2.) there
must be a sense of duty and respect for law, and sincere
love of the good.
AUTHORITY. As we learned in Chapter I, Dewey and
Tufts make the state the supreme authority, through its laws
and officers, ulembershlp in the state requires cooperation
among states. Cooperation implies a common end. It means
that each state is interested in the success of all. It
forms a controlling rule of action and is one of nature's
most effective agencies for a social standard, flooperatlon
makes for sympathy and requires understanding among states.
These authors do not indicate that they
expect all men now or at any other time, to live under the
same form <hf state organization. Men in different sections
have always observed eccentricities of custom, and it is
good that they do. Customs and habits tend to bind the
individual to his group. The authority back of the custom
i4
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is the group. Within the group there are conditions which
bring out the importance of group standards and render group
control conscious: 1.) education; 2.) constraint or restraint
of refractory members and the adjustment of conflicting in-
terests; and 3.) occasions which Involve some notable danger
or crisis and therefore call for the closest cooperation to
avert disaster and maintain the group. But groups must not
be in opposition to each other. Neither must they assume
a charitable attitude in regard to one another which might
become condescending. On the other hand, it is well to
remember that each group has a share in the life of every
other group, and is, in fact, its "brother's keeper."
FR1&ISDSHIP. Dewey and Tufts see the need of fri-
endship among peoples, a genuine social interest much broad-
er than an instinctive sympathy in reaction. "Sympathy is
a genuine natural instinct, varying in intensity In different
individuals, " Sympathy is Instrumental for the development
of social insight and socialized affection, but it may lead
to sentimentality or even to selfishness. When a nation sees
good that it considers may be done to another nations, it may
arbitrarily try to force its own standard of living and ideals
upon the other nation, and thus do an injustice to them.
States must avoid this by first taking careful note of the
disposition, need and possibility of reaction of the needy
nation and then encourage its people to keep themselves.
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Otherwise hatred and a state of hostility will result.
Altruism is good if tempered with reason.
Peace and tranquility are not merely $he
absence of open friction and disorder. They mean
specific, easily-known and generally recognized
principles which determine the province and
limits of legitimate activity. Publicity , stan-
dards, rules of procedure and remedies acknowledged
in common, are their essence. 'Res publica 1 , the
common concern, remains vague and latent till defined
by Impartial, disinterested social organs. Then
it is expressed in regular and guaranteed modes
of activity,
and justice obtains for all. It is to the interest of mankind
to provide for such a state among themselves, that will hinder
the growth of ill-will and retaliation, and will provide pre-
cedents and principles that will lessen uncertainty and con-
flict in the future.
AN ORGANIZATION. Dewey and Tufts favor an international
organization. As nations needed to be developed out of clans,
sects, and gangs with their intense internal sympathies and
Intense external jealousies, so states need to combine into
some form of federation. States are still arrayed against
states with patriotism, loyalty, as internal virtues, and dis-
trust and hatred as external vices. The idea of humanity in
the abstract has heen attained as a moral ideal. But its
political organization, embodied in law and administrative agencies,
has not been achieved. International law, arbitration treat-
ies, and the Hague Tribunal, whose power is sentimental,
1. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics t P.455,
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but net political, o .rk steps forward. Tc these authors,
the idu.. of e& world federation is net absurd. An inter-
national st^te cf federated hum. .nity, with its own lawsj
its own courts, and own rules for adjusting disputes, is
net a drear: cr m illusion. They see the formation cf such
a federation as but .. slight step forward when compared
with these taken, substituting nati cn&jl authcrity for
tribal rule, cr publicly administered justice fcr the re-
gime cf private war and retaliation. In conclusion:
The argument fcr tue necessity of-
prep ring in peace by eul..iged armies and
navies for the possibilities of war,
must be offset at le ist by recognition
that the possession cf power is always
a direct temptation for its irres-
ponsible use.
It is geed tc hear such decided arguments fcr . picgram of
international authority m king fcr peace coming from American
educ .tors, partivul rly prior tc the World War -.nd the formr
.tic;, cf the i.eague cf Nations,
DBAKB, Drake says:
The gcuL cf personal morality is reached
with the adoption of th .t mode of life
that leads tc the stable and lasting
happiness cf the individual. Such a
happiness necessarily presupposes re-
lations cf kindness and eo-operation
with ti.ose other persons th ,t form the
immediate envij enment*
Eut this is not enough. Th« gre test tct^l geed is net
tc be attained by selfish living; "man r.Aist march en
1. Dewey ana Tufts, Ethics. Fi482,
k,. Drake, li cbi^.^c of Cc.duct
, P. 505.
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masse" must work fcr ends th. t lie far "beyond his personal
satisfactions, for the general we If--re 'and posterity. These
larger public duties are tec easily overlooked. Our con-
science toward them needs to he .reused.
Drake considers trie first great problem
to he that cf war as the attainment of peace if the prere-
ABOLXTiQB 01 WAR quisite cf all social advance. When
PlhST PRiiiL.^UIoIT^
ol I^.'-.GE. a nation 1 s energies are absorbed in
war, nothing else can he dene "well.- In building up this
ideal cf peace j i.e starts with the individual in his. rela-
tions to his native land. After a detailed discussion he
concludes that man's idea of a conceited patriotism is to
blame fcr most of cur present difficulties; that we need
to see the sncrtcoming cf cur own country; and the gcod cf
ether lands.
FRL^ISHIP The individual's attitude toward alien
TOWARD ADLdJJS.
peoples being ameliorated, mutual friend-
ship must be extended through newspapers, travel, all inter-
national associations, the increasing interest in v/orld-
wide problems.
SOIL* I_L_i^TI01» He states his belief that somu federation
or STATES i:^c-
iSSARY. of states is necessary as the ultimate sol-
ution cf world difficulties. This organization must have
legislative, judicial, and executive functions. It must
be based on mere than arbitration treaties among states,
but rather a "parliament cf nations." Yet he shews no in-
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clination toward the ^egue cf Nations* ( 1920) Ee s ys
:
It is tec early tc say with assurance that
the present League cf Uaticns is tc become
such, a genuine worid-organize ticn, with ac-
ual^'.nd pewer tc enforce justice and peace.
^
If far-sighted statesmanship can be found tc guide its des-
tinies, he admits that it may be the long hoped-fcr federa-
tion cf the ..clld. If It fails, cr falls tc pieces, cr be-
comes impotent, cv/iag tc the selfish ~.nd imperialistic pol-
icies cf nations, he confidently asserts that seme ether
federation will rise tc take its place, Per
enly by the constitution uhd maintenance
cf such - supernaticnal structure can
future wars
a
mere destructive til! n any
yet experienced, be .voided.^
Iv
T BCEBlflS He makes the mistake here th .t many make.
SUGGESTED*
Drake shews ^ittie interest in the League cf ITaticns; He
gees into no detail tc snow its value cr disadvantage. He
treats it ueubtfully -s „ thing th .t might be cf worth
but in .11 probability will .ict be. What - typical ttitudej
His gre.vt objective is the abolition cf war. Th -t is worthy
but he dees :.ct le-iize th .t happiness and prcspeiity must
come through understanding before wai car be abolished. Law
will net dc it. Like scm.ny ethers, he hopes for seme
scheme for wcrld organization, but he is indefinite. "Let
it be dene," by ethers is the ttitude tl t t the maj-
ority cf us have. His attitude is: ~et ether nations join
1. Drake, I rcbi.ei:.s cf Cendue t , P.321.
k.. Ibid, P # 322,
V*
<
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CRITICISM j this League, and then if it -s good, we sh>.ll
SUMHABY,
'CONCLUSION, dc «rell tc join it .lsc. %t is the attitude
fcr which mcst Europeans criticise the United States. McDougall
gives an outline fcr peace ( ..s sh 11 fcllcw). There, are, I
"believe, ssi icus mist .xes i.. his plan, "but he has dene seme-
thing constructive , ud nas given something net enly to hepe
for, hut tc biuld on, even tneugh it may need remodeling.
BOSANw.lLaT
.
Bcsanquot sees the need cf doing two things:
fiist, that we need mere, ^d net less of the state; and se-
cond, that men nr~y come together mere and mere on any sound
b .sis cf sympathy, that common cause ,nd the good cf humanity
should he iudepe.-c.ent cf n ticnality. It is net necessary to
disxeg-xd either cue or tne ctner. It is net necess iry fcr a
st .te tc lese its individuality and iiidependence in any sch-
eme cf internationalism* , but rather it sneuld strive tc im-
LUAL IZ^CLSSITY: prove itself itself. Tc illustrate,
.;^LD OP 'lEi, ST^Hc.
.^JD OS SOUND B.-.S- he quotes fx cm an ..ddiess by Fichte,
IS Oi' IJT^RNATIOK-,L
SYiviP^THY. made in I£06:
A country th.-t h.^s lest its independence
has icst ti.eiewith the power cf interven-
ing in the stre;jn ef time, and independ-
ently determining its course. Sc leng .s
it remains in this ccnaiAtcn its destiny
arid very chronology are measured by the
foreign power that rules its fate
There is but cne condition on which it
can emerge from its present state. ..and
th .t ms, tn .t a new world should be cre-
ated, which should ii itiatc a new period
of history The remedy consists in
the formation cf a new personality, such
as lias previously perh .ps been present
in individu. .Is , but never s the self cf
<
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the v/hcle and cf the nation. It means the
gducatici of the people . That which was
lacking in the old education was the power
cf pexiu trating tc the roots cf vital action
a»d exaction,
Bcsanuuet agrees, and adds that all memheis cf a nation must
he sc educated, that culture must he cf a nation and net of
EDUCATION, a class. He has no use for cl -ss differences.
They tend tc ere -te fiction, and split up a nation rather
than weld it together. It is the nation that must he m -de
COJDjiMItf ChLTL* right, our first duty is tc cur own state,
-nd that duty is tc make the state strong
and healthy.
Thus all differences cf classes, which ether
grcuna may te.:d to perpetuate, will in the
province cf culture vanish,
,
»and in this way
there will -rise among us, net an education
cf people hut the culture of nation,'-
Bcs-u^uet is against international fled-
eraticn cf states, cr cthei international ..uthenty. Leagues,
alliances, united states, which h ,ve net the spirit cf true
communities, he thinks carry the germs cf disruption within
C0&DHOI8 Ih'T^h- them and the prchahility cf antagonism
national IjJL^-
ATIOJaS. without. The organization cf rights can
only he complete in a community which satifies the conditions
necessary tc the possession cf the gener 1 will, and this is
fcund only in the nation. It cannot chtaih in a commonwealth
cf ;.aticns. If laiger units than n^ticn-ststes ccme into
1. Bcsaj quet| bec- .1 t nd lutejrnaticnal Ideals
»
P,8,
k,, Ihid,
ii.
existence, they must fulfill these national conditions. He
admits, however, th -t a wcrld-st-te may be possible sometimei
p e rhap s i - c t far i! i th e fu tui e
.
SYST-aM OF He gives the -dvantages cf such a system.
iUTIOIJ-ST^Tr.S.
It v.cudd involve universal freedom cf trade
and intercourse. He suggests here th ~t it would be well for
ti.ere to be different "sovereign pcweis" in different ^egicns
cf the earth, rhis is - divergence frcm any theory proposed.
He dees net seem to have thought iti-.cut fully, he suggests
the possibility but explaii l no picgiam.
On the Wnfcle, what seems best to him is a
system cf st-tes, each doing with fair completion its loeal
work cf crganizati on, e xch rec cgnizing wcild problems, and
rel -tiens. Such _. system would result in a world as peaceful
as one under ^ more unitary system. Such a system need net
form i foderati on . Federations are apt to be unsuccessful,
unless, like the United States cf America* they .re national
in type. He makes this statement: that these who believe
in . federation as ..ecessary for the sake cf central force
believe in force r -ther than friendship. &nd without friend-
ship, force is d.ngercus; with it, it is unnecessary. States
should remain peaceful neighbors with full national differ-
ences. They h-ve reason for friendship nd none for enmity,
and are united in common enterprises. This .Hows for diver-
sity cf contributions to the _ife of the world.

158
The idea cf world-state is feasible, "but the real problem
cf the future is whether BUch u thing will result in a single
state, and if sc, whether or net it will he practical, if the
individualities cf .,11 the aatiens were fused into one, what
would be achieved? V/culd tney ^raeunt to as much as singly, working
in harmony? He adds this warning: "Kraiy people are very good
friends apart who v/cuid qu *rrel if t.:ey kept ncuse together. "
CO-UbL-^TICh; ol1 Bcs^nquet thinks that peace-le.gues , federa-
^TlOilS, i^TC. tiens, and cemmenweaiths aim at restrictin
and disparaging the group-will and that t:-e vaster they be-
come the greater are tne uaz^rds, As he sees it the principal
trouble ted .y is that -.uge federations and alliances have
gene beyond control cf the gecup-will. If tney encroach on
each ether t..e disaster is inevitable. Such cencerbs ca: net
have z..e §agacity or the flexibility or single purpose of
the "true communal will ana mind." For this re sci
,
he fears
t.i t .n international politic .1 organization is net wise.
Bcs.mquet , xike the ethers, believes that
what the group does at home ..ill be a, clue to what it will
do i.: larger relationships abrc ird. Therefore, no st^te can
"exhibit a'na unperverted conscience abrcard which is net bent
on freeing itself from sinister interests at ,.crne, nd on
making itself an equal instrument cf the best life fcr all." 1
3cs anquet sees that cl .ss interests and privileges must be
b .i.ished successfully ^.t heme before any international re-
1. Bcsanquet, Social ^nd Intemati enal Ideals
,
1.308.
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forms can be effective. No nation can preach a gospel of
peace and expect to be heeded, which permits the outwitting
of other countries and securing of gains at others expense,
thereby ruining their trade and industry.
The aim and nature of the state is to
build up a citizenry which will recognize and maintain these
values. Bosanquet believes that man is not naturally aggres-
sive, but so only through failure to recognize and appreciate
what can be had without fighting. Everett and Bowne would
agree. McDougall would be vehemently contradict such a
statement.
CONCLUSION. In conclusion, he states with Kropotkin
that the soundness of any external relations can depend only
on equality. Therefore, the only effective unity (or inter-
national organization) can come only as nations consciously
strive to secure the best for all concerned. The best pre-
ventative against war, says Bosanquet, is: "seek ye first
the kingdom of God and his righteousness." Only righteous-
ness and not force can rule this world permanently and he
considers the real bond of a League to be force and not ef-
fective. If peace is not to come through righteousness, but
through desire to secure profit, and there should be oppor-
tunity to gain more profit via a successful war, then peace
and peace pacts are time wasted.
Bosanquet is an idealist. He was an-
tagonistic to current orthodoxy and the established churches.
i
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He was against the dualism of a good God and a bad devil
and remarked that
religion and politics have played
each other's game; religion has
taught what despotism desired,
contempt for the human race, its
incapacity for all good, and its
powerlessness to be anything in
its own strength.
1
The idealism that appealed to him was bound up with the
humanizing movement of the century, and was expressed in
man's relation to his community, state, nation, and finally
to humanity as a whole.
^.V^aJcLi-.TT . Everett gives no definite program for
the maintenance of peace among nations. But he gives materi-
al to be thought about; ideas which, if put into practice,
would result in moral behavior for mankind and their perma-
nent happiness. He sees the social structure to be rooted
in the moral life of the individual. All that man can hope
for is more completely to understand himself, and by so doing
to know other men better.
All that we can do is to endeavor
to promote this understanding more
and more in ourselves and others,
and to act more and more in a way
that is consistent with the promo-
tion of this understanding.
2
All right acts, says Everett, are social acts; and all moral
values are social values.
In the realization of individuality
there is found also the needed
realization of some community of
1. Cf Philosophical Review , November 1923.
2. Everett, Moral Values . -P. 101 (See Mackenzie, Manual of
Ethics . .PP. 251-2.
t
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persons cf whish the individual
is member; and, c diversely, the
agent who duly satisfies the c cm-
muni ty in which he shares, by
that s -me conduct satisfies him-
self. Wherever such a h rmcny cf
individual and scci.l gccd is not
a matter cf clear Insight it still
remains the postulate cf ethics,
the faith cf cur moral life.
Lverett sees l-.ree general conditions cf
progress which m y serve as univers .1 aims cf the moral
life: ;.) the harmonizing cf activities; 2.) tc perfect
human nature is tc rationalize it. Reason, -s the developed
form cf intelligence, is the guiding principle of human con-
duct. It regulates cur interest, controls cur conduct, ac-
CClDITIG_:s OF companies and moulds the entire process cf
PR0GSSS8.
c cnsci cusness . ~:c hura.m interest is alien
tc it and nothing significant is lightly esteemed. 3.) to
perfect human activities means tc socialize them* Ho one,
he s^ys, c .n fulfill the moral task while remaining centered
upon individual ii terests. Moral development is always a
growth in aevcticn tc mere ccmprehe;isi ve c.uses,
In the .sscci .ticn cf individuals in groups
cf whatever kind or exte.it we find associaticnal values, ex-
tending through friendship into the life cf the community.
These make possible co-operation whicn results in gccd not
ptherwise cf realization* Heee again we find the element of
human sympathy.
l.Sverett, Moral Values.
,
1.168
1( <
<
I
163
iverett does net "believe that any single
reform movement will "be adequate to meet all the needs and
cure all the ills of society. One who believes that any
single principle is adequate for ti.is task, he "brands as a
visionary.
CONCLUSION In conclusion: his theory is an individual-
ism in the sense that the realization and appreciation of all
value is an affair of the individual consciousness. If we
seek in human nature for the psychological "basis upon which
social relations have been reared, we find in man an instinc-
tive feeling for his kind, which we c^ll sympathy. In the
lower stages of civilization feelings of sympathy were lim-
ited tc tribes. Today sympathy trail sc ends all barriers of
race and nation. With every increase of numbers the circle
in which sympathy operates becomes larger , Until new no nation
can think in terms of itself alonge nor can nations be defined
apart from a community of nations. With the progress of civi-
lization, social cc-cperation, sympathy and mutual respect and
recognition display both extensive and intensive growth,
Friendship
J
and the spirit of love enhance the worth of
life w„ile on the contrary h.-te, envy, and jealousy are
the sources of unhappiness,
_,verett believes that progress towards
a better social order must be very slew. We must net be
blinded by power or carried away by vision. The great

minds of the past have pictured a Utopia, ^verett does net
have any such illusions. He says: .
Such a structure can never take final
fern. It is always in the building,
for its materials -re act fixed and
inert. ... .but are none other than pulsing,
e-.ger lines, which forever create, and.,
forever re-fashion their own creation.
Progress is slowly and painfully won.
MECKLIN kecklin has a efinite plan for securing
peace and c o-cperaticn. Ke wculd "make democracy safe for
the world. " Lemccracy as he defines it is the vesting cf
the people with the sovereign power* Its advantage is tnat
through it freedom and responsibility, rights and duties are
.nest intimately related, while the exercise of sovereignty
emphasizes the obligations that accompany it. As he writes:
POPULAR Democracy is true, then, net bee-use
SOV^IUIGIITY it reflects the eternal order of
things but because of its practical
results. Cf governments as well as
cf religious beliefs it may be 3aid:
'By their fruits ye shall knew them,* 3
Political democracy dees net exhaust its
meaning* There is something more fundamental than popular
sovereignty, Equity is more fundamental than popular scv-
StjUITY, ereignty. It is mere fundamental in the conception
cf democracy because the re ..sen we stress popular rule is
in order to secure equality. But real equality can never
exist. Je should strive to elevate human life tc a higher
1. ^.verett, Loral Value
s
, P # 249,
2. kecklin, £n Introduc t L on to Scca.l ^'.uics, 1 .
3
3. Ibid, P. 3.
'
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level where men will "be mere equal "but human nature prevents
absolute equality, and ticubtless it is wisest that this is
sc. If all men were eu.ual and could net be o the rv/i s e , there
would "be an end to striving. So it is with states.
leeper than the notion of popular sover-
FRATLKI7ITY eiguty and equality, we find that of fraternity,
as Hecklin terms it, "spiritual and moral like-mindedness.
"
It is this sentiment of brotherhood to all men, he says,
that
vitalizes the struggle for jus-
tice and assures an intelligent
and sympathetic exercise of popu-
lar sovereignty, Y/ithcut it,
Democracy would be as arbitrary
and tyrannical as the most cruel
despotism.
1
TASK OF The task of democracy is that of organiza-
BKUOCBACY*
ticn, and the enlightenment and application
of this body cf sentiment to the fundamental scci-1 problems
of living together. Democracy is a mental attitude, a
question cf the organization of human sentiments. It is
CHG.kW IZATIQI, founded upon the common will, and every
individual may have a part. If all states were so founded
men could net help but apply the s-*ine democratic principles
to ail men that they new reserve for the citizens ci the
nation, gccd-will would take the place cf suspicion,
SDUCATIQB Democracy is not ruled by its highly
educated men, s-ys Mecklin, but by the "average man" and
l.Mecklin, An Intro ductici to Social ethics
.
P, 5
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it is well tu^t this is sc fcr here he believes is the pulse
cf society, the "keeper of the conscience of the ccmmuni ty.
"
It is net the average man who makes wars and who is indus-
trially selfish, but it is he who, Mecklin believes, is
unbiased in moral judgment and most trustworthy on great
moral issues.
Professor Mecklin 1 s scheme would make the
world a "Great Society," Such a Society he believes is in
the process cf formation* It was the outgrowth cf the Indus-
trial devolution and the rise of the machine process. JPron-
SCIi^L-. FOE A tiers are disappearing, nations are becoming
GREAT SOCIETY
mere compactly welded together by *big
business." The Great Society is international . In spite
cf differences in race, creed, language or ether restric-
tiens, the gre.-t civilized nations constitute one vast in-
dustrial whole. The World War has contributed much toward
the unification cf the nations, it has brought out mere
clearly the extent tc which a community cf interests had
been intensified by the discipline cf the Great Society.
Mecklin, firmly believes that unity of natiens is finally
tc be permanently secured through the implications of the
machine process as well as its application. The Great
Society is both materialistic and idealistic. C the one
side, the present tendency is mainly pecuniary. Against
this, is a compelling desire fcr social welfare, brctherhodd,
friendliness, and belief in a better world yet tc be,

IDEALISM IB ACTION. T^Le ffceat civilized nations must put
their idealism into action. There is a strenuous and un-
remittent struggle ahead to reach the goal of our endeavor,
"but it can be done. Solidarity does not settle our problems.
Instead of "bringing security, it has often multiplied them.
V/ars are an international problem now. Financial crises
affect not only the affairs of single nations but include the
whole world of finance. On the other hand, the dangers of
famine and plague have been greatly minimized and insofar as
human life is concerned has been placed on a more secure basi
The question is, whether such a Society has power to endure.
History shows that great civilizations and powerful combines
have suffered most from the inner stresses and strains.
L'ecklin finds considerable in the structure of this newly
formed Society to cause worry. Profiteering is one. The
impersonality inherent in the machine process is another.
Clashes between powerful groups of interests threaten the
solidarity. We have built up this civilization so rapidly
that we need be ,uncertain as to the outcome'. Is the moral-
ity of the present age staunch enough to stand the strain
put upon us by this new power? Mecklin is skeptics.! and
fearful for it. To support a towering structure, the foun-
dations must be deep and solid, and Mecklin fears that
the present foundations are not yet deep or solid enough.
Harry Emerson Fosdick, S. Parkes Cadman, J. Ramsay HacDonald,
and Herbert Hoover express the same fear. But it cannot be
(
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stopped now. The test that can "be done is to strengthen
the structure as we "build it "by mating the individual strong
and true, the state just and benevolent, and the great in-
ternational associations friendly, frank:, honest, and "banded
together for the interest and good of all. Today nations are
on a dual "basis. The facts are one thing, ideals are another.
The Great Society will never last, for peace, prosperity, and
the "benefit of all mankind, until the two become one, and
democracy is safe for the world.
AVSRAG.3 LLAN. Mecklin emphasizes the role of the in-
dividual as a member of a Great Society of democratic states.
A new responsibility is here given to the individual. A
democracy throws responsibility onto the voter. Thus, the
individual is closely linked up with the greatest movements.
To be fitly qualified to vote, he must be a student of trends,
tendencies, and conditions, be well assured of the state of
things in his own group, and at the same time cognizant of and
alert to international affairs -. He must vote as he thinks,
not as others think and force him to think, and he must think
.
Heckling Great Society is ruled by the "average man," there-
fore let the "average man" take warning and not fail at his
job.
Mecklin draws an interesting picture of
a world of peace, a Great Society. His fears are wise, his
warnings timely and to be heeded. He is not always consis-
tent. In theory, the "average man" is the ruler, but he,

169
in other places, slips back into the usual academic groove:
the "educated" nan is the "best fitted to rule. But the
two are not yet at least identical. The social conscience
or intelligent public opinion carries the responsibility for
the moral welfare of the community and of the race. Mecklin
says that it "constitutes the source of moral guidance."!
It furnishes social control, makes possible the maintenance
of a well-balanced social order. It must not be allowed to
be an enemy of new ideas or innovations, but must be pro-
gressive.
CONCLUSION. In conclusion, he gives a glimpse into
the future. The ultimate bond of democracy, he says, cannot
be embodied in a code of laws, it cannot be the selfish ties
of politics or business, nor the coercive force of govern-
ment and police control. The only basis upon which the
democracy of the future can rest must be more than a body
of laws, more than a social or political program; it must
be loyalty, and faith in mankind. Herbert Hoover emphasized
the same idea in his Inaugural Address. Laws can abound
but unless men will be loyal and will act from conscience's
sake, human welfare, peace, truth and justice will be mere
abstractions. Here he gets at the root of the matter. Here
he approaches Everett and Bowne in their insitence upon
morality of the individual before permanent peace can obtain.
When the individual is right, then we shall probably see his
ideal of a Great Society based upon the principles of true
democracy.
6ft,
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KBOPOjHEIg . Kropotkin' s Mutual Aid which was pub-
lished as a contribution to "biology and anthropology aimed
to establish the reality of social instincts and tendencies
as veritable factors in the evaluation of animal life and
of civilization. His argument was that the social tenden-
cies are not only valuable in themselves but also are in-
strumental to the growth of intelligence, another incalcul-
able power for survival, particularly for that of mankind.
SOCIAL INSTINCTS* Ethics continues this argument. Man
has animal instincts toward sociality, but he is not satis-
fied with the plane of life of the animal. Man has and can
cherish moral ideas and can live as he does only with those
ideals. Y/ithout morality there can be no human survival.
Civilization will destroy mankind unless this ethical in-
terest becomes as dominant in conduct as it is naturally
fitted to be. Kropotkin shows that even Darwin recognized
a natural origin of moral consciences in the social instincts
of animals. Kropotkin traces the development of natural
morality through the earliest phases of human society until
it takes the highest forms, he believes, characteristic of
life today; justice and self-sacrifice. Kropotkin fights
for the moral attitude, for an ideal, not impossible of
attainment.
He believes that in history, institutions
have been seen to be readjusting themselves and reestablishing
an equality constantly threatened by the aggressiveness of
c
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certain individuals or groups. Equality, he believes, has
"been the guiding star of human progress. Lien must have such
regard for others as equals as to he willing to give up some-
thing that they consider their own for the sake of others'.
There is far too little self-sacrifice in this world. We are
all glad to talk of equality and of giving, even till it
"hurts", out we shrink back when the time comes for us to
lead out in the actual giving. Nearly all nations have had
the ideal of self-sacrifice but very few have ever sacrificed.
During the World War, when America came into the conflict,
France was happy and there was joy everywhere because America
was repaying her debt to France. Since then, America has
been extolling her war-reparation debts. She wants to be
well paid and quickly for her sacrifices. It is natural
that Europe should not be as enthusiastic as before in her
friendship for us. Such is Kropotkin's idea. He realizes
that when men fail to achieve fine generosity, they will still
acknowledge to themselves the authority of this ideal. Hen
and nations may ignore through self-interest what is "right"
but they are kept mindful of the existence of others through
consciousness of duty. None of us can escape facing the in-
equality of our conduct and intentions.
NATURAL -QUALITY. Kropotkin believes in the natural
equality of men. There can be no permanent state of affairs
settled otherwise than on this basis. When a mind makes a
judgment of the morality of a deed, it employs an intellectual
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criterion, the idea of equity. It is this that determines
the estimate of right, justice, or goodness. This idea
is implicit in human sympathy. It "becomes clearer and
clearer as a factor in the moral judgment as mankind is seen
to advance from the fellowship of sympathy to that of jus-
tice and magnanimity. He "believes the idea of equality to
"be a criterion. It tends to "bring men into closer intimacy
with each other and to make them take more frequent cognizance
of each other. In this he repeats Kant that every man is an
end in himself and not a means. Like Kent, he makes this
law of equality "basic for man T s relations among his fellow
men.
A SYNTHESIS. Ke sees that the demand of ethics to-
day is for a practical synthesis of the two diametrically
opposed feelings which exist in man. In the one set are the
feelings which induce men to subdue other men in order to
utilize them for his individual ends, while those in the
other set induce human "beings to unite for attaining common
ends "by common effort: the first answering to that funda-
mental need of human nature - struggle, and the second
representing another equally fundamental tendency - the de-
sire of unity and mutual sympathy. Man cannot admit today
that a struggle to the death is the only supremacy. At the
same time he does not see it in communism of the extreme
Christian teachings. Kropotkin^ answer is that such a
synthesis may "be found in mutual aid
,
justice
, and morality.
V
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These are the necessary conditions of survival and of pro-
gressive development. Without them, the group, race, or
species dies out.
Happiness, peace, and prosperity will
not come through the state so much as through the individu-
al. If states are to practice aid, their individual mem"bers
must do so first and apply their precepts to their own lives.
True social sympathy comes through mutuality of service.
3Uiau»tt.Y. In the final analysis, Kropotkin sees
the happiness of the individual identified with the happiness
of the majority of men. Happiness, he s--ys, is attained
through a life which is in accordance with the requirements
of justice. He writes: we are enabled to conclude that the
lesson which man derives "both from the study of nature and
his own history is the permanent presence of a double ten-
dency towards a greater development, on the one side, of
society, and, on the other side, of a consequent increase
of the intensity of life, which results in an increase of
happiness for the individuals.
Kropot3cin T s ideas are all organized
about a central, governing conception, the idea of equality.
He is a revolutionary* To him equality produces civiliza-
tion and thus morality for all human life. Kropotlcin
greatly develops the idea of sympathy. Men and nations are
naturally drawn into associations with each other for both
security and enjoyment and when they find themselves in a
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society they "become sensitive to a greater degree, to their
mutual feelings and doings. Sympathy requires intelligence.
It means the putting of ourselves in the place of others.
This means, then, that we regard others as equals. The con-
cept of justice follows and like-mindedness. Finally, we
have a state of security and contentment - or peace.
IXiAAJC-^-"'. . ifeDougall 1 s plan for a program is very
definitely mapped out. Our first need, as he sees it, is a
synthesis of the universal system and the national system.
Kant's "Treat no man as a means, but every man as an end in
himself
,
n Bentham's and the Utilitarian's "Act for the great-
est good of the greatest number", and Schopenhauer, who
acknowledges acts of kindness as the whole sum of action -
all are clearly universalist formulas which, contends
i.IcDougall, take no account of the great fact of nationality,
ignoring the obligations and duties arising therefrom. To
LIcDougall they are "formulas" fitted only for a world that
has passed beyond the need for civil government, for national
defense, for patriotic self-defense, for loyalty to fellow-
citizens, or fellow tribesmen, to national or tribal insti-
tutions. On the other hand, we recall pre-war Germany, which
brought so much suffering to the world by her code of national
ethics, unsoftened by universal ethics,
PBBSHnr . McDougall deals with the present. He
raises the question: shall America join the League of Nations?
Universal ethics says "yes". National ethics says "no." In
i
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the end he sees America rather guiltily obeying the dictate
of the latter. He "brings up many other points: immigration
from "both Europe and Asia, the question of the negro in
America, and others. In all of these, America follows the
trend of National Ethics.
The principles of neither system can "be
imposed on those states under the other. All nations could
not survive contentedly under such a system of ethics as that
of Burma, China, or Thibet. Secondly, he deals with the
possibility of a Cosmopolitan government. Under such rule
all national frontiers and national governments would be swept
away and mankind would settle down peacefully in one huge
family. He does not mean by this, Internationalism. Inter-
nationalism implies a settled regime of friendly rivalry and
considerate dealing between nations. Cosmopolitanism, on the
other hand, would supersede the functions of national govern-
ment, embracing in one great nation all the peoples of the
world, with all national boundaries swept away, nations
would be abolished and national governments would have to be
abdicated in favor of one universal parliament of mankind.
This ideal is not impossible of realization. The question
is whether or not it is desirable. McDougall says that it
is not.
Mankind could not continue to flourish
and progress under such a system. He lists his reasons:
1.) Man, a social being, cannot live and thrive alone. He
(e
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can "be induced to work consistently for the good of his
fellow-men, and in harmonious cooperation with them, only
by participation in the life of an enduring organized group,
a group that has a history in which he may take pride and a
future on which he may fix his hopes. Professor McDougall
"believes that the identification of the individual with
such a group is the only v/ay in which the mass of mankind
can "be "brought to live consistently on a plan of altruistic
effort and public-spirited endeavor.
2.) Only a group that is completely
individualized and self-contained can effectively subdue and
turn to the higher uses of social life men's egotistical in-
stincts, Man can find place for his talents and ambitions
only in such a group, he asserts. Here each individual would
be a member of a vital organization.
Any group less than the nation, any
such group as a professional or
trade association, or a league of
socialists or reformers of any kind,
even if it be world-wide in its scope,
is incapable of doing for its members
what the nation can and in various
degrees does do for its citizens, in
the way of raising their lives above
the animal plane of self-seeking or
of merely family altruism,!
On the other hand, it must be considered that if the nation
is to do so much for its citizens, that nation must have at-
tained to at least some degree of advanced civilization and
many nations still rank very low. There is a possibility that
it might be better for some world-organization to have the
1 .UeDougall , Ethics and Some Modern v/orld Problems
, P. 61,
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right and power to take over the civilizing or even more
completely educating the members of those "backward nations.
Doubtless in the process of evolution, they will be given
such opportunities, "but in the meantime there are many who
are backward because their native country has done and can
do nothing for them. Mandates or protectorates are not
equal to this need.
COSkOPOLITAlIlL>k. 3. ) HcDougall does not have faith that
cosmopolitanism can replace the nations in the performance
of these functions because a. ) such a group would be too
vast and too heterogeneous for effective sharing in the life
of the group, b.) there would be no national appeal to men
to evoke their best efforts for their country. Civilization
requires the rivalry of a number of nations, if it is to
progress, ^gain, any such cosmopolitanism would suffer
from mere size. The difficulties of representative democ-
racy are bad enough, but all these would be magnified im-
mensely under the cosmopolitan system. He concludes:
Nationalism, then, is a great force,
the grei test force in the modem
world; and, like other great forces,
it is capable of doing much good or
much harm according as it is directed
wisely or unwisely.
1
A system of universal ethics expressing itself either as
a universal anarchy or as a single cosmopolitan world-
embracing state, is not a reasonable ideal to make the goal
of human progress.
l.UcDougall, Ethics and Some Modern World Problems
.
P. 6
7
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ZLATXI^R TEACHINGS. McDougall criticizes the previous
ethical teachings in this matter. The Greeks and the earlier
and later moral philosophers have not considered the immense
complications involved, as he points out, mainly that of
population. The difficulty has "been that the vision of each
has "been mostly restricted to his own people. Fichte and
Hegel, exponents of the National System, have been no "better,
in that their moral philosophy was confined to the Prussian
State and was intended for the guidance and control of the
citizens of that state.
I 3DOHGAIX' S irLAN. McDougall then attempts to accomplish
a scheme for a synthesis of the tv/o systems. He "begins by
insisting that it is the
essential nature and function of
mind to exert a progressively in-
telligent, foresighted, purpose-
ful guidance upon the seemingly
blind mechanical processes of the
material world, including those
processes of natural selection
which seem to have played so great
a part hitherto in fashioning the
nature and destiny of man. If
mind has this power of guidance,
it may hope to guide, though it
may not effectively combat the
economic process.
1
He rejects the utilitarian principle that our moral idea is
fixed for us by some supernatural organ or faculty, which
would maice our moral ideal static and incapable of develop-
ment or evolution.
He believes that our first natural
inclination is to regard man as an end and not as a means;
1. IIcDougall, Ethics afld Some Modern World Problems , P. 157.
\
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that all men have an equal claim to an equal share of every-
thing that is worth having. On the other hand, we seek to
discover how we may
"best cooperate in the cosmic process
so guiding it as to carry to yet
higher levels that highest product
of evolution, the cultural life of
well-organized societies - in which
E.lone human nature can realize its
higher potentialities .1
Our new task is, then, to determine not only how human nature
should conduct itself, "but also what kind of human nature is
most desirable. Ethics must assume the responsibility of
formulating an ideal of what human nature may come to be; .
POLITICS. The first step, he says, must be
the realization that ethics must recognize politics. When
we inquire as to the true goal of human purpose and endeavor,
he teaches that the result is that we cannot treat a man as
merely an individual, but that the inquiry concerns the whole
of organized society. Two goals claim his attention: "1.)
the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 2.) the de-
velopment to the highest possible degree of the species homo
sapiens, or, in other words, the finest possible flowering of
all that we call human culture and the higher life of man. "2
The former is the goal proposed by the utilitarian school.
IIcDougall ammends both goals by adding some recognition of
the claims of the future when he states his own position:
"the enduring and highest happiness of the greatest number. "3
In so doing, he refutes the Kantian theory that each man must
be aii end in himself,
-bt,—
1.IIcDougall, Sthi o s and Some Modern V/orld Problems
.
P. 160
2. Ibid. P. 155
3. Ibid. P. 170
f
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UJTSRNATIONALlSll* When all governments are well es-
tablished as he has planned for them to "be, the next step
is the recognition of internationalism as the true and de-
sirable world-order
.
Nations and the spirit of nation-
ality are to "be recognized as the
products and instruments of the
process of human evolution. In
that society, then, each nation
must increasingly recognize the
rights of all nations and its own
moral obligations and duties as a
member of that society.
1
He sees the hope that nations may attain to a decent level
of international morality in their dealings with one another.
This is far better grounded than the hope that, under a
cosmopolitan order, men would continue to achieve the modest
level of moral conduct v/hich is now the average level of
civilized mankind. Indeed, he sees no other conceivable
world-order from which we can hope for anything but chaos
and barbarism.
Such a condition, he believes, will
bring peace and order among nations. Each nation is concerned
with the welfare of every other nation. Each has moral ob-
ligations to every other one. No nation organized as an
ultra-democracy could hope to be included. It just would not
fit into the scheme of things.
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION* He discusses in detail the 1.) in-
ternal organization of the nation, namely efficient legisla-
tion and administration, and 2. ) the external function, the
l.McDougall, Ethics and Some Modern V/orld Problems
.
P. 188
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effective cooperation with other nations in maintaining the
principles of international morality. In reality, he adds
scarcely anything to the democratic ideals of our own
democracy and the larger existing ideal of an international-
ism or world-order. True, much that we hold in ideal is not
yet in practice, "but, as Dresser observes, ideals last through
disappointments and distresses, and the time may come when
they are in practice and new ideas will have to take their
place. They may "be anarchistic. But that is for too distant
a future yet. The standards which he advances to make for a
"better race of men are: 1.) literacy requirements; 2.) Pro-
hibition of intermarriage, which would result in. what, to
him, are the benefits of a simple cast-organization; 3.)
establishment in all nations of a three-class system based on
one and two.
The foregoing is a brief review of
his program which would build up a world of strongly national-
istic, aristocratic nations which are to live in peace under
a reign of international justice, whose plan follows:
L^kClL, HLvi^^LaIc. The League of Nations, although
founded with good intentions, is not adequate. Any nation
that enters the League commits itself to the sacrifice of
its sovereign rights in an undefined and unlimited degree.
He regards the League as too large a change to have been made
so suddenly.
CGUhT OF JUSTICE. For today's needs, McDougall would
prefer a permanent court of international justice. Such a
(
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court would have power to interpret and enforce treaties.
He expresses a wish that the nations would enter into a
series of treaties looking toward peace and international
justice. The terms of such treaties, signed "by the nations,
would then assume the status of international lav;, "binding
upon all nations and enforced "by the rulings of a world court.
In this way, he says, we should advance from the present posi-
tion in which no international lav/ exists, but only partially
recognized principles of international right, to one in which
all nations would "be "bound and forced to obey certain explicit-
ly defined and limited principles of international law (law
in the full sense of the word, only if this world court
wielded the power to enforce its rulings.)
In all probability the most impor-
tant of all such laws would be that forbidding any nation to
proceed to military action without having first stated its
case to the world, and having been allowed a certain space of
time to elapse between such statement and its first attempt
to apply armed force. If such a court were found inadequate,
its existence and operation would have made easier the further
step of the establishment of a League of Nations with powers
of international legislation end a parliament of all mankind.
He suggests that representation in
any such organisation should not be on the principle of pro-
portion to the number of the population of the states, but to
an extent proportionate to the annual budget of the state.
(
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Or, the nations might "be grouped in classes according to the
amounts of their "budget. He justifies this arrangement on
the grounds that the annual expenditure of a nation corres-
ponds roughly to the extent of its power, and the magnitude
of its commercial interests. There are objections to this
"but he holds to it as a fair indication only, to he changed
when a "better method is found to replace it.
^iNl^ORCiiLiclTT . For the problem of re-enforcement,
he has a solution. The "boycott is ineffective because it is
slow, able to be defied, and impossible to be universally en-
forced. A plan for national contingents to an international
army is rejected because it would be a slow process, it
would be expensive, it would necessitate so vast an army that
it would be unwieldy, and there would be encampment diffi-
culties. But nations are unwilling to disarm until protection
is assured. This protection would be an international air-
force. To enforce such protection the right to navigate the
air would have to be confined absolutely to the air-force of
the international authority. IIcDougall thinks that such
drastic suppression is both practical and possible. With
commercial air-service as popular and favorable as it is to-
day, I do not think his plan either wise or feasible. The
principle features of such an air-force would be the patrol
and police duty.
COITCLO&IOlsr, In conclusion, he writes: "No other
plan than the one here proposed can relieve the world of this
horrible nightmare .
-
CRITICISM* MeDougall chose as his thesis:
The greatest damage that con-
fronts us arises from the work-
ing within us of the altruistic
and "benevolent impulse.
1
He has presented his case concretely, "boldly, almost dog-
matically. His chief fear is Universal Ethics which he sees
embodied in the Christian principles, democracy and social-
ism. He is absolutely in opposition to Kropotkin. He does
not agree with any of the other authors although l.Iecklin
and, on rare occasions, Paulsen approach him - l.Iecklin in
his aristo-democratic teaching and Paulsen in his upholding
of the principles of a more exclusive nationalism,
I was disappointed in the book. It
incites to interest, it provides food for thought, but in
his pseudo-sciehtif ic arguments which come to the defense of
wornout prejudices he does not seem to be in his proper
element at all.
L.^uuui* . Dresser is a practical idealist. We
strive for the ideal of the perfect fullness of life, yet
the actual conditions make all ideals so difficult that we
almost despair of their attainment. The World War reminded
us that we had been dwelling apart from the actual realities
of life, that men needed to put their ideals into practical
application. Rather feeble efforts have been made since
toward the establishment of world peace, we have hopes that
greater and more decisive steps will be taken before another
war can set the world back again. We learned our weaknesses
l.See review of LIcDougall by E. L. Schaub in Philosophical
eview , November 1924.
i
after the war, and it is new our duty, as nations, to
remedy them,
MUTUAL ADJUEIMKfT He says:
THROUGH MUTUAL
jujjlukkSTANDIITG. Society, whether in large or in
small groups, is constituted "by
mutual under standing. .... There
is tacit agreement, there are
unwritten laws and a_ common
interest or purpose.
Mutual adjustment is fostered "by mutual understanding;
in larger groups there may be a" system of personal ends
determined in mutual freedom and agreement," Social
action by mutual agreement "becomes progressively ethical
through fellowship in mutual interests and purposes,
Differences often draw men together, as Dresser points
cut: "Your fellow by his very difference opens the v/ay
to a larger expansion of yourself, M<i
Dresser would net abolish nations.
Such a step may come, but we are net ready for it yet.
The World War proved to us that the idea of peace was
not enough. Previously, men had been saying that nations
could not possibly go tc war ag -in, at least, if there
were such a thing as war, it would net las; long. But
war did break cut, and it lusted fcr four years. After*
ward, many laughed at these whe had said that peace had
come ar could ever ccme. But the ideal has remained and
there are peaee pacts signed and in formation today. .
On the other hand, there follow
1. Dresser, ethics in Theory and Ap];lic ...tion
, P. 407.
Dresser, _^t..ics in Theory and A};plicati on
,
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new hatreds and schemings preparatory to the next armed
conflict. Men have "been repeatedly disillusioned when they
cherished the hope that now at last peace was established in
the hearts of men. Dresser discusses world issues in detail.
A "brief discussion of his treatment of them follows.
It is sometimes maintained, he states
that international relations are never matters of ethics, "be-
cause it has no power to enforce its treaties. Hat ions have
rested their international ethics on the old excuse that
"necessity knows no law," that there is nothing to prevent.
But certain principles of equity remain, and public sentiment
increasingly sustains their agreement. There is a strong con-
viction that the principles/Of justice which have prevailed
within one nation should "be extended to all nations.
IH2KHHATIQKAL LAV*. Groups of principles, known as
international law, have "been collected and set aside. Dresser
defines it:
International lav/ may "be regarded
as a positive system in contrast
with rules of legal validity, or
rules asserted by individual govern-
ments, guided "by either altruistic
or selfish motives.
1
These rules may "be tested "by the general conceptions of justic
as held b/ the states, as international lav/ is still in the
formative stage. The criterion in each case is "the sense of
justice prevailing at the given time within the community. "2
He describes them as:
J..Dresse
r> Ethics in Theory and application . P. 426
2. Ibid.
I
the "body of rules accepted "by the
general community of nations as
defining their rights and the
means of procedure "by which those
rights may "be protected or -viola-
tions of them redressed.
1
One of the greatest weaknesses of international law is that
it is abstract . The ideal for future conduct must "be a
"better statement of principles already in operation and a
more concrete statement of the duties to "be performed by the
nations, and results to "be expected in respect to rights.
Today, international customs are flexible, uncertain, and
often in conflict. The principle proposed for writing this
is the one advocated through history: namely, that wheiE dis-
putes between groups were once settled by appeal to arms,
they are now settled by appeal to reason and justice. This
is the place for the working of the world court.
JMOCRACY, Dresser follows previous leads in
advocating democracy as the best form of government, through
which nations can work together in greater harmony. Although
all nations are not yet ready for thi3 form of government,
he recognizes the necessity of the obligation of stronger
nations toward weaker, but adds nothing to the suggestions
already given in this chapter.
CONCLUSION. In conclusion, he finds that it is
plain that we are still in the formative period, hesitating
to make the step between the smaller and the larger groups.
International law is in process of formation as is any large
world-wide organization. Y/e need, he says, to remember in
Dresser, Ethics in Theory and Application , P. 426
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all things the Christian ideal of "love one another," that
we are "members one of another." The problem is that of
m developing the mechanisms for carrying into effect the
principles already agreed upon as highest, so that friend-
ship, mutuality, and justice shall "be realized among
nations. The international situation is far more complex
than the situations of the different nations. To make the
moral mechanisms effective so that there shall he a com-
plete equivalent for war, it v/ill he necessary to subordinate
political and financial interests which will strive for
leadership on the ground that diplomacy, political ambition,
and economic demands should settle world issues. It is dif-
ficult enough to curb selfish interests within the nation:
difficult too, to pass treaties and make them effective among
enlightened people. So too is the situation when great
financiers claim to control the fate of nations.
We need to take the principles of
international ethics more seriously, to educate youth to
put into practice moral principles and theories. There is
a moral equivalent for war and it must be found and put in-
to practice. V/e must make justice a fact, not theory^ V/e
must differentiate between a narrow nationalism and an
all inclusive internationalism. Meanwhile,
| the larger social conscience called
for by the international situation
is steadily being acquired in these
days of widespread interchange, rapid-
ly increasing information, concerning
the nations, and growing knowledge of
the difficulties which beset moral
idealism.
1
Dresser, Ethics in Theory and Application
. P. 428

It
conclusion
ti
In the first chapter we saw how nations
come in contact with one another today as never "before.
All ten of our authors acknowledged the necessity for or-
ganized governments; even Kropotkin admitted that the organ-
ized state is the best safeguard for the individual at this
stage in the process of evolution. Each author "believes
that states, as they now exist, are capable of greater reali-
zation of true good for mankind. The primitive duty to a
narrow circle has gradually been widened into a duty of men
to men, nations to nations, and this duty is felt by many of
the highest minds to be morally as binding as any legal ob-
ligation and that it cannot be explained in terms of selfish
interests. The humanitarian idea is now a real extension of
the social oblig tions of man, and must, as it becomes part
of the recognized morality, greatly further the development
of man. It implies a refinement of the sense of justice;
that is, that no state should seek the good, either of itself
or of others by means which hinder the good of others or
should measure the good of different states by different
standards.
'..'e have found that there are two kinds of
patriotism, the first - a misconceived idea of nationalism
which makes no effort to find good beyond its own boundaries
and so does more harm than good. The second idea, which
attempts to build up the homeland that it may be well fitted

to t^ke its place amon£ nations, makes for happier relations
all -round, and is the only true patriotism. Finally, we
found tnat a state of war "breeds passionate hatreds, "brings
death, suffering, destruction, and debt, and is net the
remedy for the ills of the world, Paulsen h.s his doubts,
he wants to see happiness reign "but is net ^uite ready to
abolish war. Bcsanquet also hesitates, and McDcugall comes cut
point blank on the side of war as the inevitable recourse
that nations have always taken, the only course that they
can take until much mere progress along the read of mutual
understanding has been made by them all.
As tc the conclusions reached in the final
chapter, there is net much mere tc be said, Bcwne, cur
earliest writer, a perscnalist, gives a wonderfully substan-
tial foundation* Peace is first tc be found in the indiv-
idual. He must "seek peace and pursue it," The individual
must be trained in his du.iiy living tc a greater appreciation
of his fellcwmen. Paulsen, who wrote next, wrote from a
German point of view, in that period so important for Germany
between 1871 and 1914. He tries tc threw off the narrow
ideas of petty nationalism in his gospel of "energism" and
welfare, but 1 it crops out occasionally, Dewey and Tufts
lay the emphasis upon the individual in the social order,
Lrake, writing later, sees the danger of war and his whole
program is based on an attitude tc be tuilt up that shall

prevent men from rushing into war. He only approaches the
definite crgonizati en cf a League and is skeptical and
hesitant about the worth cf such a League as new exists,
although granting that seme sort cf wcrld-crganizaticn
ought tc exist. Bosanquet has still another outlook, mainly
th.„t of the English sociologist, ^verett emphasizes the
moral values instrumental in the building up cf a truly
good and strong and moral individual, Krcpctkin's work,
although net completed, seemed at times tc glow with the
fire and enthusiasm and ardor of the reformer, one who would
stand on the Bide cf the peasant in defense cf the lesser as
against the egotistical greater. Bteeklin's beck savored of
the aristocratic professor whose vision shewa him the need
for a greater g and international democratic society which
would f^vor all men. Such was the tueme but in certain
places he fell back once mere on the rule cf an intellectual
aristocracy as the final gecd. McLcugu.ll 1 s beck was entire-
ly unlike all the rest. It was unusually interesting, was
easily read, and ccnt-ined much cf value, but the whole
trend was so anti -Christian, so unnecessarily aristocratic
and dogmatic, that my own reaction was merely cue cf inter-
est, net cne of great value gained, Lresser's work was
large, all-inclusive. He is tua idealist in the extreme yet
practic-1 idealist. His beck is demccratic, reasonable,
cf real value.
^s a general conclusion, I should s.~y
th:.t the tendency cf all the becks is in favcr of
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nationalism, that is, a stable, more or less democratic
form of government, in which sympathy was practically ex-
pressed in open, honest, friendly cooperation among nations.
Justice is granted "by all to the fundamentally sound princi-
ple of the right of every man and every government.
Patriotism is seen "by all to include recognition for and
appreciation of other nations, a patriotism that makes the
individual strive to live so that his country will be a
"better one because of him. The majority would banish war.
All would banish war if peace and security could only be
assured and some newer method of arbitration were to replace
the old methods. The tone of them all, regardless of the
difference of conclusions as to ways and means, was "peace
on earth, good will to men,"
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